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Chapter 1 Introduction to the research problem 
Establishing a well-functioning judicial system is often accompanied by a balancing act between 
several, often conflicting, demands imposed by various stakeholders. Moreover, a justice 
system, such as the Belgian one, consists of an extensive network of organisation, which, as a 
whole, ensures the rule of law in the Belgian democratic constitutional state. Management of 
such system can be challenging to meet the needs of the individual organisations and of the 
various stakeholders. There is an increased demand for efficient, fast, and economical 
functioning, and at the same time, there is a call for thorough investigations, for documenting 
an extensive administrative trail, and for including more parties into the process. Another 
tension exists between, on the one hand, the need for checks and balances and the highest form 
of impartiality, and on the other hand, the need for close cooperation between the different 
judicial organisations. There is also a need for more external control on the functioning of the 
judicial actors, clashing with the important value of trust in the independent discretionary 
power. Similarly, a call for more transparency from the judicial system clashes with the 
importance of confidentiality and privacy. All these tensions put pressure on the functioning of 
this network of organisations, and this research will focus on whether and how the judicial 
network of interorganisational relations manages to function in a constructive manner given 
the tension put on the cooperation under these difficult circumstances. The focus will go to 
trust as a relational dimension between the organisations, which can influence successful 
cooperation. 
1.1 Reasons for studying interorganisational trust in a judicial context 
There are good reasons why studying interorganisational trust in a judicial context is important 
and valuable. The amount of cross-sectoral, interorganisational collaboration in the delivery of 
public social services is growing, and increasingly scholarly attention has been devoted to 
understanding the functioning of such alliances. Practitioners, as well as scholars, can benefit 
from a systematic investigation of what accounts for the performance of interorganisational 
alliances. Understanding the dynamics of collaboration will help organisations take proactive 
steps to address potential problems in the formation and functioning of interorganisational 
networks (Chen, 2010). Collaboration in such networks is not self-evident, since there are less 
reasons to come to the table, to work together on problem clarification and solutions, to reach 
agreements, and to follow through on implementation when people from different 
organisations are not in legally bounded authority relationships (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). In 
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a group of organisations, it is easy to be a free rider, because accountability does not lie with 
just one actor. Free riders are those who benefit from the provision of a common outcome 
without bearing any of the costs, or less than is required of them. Therefore, free-riding is a 
central concept within the ‘logic of collective action’ (Ostrom, 1998). The judicial system forms 
such a complex network of collaborations for public service delivery, but it is not extensively 
researched within the network cooperation literature. Meanwhile, judicial networks have a 
long-standing history of cooperating and with its specialisations and divisions of tasks, the 
justice system contains a large number of actors, where the organisational efficiency depends 
on the coordination between the different players. This makes it an interesting case to look at, 
with undoubtedly a depth of information about the functioning of interorganisational networks. 
Moreover, the movement by trial courts to become more performance-oriented and responsive 
to user needs brought institutional changes that necessitate an increased study of court 
organisation. In the late 1960’s, scholars began studying trial courts as organisations, especially 
in the US (Ostrom et al., 2007; Shomade & Hartley, 2010), while less studies have taken place in 
a European context. Despite their long-standing alliance, successful cooperation cannot be 
taken for granted. For a long time, the efficiency of the Belgian justice system has been a serious 
point of concern among politicians and citizens. Past and current reforms bring with them an 
increased differentiation and a less hierarchical structure, which makes the coordination even 
more tedious.  
The lack of academic interest in the judicial system as an exemplary case for network 
cooperation can be explained by its specificities, which make the judicial system an atypical case 
for network cooperation. The literature on network cooperation typically deals with voluntary 
networks, where organisations choose to cooperate with others because this will benefit them, 
and where networks can dissemble when the benefits no longer outweigh the costs. Judicial 
organisations are “condemned” to cooperate with one another by law and a legal professional 
cannot choose to deal with another organisation when they are, for example, not happy with 
the dealings of their counterpart, since they are geographically bounded to a particular judicial 
actor. Moreover, between the judicial organisations, there is a strict separation installed to 
ensure a fair and impartial handling of cases, and even the slightest appearance of partiality 
should be avoided at all costs to ensure public legitimacy. Therefore, the organisations cannot 
demand transparency or exercise control over one another. Furthermore, the stakes of the 
cooperation are high, and a failed cooperation can lead to severe consequences, for the 
individual litigant, as well as for the fairness and safety of society. Therefore, this network can 
be described as a high risk, high autonomy, and high interdependence public network. Other 
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examples of such public service delivery chains with similar characteristics are public health 
organisations, public military and defence, municipal services, and public educational 
providers.  
To ensure stable and efficient cooperation the literature suggests the importance of trust 
between organisations. Specifically for the judicial system, the characteristics of high risk, high 
autonomy, but high interdependency can all increase the need for trust and hamper the 
formation of trust. The importance of interorganisational trust has been suggested in many 
recent works, which covered both trust between private economic businesses (e.g. Du et al., 
2011; Swift, 2001) and trust between public institutions (e.g. Bouckaert, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 
2008). Research has shown that interorganisational trust can greatly facilitate smooth 
cooperation between organisations, which in turn can lead to important gains for the members 
of the organisations, the organisations themselves, the alliance, and society. According to 
Luhmann (1979) the main function of trust is to reduce social complexity and thereby making 
room for new complexities. For the individual employee, trust within and between partnering 
organisations contributes to the well-being of the individual (Helliwell & Huang, 2011) and 
increases work satisfaction (R. M. Kramer, 2002). On the organisational level, trust is often seen 
as an important factor of the social capital of the organisation – the non-materialistic capital an 
organisation can possess – that offers a clear benefit to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organisation (Andrews, 2010). Seppänen, Blomqvist, & Sundqvist (2007) collected benefits from 
a private sector point of view, where interorganisational trust is believed to facilitate open 
communication, information sharing, and conflict management; to increase predictability, 
adaptability and strategic flexibility; to reduce transaction costs, such as management costs and 
internalisation costs; to pave the way for informal network collaboration and collaborative 
innovation; and to advance business performance and give sustainable competitive advantage. 
Moreover, it can speed up work processes (Adams et al., 2010), promote cross-boundary 
knowledge and information sharing (Chen et al., 2014), lower the need for controlling the other 
organisation, with reduced costs for control (Dyer & Chu, 2003), enable to focus on core tasks 
by each organisation (Claro et al., 2003; Girmscheid & Brockmann, 2009), and increase joint 
action and commitment (Hausman & Johnston, 2010). Trusting relations between boundary 
spanners also have been associated with easier negotiations (Currall & Judge, 1995). Dodgson 
(1993) suggests that trust is necessary for the sustainability of network collaborations and that 
trust is imperative to create a viable environment for communication, organisational learning, 
and innovation. Das & Teng (1998) argue that the trust building process eliminates pitfalls and 
hindrances stemming from diversity of actors – a reality of most collaborative networks. 
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Conversely, distrust has been assumed to cause a lack of cooperation, avoidance of interaction, 
unwillingness to share views and preferences, information distortion, disbelief, hostility towards 
distrusted others, and intractable group conflicts (Bijlsma-Frankema, Weibel, & Sitkin, 2006). 
The presence of interorganisational trust should never be taken for granted since such fragile 
relational state can be broken by a myriad of factors occurring in relationships between 
organisations. Das & Teng (1998, p. 495) state that “trust is not for free: trust building is a 
planned activity and takes considerable resources from organizations”. Trust-building should 
be an ongoing process nurturing relationships among network participants, which in turn 
results in longer, more effective, and more productive results (Bryson et al., 2006). Trust will be 
a way to improve the conditions between the involved parties of the involuntary network 
cooperation, rather than keeping them together. It could be expected that it is hard to develop 
trust between organisations that are forced to work together, highly dependent on each other 
for reaching a high stakes goal, but have little to no authority over one another. In a judicial 
network the organisations differ on many aspects, while trust is often based on value 
congruence (Cazier et al., 2007) or similarities and familiarities (Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Given 
the importance of trust on the performance of cooperation, it is advisable that trust optimisation 
is at the forefront of reform initiatives for the institutions of justice. However, because of the 
system of checks and balances, a certain degree of distrust is also an important condition for 
the performance of the judicial system, making trust a challenging issue in this context. 
Based on the model of Bouckaert (2011) on trust in the context of public administration three 
clusters of trust relationships can be distinguished for the judiciary. The first, T1, focuses on 
trust of society and its citizens in the judiciary, the second, T2, relates to trust of the judiciary 
in society, and the third, T3, encompasses trust of the actors of the judiciary in relation to each 
other. 
 
Figure 1 The different forms of trust in and from the judiciary 
In current discussions on the organisation of the judiciary, trust already has an important 
influence; however, it is the public trust in the judiciary (T1) that takes the lead in these debates, 
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through research on public opinion and public attitudes regarding the justice system. Rightfully, 
trust of the citizens in the justice system is an important factor that can alter the success and/or 
failure of this system and trust is a necessary condition for the legitimacy and the effectiveness 
of the judicial system (Hough et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the argument at the basis of this 
research project is that interorganisational trust between the different entities constituting the 
judicial system can equally affect the performance of the judicial chain. Since applying 
jurisdiction is not an exact science, the process is influenced by many relational factors, such as 
communication and cooperation (Beyens, 2000; Franssens et al., 2010), both influenced by the 
amount of trust in a relationship (Van Oortmerssen, 2013). The current project will therefore 
focus on an aspect that has remained in the shade: trust within the judiciary itself (T3). The 
judicial system has so far not been involved in this research line, despite the concern that past 
and present reform proposals have emphasised the importance of public trust and neglected 
the importance of interorganisational trust (Bouckaert, 2012, 2013). Possibly, reforms for 
achieving a higher level of public trust create a lower level of interorganisational trust. For 
example, when more audits and more controls are installed, more suspicion can be raised 
among the different organisational partners. In addition, it is not inconceivable that 
interorganisational trust (T3) will be reflected in the public trust (T1), in the sense that internal 
problems of the judicial system can affect the external perception of the system by the general 
public. On the other hand, too much trust will be also not be advisable since each actor needs 
to remain critical of the others. 
It is theorised that trust will be of a specific nature in every other context (Costa, 2003), which 
makes it difficult to make assumptions on the nature of interorganisational trust in the judicial 
context based on theories and measurements of other contexts. Therefore, an exploration of the 
nature of interorganisational trust within this specific research context is a necessary first stage 
of involving this context in the research line of interorganisational trust. 
1.2 Introducing the research project and (initial) research questions 
This project is part of the ‘Justice and Populations’ study, an Interuniversity Attraction Pole 
(IAP) programme of the Belgian science policy office (Belspo). It belongs to the work package 
on ‘The State Justice System’. The aim of the ‘Justice and Populations’ study is to examine the 
agency of collective judicial actors in Belgium and the study of the intellectual, social, and 
professional networks of justice. Both the structure and functioning of the state justice system 
are shaped by constant interactions between institutional actors at various levels of the judicial 
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chain, and these are in turn, subject to change and reform because of varying public demands 
and attitudes towards justice1. 
The current research project will make ground for a discussion on the importance of 
interorganisational trust between the actors of the judicial chain. Given that this will be, to our 
knowledge, the first exploration of interorganisational judiciary trust, both nationally and 
internationally, the goals are to understand how trust is experienced in this context. Since the 
judicial system is an extremely complex and voluminous organisation the focus will go to a 
segment of this system, namely the network dealing with judicial youth protection. 
The central aims of this project are: 
1. To detect what the current levels of trust and/or distrust between the organisations 
involved in the judicial youth protection system are; 
2. To understand how the level of interorganisational trust and/or distrust can best be 
measured for the judicial youth protection system in Belgium; 
3. To unveil the nature of interorganisational trust and/or distrust within the judicial youth 
protection system. 
To reach this goal interorganisational judicial trust will need to be defined and the mechanisms 
through which interorganisational judicial trust works need to be understood. Studying trust 
on an interorganisational level requires the development of a multilevel definition of trust 
(Chan, 1998). The objects to be observed are the individual members of the judicial youth 
protection chain, which are aggregated at the organisational level, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 The multilevel structure of interorganisational trust 
The contribution of this study lies in revealing a comprehensive picture of the trust process in 
a judicial context, a long-term cooperating dyad. These insights are useful to understand why 
                                                     
1 A full overview of the activities taking place within the Justice and Populations IAP-project and the different partners 
involved can be found on the official website of the project: www.bejust.be 
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networks succeed or fail, and what network managers should take into account when aiming 
for durable and high trusting relationships in which partners behave in a trustworthy manner. 
The societal contribution of the research lies in mapping out the situation in the judicial system 
regarding trust, and offering tools for controlling the levels of trust between the organisations. 
A better understanding of the trust process can help understand whether trust is beneficial for 
more efficient and effective judicial service delivery, or whether trust is counterproductive, since 
other values such as impartiality, independence, and confidentiality can be jeopardised when 
others are blindly trusted. In other words, the goal of the research is to deliver input for 
informing and strengthening interorganisational cooperation between operational entities 
(horizontal trust) in a judicial context. 
The dissertation will be structured as follows; Chapter 2 will give an overview of the current 
state of the trust literature. In Chapter 3, the case will be introduced in detail together with the 
surrounding legal framework under which they operate. In Chapter 4, the preliminary 
exploration is described, where also the scope of the project will be given, with the 
argumentation why specific choices are made in the demarcation of the field, and the specific 
research questions the project envisions to answer will be specified. In Chapter 5, the applied 
methodology to find an answer to these questions will be described in detail. The results of the 
exploration will be presented in Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8, together with a discussion 
of these results in light of the existing theory. The conclusions drawn from the entire study will 
be given in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical background on 
interorganisational cooperation and trust 
In this chapter, the theoretical background surrounding the research problem of 
interorganisational trust in a context of judicial cooperation is presented. First, the concept of 
interorganisational cooperation will be introduced. Since trust represents only one dimension 
of interorganisational cooperation an introduction of the broader concept of cooperation is 
deemed useful, to better differentiate trust from other dimensions of cooperation. The 
intricacies specific to judicial cooperation will also be highlighted, differentiating it from other 
types of interorganisational cooperation. Cooperation and trust are terms used in many 
disciplines such as management, psychology, sociology, business, and public policy, and is 
approached from many theoretical perspectives such as population ecology, transaction cost 
economics, social exchange theory, institutional theory, industrial marketing, and resource 
dependence theory. In this chapter, the literature is reviewed interdisciplinary, combining these 
various perspectives as much as possible. 
The existing literature on interorganisational trust and cooperation will be reviewed in a 
generalist manner, without going into detail about specific empirical evidence existing on the 
research questions. The research does not start from a specific theoretical assumption or from 
testable hypotheses, but is rather set up to develop new insights into the mechanisms of the 
trust process in an interorganisational setting, and the study has a predominant exploratory, 
inductive character. Trust has not been explored in a judicial context and there is no reason to 
assume findings in other contexts will also apply to the judicial context. The goal is to start the 
exploration with an open and unbiased view to discover new findings and develop new 
theoretical insights. Therefore, it is important to set out the general field and the concepts that 
will be focused on, rather than specific variables that might be discovered in the empirical 
section, since the direction will be dictated by the progress during the research process. After 
analysis of the data, the results will be linked back to the literature to evaluate how these 
findings coincide, contradict, or complement prior empirical findings. At that stage, a focussed 
review of prior research will be performed based on the findings in the study. From the 
literature, information is gathered on cooperation between organisations and how trust could 
be defined, however, this knowledge is only partial and will be refined and complemented with 
first-hand information from the actors. Given this setup, the study balances between a deductive 
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and an inductive approach, and the research followed a cyclic movement between the two 
approaches, as best represented by Hutter and Hennick’s qualitative research cycle (Hennink et 
al., 2010) (see Figure 3). This cycle acknowledges the cyclical nature of research and exists of 
three interlinked cycles: the design cycle (conceptual phase), the ethnographic cycle (data 
collection), and the analytic cycle (data analysis). These are not followed sequentially, but the 
researcher continually alternates between the different cycles. 
 
Figure 3 Hutter-Hennink qualitative research cycle presenting how theory and empirics succeed one 
another in a cyclical dynamic (source: Hennink et al., 2010, p. 4) 
2.1 Interorganisational cooperation 
Cooperation between organisations occurs in many domains, in the private as well as in the 
public sector. The interest towards studying interorganisational relationships can be traced 
back to the introduction of the open systems view of organisations, abandoning the belief that 
organisations are closed and isolated systems. This view emerged in the mid-20th century, and 
has since spread rapidly among academics studying organisations (see e.g. Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967). The interest in interorganisational cooperation has further grown due to the increased 
complexity of the goals organisations want to reach and the growing demands for 
economisation of means to reach these goals. These impulses push organisations to find new 
ways of cooperating with other organisations to come to solutions more fit for the increasingly 
complex issues that society and its citizens are facing. Hierarchical, rigid, and centralised 
structures of traditional government are considered ineffective to solve the current societal 
problems (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). This has been the case for the private sector, and for the 
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public sector under the impulse of ‘new public management’ and ‘new public governance’. 
Exemplary of this evolution is the rise of structural terms such as network governance, public 
service delivery chains, and public-private partnerships. The main rationale behind utilisation of 
networks for service delivery has been the fact that organisations are interdependent actors 
whose results depend on the results of the others – no single organisation is capable of achieving 
its goal without collaborating with others (Klijn et al., 2000). Combining efforts between 
organisations can lead to advantages of efficiency and effectiveness. Collaborative advantage 
will be achieved when an objective is met that no single organisation could have produced on 
its own and when each organisation, through the collaboration, is able to achieve its own 
objectives better than it could alone (Huxham, 1993). In the public sphere collaboration is a tool 
to deliver better services (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2004). In addition, institutional theory stresses 
the importance of legitimacy for organisations; thus, organisations become part of a network to 
gain approval of others as well as to replicate best practices and minimise uncertainties 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
In this study, an interorganisational network is viewed as a set of organisations, from which two 
or more nodes are connected by interorganisational relationships (IOR). IOR’s are formed 
between organisations that repeatedly interact with each other. A collection of IOR’s form a 
network of organisations that is a goal-oriented social action system, inherently 
multidimensional, and typically includes formally structured arrangements for coordination 
between the involved parties (Ahola, 2009). Network governance entails a way of delivering 
public services and addressing public issues through collective action of multiple actors from 
different sectors and levels of government. It presents a more decentralised and non-
hierarchical approach usually with specific emphasis on the autonomy of stakeholders involved 
(Kettl, 2005). The horizontal and egalitarian relationships without traditional command and 
control, and cessation of top-down arrangements are the main characteristics of a governance 
structure (Agranoff, 2006). Sound network governance requires a different approach than the 
management of separate organisations. Salamon & Elliott (2002) argue that governance 
emphasises enablement-skills as opposed to management-skills in previous paradigms. In other 
words, having multiple actors and relationships requires facilitation and fostering of 
interorganisational activities and operations for a more seamless and effective delivery of 
services instead of the hierarchical top-down steering of the activities. Kilduff & Tsai (2003) 
assume networks are goal-oriented interorganisational arrangements formalised and governed 
by an agreement among network participants. In other words, it is a matter of organisational 
commitment to the overall process that determines the level of formality of networks as well as 
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the level of interdependency and responsibility (Kamensky et al., 2004). They require frequent 
coordination and information exchange and have to be managed. They are a source of greater 
communication, coordination, and innovation if the participants of the interdependence are 
collaborative. The notion of interdependence is related to the concept and the degree of 
interconnectivity, which refers to the quality of connection between elements. The concept of 
interdependency will be used in the meaning of an action or event affecting another element, 
either on its result or on its process (Marle & Vidal, 2016). Networks mainly focus on joint efforts, 
resources and decision-making to produce a common product (Kamensky et al., 2004).  
Collaboration may have different forms depending on the level of commitment, organisational 
preferences, structural restraints, and/or contextual factors. For instance, while cooperation 
might be enough to accomplish certain knowledge-based initiatives, large-scale, long-run and 
relatively formal engagements through combining resources and information exchange may be 
only effective and viable through collaborative partnerships and networks (Agranoff, 2006). 
Thompson et al. (2003) distinguish cooperation based on the interdependence between the 
actors, namely pooled, sequential, or reciprocal interdependence. Pooled interdependence is the 
loosest form where each organisational department or business unit performs completely 
separate functions. While departments may not directly interact and do not directly depend on 
each other in the pooled interdependence model, each does contribute individual pieces to the 
same overall puzzle. Sequential interdependence occurs when one unit in the overall process 
produces an output necessary for the performance by the next unit. Perhaps the most obvious 
example of sequential interdependence is an assembly line. The demand for coordination to 
prevent slowdown is greater than for pooled task interdependence. Scheduling and planning 
the organisation’s resources in a sequential interdependence model is essential to efficient 
operations. Reciprocal interdependence is similar to sequential interdependence in that the 
output of one department becomes the input of another, with the addition of being cyclical. In 
this model, an organisation’s departments are at their highest intensity of interaction. 
Reciprocal models are the most complex and difficult to manage. Wagner & Hollenbeck (2015) 
add the notion of comprehensive interdependence to this, which is the most dense and tight 
version of the network. 
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Figure 4 Types of interdependence (source: Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2015, p. 179) 
While cooperation between different organisations is beneficial, there are also many 
difficulties and negative side effects that arise from it. They are a source of risks if this 
cooperative mode is not present or if the interdependency is not correctly managed. The risks 
for each organisation increase because they are now dependent on the other organisations. 
Collaboration in such networks is also not self-evident, since autonomous organisations will 
have to be motivated to put their efforts into negotiating, to work together on problem 
clarification and solutions, to reach agreements, and to follow through on implementation 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). In a group of organisations, it is easy to be a free rider, because 
accountability does not lie with just one actor but in the success of the collective action 
(Ostrom, 1998). Organisations tend to prioritise the tasks which are of primordial importance 
and for which they are accountable and, subsequently, benefit them most (Leat et al., 1999). 
Groups can have a common interest but an individual member can have no interest to ‘pay’ for 
the provision of that common interest. While rational models provide much insight, 
organisations are not only motivated by extrinsic rewards and incentives, and they are not fully 
rational, especially not in the case of multi-actor complexity (Molenveld, 2016; Ostrom, 1990). 
Wicked problems cut across institutional boundaries, and are accompanied by an increase in 
institutional uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). There can be a clash between divergent 
institutional regimes, resulting in a high degree of uncertainty about how processes will be 
handled and how the interactions with the other actors will develop. This cannot be readily 
solved since institutional frameworks develop gradually and are deeply rooted in formal legal 
frames, informal institutions or long-term societal transition processes (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). Because accountability is shared, this leads to a weakness owing to the lack of effective 
tools to correct system-wide errors because no specific agency or organisation is totally 
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responsible for the end result (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Unclear roles can emerge between the 
organisations in the partnerships. Performance evaluation is also difficult because the 
cooperation focusses on broader impacts and results rather than on specific outputs (Garayev, 
2011). Securing cooperation from each involved organisation can be a challenge, because 
networks are not based on the legal authority paradigm, instead they are "structures of 
interdependence, involving multiple organisations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely 
the formal subordinate of the others in some hierarchical arrangement" (O’Toole Jr., 1997, p. 
45). 
2.1.1 Cooperation within the judicial system 
Cooperation in the justice system can be approached as a collaborative network, where there is 
a long-term (even indefinite) prospect of cooperation that is formalised by legislation, and 
where several actors are involved. The interdependency between these actors can be viewed as 
reciprocal or even comprehensive, because contrary to the often used term of a ‘justice chain’, 
in practice it is less a chain because cases can move back and forth within the chain, or circle 
through the chain several times. Regarding the juvenile justice chain, that functions as an 
instrumental case in this study to explore the trust process in a judicial context, the decision-
making process towards a meaningful intervention requires extensive and up-to-date 
information on the background of the child, made timely available for each actor. Justice 
systems are neither equipped nor mandated to fulfil this intervention alone, and need to work 
hand in hand with the police and the social sector towards this end (UNICEF, 2013). Recent 
initiatives within the judicial child protection recognise the need for alignment and have called 
for a more collaborative approach to overcome fragmentation in service delivery and to provide 
adequate responses (e.g. Cohen, 2002; Howell et al., 2004; Wulczyn et al., 2010). In the absence 
of such intersectoral cooperation, juvenile justice interventions decrease the opportunity of 
supporting a sustainable change in the child’s behaviour, circumstances, and environment. 
There is a strong delineation because the network is built around the achievement of a common 
goal, and the coordination of the network is centralised in Flanders thanks to a decree on 
integrated youth care. 
Networks can be put on a scale between loosely coupled and tightly coupled networks, of which 
the judicial network fits into the tightly coupled form. They can be categorised as collaborative 
networks characterised by more formal and long-term interorganisational relationships with 
comprehensive and multilevel planning and clear communication channels directed towards 
achieving a common goal. Such networks entail high risk and require comprehensive 
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commitment with an understanding that each single network participant is not autonomous 
but a part of the general and common mission (Brown & Keast, 2003). 
Most of the literature on network cooperation involves organisations that voluntarily choose to 
cooperate in order to reach a goal they otherwise reach less efficiently or not at all. They can 
also choose to exit the cooperation when they feel like nothing can be gained further from the 
cooperation, or when the other organisations are not trusted. In that case, they can also choose 
to cooperate with another party, possibly the competition, if this seems like a more trustworthy 
partner. In many policy domains, however, interorganisational cooperation is not voluntary, 
and there is no choice to exit a network. Generally, only one specific governmental department 
is responsible for a specific task in a certain region. They are predestined to cooperate without 
the possibility to separate, even when relations are irreparably damaged. As the collaborating 
partner is not chosen deliberately, the collaborative experience may be unproductive (Chen, 
2010). 
Past studies of trial courts exemplified the importance of organisational structure, the behaviour 
of court actors, and the way of interacting to achieve justice (Beyens, 2000). It can be seen as a 
linkage of professional organisations, such as the police, courts, and judicial social services 
that rely on highly trained professionals who demand autonomy in their work. There's a high 
degree of specialisation and decision making is decentralised (Mintzberg, 1983). In the judicial 
system, investigators and magistrates need to be completely independent beyond control to 
ensure objective investigations and ruling. The system of checks and balances incorporated in 
the judicial system ensures this autonomy, to ensure an independent handling of individual 
cases, and sufficient controls and divide of power to ensure impartial decision-making. At the 
same time, the court system is a process with a set of sequential tasks and activities linked 
together, concerning different participants. The process demands continuous and coordinated 
flow of a large number of individual and infinitely different types of cases. As such, judicial 
systems are organisations “balancing between the needs of independent professional work and 
effective mass-production processes” (Pekkanen et al., 2009, p. 222). The cooperating entities 
are in many ways distinct spheres, being the responsibility of separate ministries, with different 
internal structures and managerial cultures. Distributing the decision-making process between 
separate entities to increase the fairness of the judicial decision-making towards the citizenry 
remains important to safeguard the integrity of the procedures, but at the price of adding 
inefficiency. To ensure the efficiency loss is not problematic, good coordination between the 
entities should be continually strived for while guarding the boundaries between the entities to 
warrant a system of checks and balances. There is reluctance to coordinate this network as joint 
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partners because of the importance of maintaining separate organisations and carrying out this 
image to the public. There is a fear that increasing the process viewpoint and process 
performance will lead to unfavourable circumstances for professional work and thus weaken 
the quality of the decisions made (Pekkanen et al., 2009). As such, this makes for a complex 
cooperative model with high interdependence increasing the risk for each actor, and therefore 
the need for interorganisational trust for effective cooperation. Colquitt et al. (2011) found that 
trust in such high-reliability contexts could be different from trust in typical contexts. 
2.1.2 Interorganisational information sharing as interdependency 
The main interaction between the organisations of the judicial youth protection chain is the 
exchange of information. Each organisation contributes particular pieces of information to 
the entire flow of information within the youth protection chain, creating high information 
interdependency. Information transfer from one entity to the other should be coordinated well 
(Hall et al., 1977; Howell et al., 2004; Rivard et al., 1999). Often the information one entity holds 
is a prerequisite for another organisation to be able to perform their tasks. Decision-making is 
therefore a social process in that the decision-makers use information provided to them by 
others (Beyens, 2000; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). Of specific importance here is Simon’s theory 
of bounded rationality that stresses the inability of one single actor to have complete and perfect 
information for decision-making, thus emphasising dependence and reliance on external 
sources of information (Simon, 1991). 
Efficient interorganisational information sharing has been found to have many benefits for 
interorganisational cooperative structures. Throughout the scientific literature these have been 
mainly described for private partnerships, such as supply chains (e.g. Cheng, 2011) or marketing 
channels (e.g. Sezen & Yilmaz, 2007) where information sharing has the ability to reduce supply 
chain costs (Huang et al., 2003) and achieve competitive advantage (Shin et al., 2007). The 
exchange of information is also of great importance in a public service supply chain, such as the 
public healthcare system (e.g. Walker et al., 2005) and public child care where exchange of 
information serves the purpose of coordination, control, planning, evaluation, and client 
assessment (Howell et al., 2004; Rivard et al., 1999). Dawes (1996) sums up the claims of 
experienced public managers on the benefits of information sharing:  
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Sharing supports better, more integrated planning, policy development, and 
program implementation across agencies; contributes to more comprehensive 
and accurate information for decision-making and problem solving; makes 
more productive use of increasingly scarce staff resources; and helps build 
positive interagency and professional relationships. (p. 391) 
Despite these benefits, sharing information between organisations can also be perceived as a 
vulnerability wherein the actors take a risk beyond the control of the own organisation. When 
information is shared there is the risk that information transferred between parties for specific 
professional purposes can be deliberately (or unintentionally) used by the receiving party for 
purposes outside of the intention and to the detriment of the party providing the information 
(Clemons & Hitt, 2004). Information exchange also drains the organisation of time and energy 
that could be applied for other organisational priorities. Vulnerability in interorganisational 
exchange is context-specific and varies according to the properties of exchange relations. 
Organisations become vulnerable to the extent that they take the risk of conducting exchange 
in uncertain environments and make investments for specific transactions that result in 
dependence (McEvily et al., 2003). Vulnerability raises the question whether a counterpart is 
likely to exploit the opportunity to take advantage of its exchange partner or, alternatively, act 
in good faith and pass up the opportunity for exploitation (McEvily et al., 2003). 
Information exchange is dependent on organisational features such as organisational culture 
(Cheng, 2011), coordination policies and rules affecting the ability to process information. 
Moreover, individuals, within their organisational roles, affect the development of interagency 
relationships trough establishing both professional and personal ties (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  
2.2 Interorganisational trust 
From the theory on interorganisational cooperation, it can be concluded that cooperation, and 
more specifically information exchange, between organisations, especially in complex networks 
with high interdependencies, is accompanied by vulnerabilities and risks for each of the 
involved organisations. Not all these vulnerabilities can be omitted through formal agreements 
between the partners because of the complexity and unpredictability of the uncertainties. To 
avoid inertia between the organisations due to an unwillingness to accept vulnerability there is 
a need to complement risk mitigation through control with social forces, such as trust (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2001). Warm (2011) asserted that the successful elements to collaboration involve 
interorganisational activity, responsibility, mutual benefit, and community value under a 
committed leadership to develop a culture of trust between the collaborators. In addition to an 
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economic, calculative viewpoint of cooperation, social scholars have proposed a 
complementary, social viewpoint, according to which all economic activity is embedded in and 
affected by a social structural context formed by individuals connected to others through 
interpersonal relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Krackhardt, 2003). The importance of trust for 
the functioning and well-being of organisations is well on its way to being fully recognised 
(Costa, 2003). Chen (2010), for example, evaluated the effectiveness of children and family 
services starting cooperation under favourable and less favourable preconditions. He found that 
effective, efficient, and responsive public service delivery does not only depend on the starting 
conditions of a partnership, and that a process of building trust can counter any negative effects 
of disadvantageous preconditions of the collaboration. Luhmann (1979, p. 16) predicted that 
scientific and technological developments that bring events under control will not substitute 
the need for trust as a social mechanism. Instead “one should expect trust to be increasingly in 
demand as a means of enduring the complexity of the future which technology will generate” 
(Luhmann, 1979, p. 16).  
The link between trust and information exchange or information transfer has, however, not 
been extensively studied. There are two directions proposed on how information sharing and 
trust are interlinked. On the one hand, it is suggested that trust is the independent variable 
within this correlation, and that trust contributes to more information sharing and more open 
communication (e.g. Sezen & Yilmaz, 2007; Williams, 2005). O’Reilly (1978) for example found 
through experiments on information flow from a subordinate to a superior that low trust in the 
receiver of the message results in significantly more suppression of information by senders, 
especially information that reflects unfavourably on the sender. Strong healthy communication 
patterns such as high levels of connectedness would also increase the probability that 
meaningful information sharing will be conducted between the partners (Cheng, 2011; Mohr & 
Sohi, 1995). On the other hand, trust is proposed as being dependent on information sharing 
(e.g. Fisman & Khanna, 1999). According to Sydow, “frequent, repeated and multifaceted 
contacts among organisations and an open exchange of information increase the possibility of 
trust building in networks” (Sydow, 2000, p. 48). The more information is shared and thus 
available from the other organisation, the more the other party is able to assess the expectations 
of the counterpart and the more potential positive trust assessments can be made. However, 
when the information is negative this might also decrease trust. As such, the correlation is 
actually between information exchange and trust-alteration, because trust can potentially 
increase or decrease because of the interaction, depending on the experience within the 
interaction. It is conceivable that there is not a unidirectional causal relation in the correlation 
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between information exchange and trust, but that a coevolution takes place where trust enables 
further information sharing while information-sharing breeds trust. 
Given the decisive role trust plays in cooperation, it is no surprise that the concept has been 
gaining attention over the past few decades (e.g. Ashleigh et al., 2003; Connell & Mannion, 2006; 
Dietz & Gillespie, 2011; Gursakal et al., 2009; Heavey et al., 2011). As with interorganisational 
cooperation, interorganisational trust is researched and developed predominantly in a business-
like, private sector, economical exchange context. In the context of public institutions the focus 
went primarily to trust of citizens in these institutions – called institutional or public trust – 
which is important for the legitimacy of public institutions and the preservation of public 
support and cooperation with these institutions (Hough et al., 2010). In the case of the judicial 
system, being a specific segment of the public sector, the topic of public trust has received 
extraordinary attention (e.g. Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; Parmentier & Vervaeke, 2011; Tyler, 2001, 
2003; Tyler & Jackson, 2013). However, in his call for a broader perspective to fully understand 
the functioning of the public sector, Bouckaert (2012) distinguishes two other directions of trust 
relationships, next to the trust of citizens and organisations in government and the public sector 
(T1). The added perspectives are T2, trust of government and the public sector in citizens and 
organisations, and T3, trust within government and the public sector. In this study, this call is 
answered by exploring T3, trust within judicial cooperation (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1). 
Unfortunately, a consensus on what trust is has not been reached throughout the theoretical 
literature, neither on how to conceptualise and operationalise the concept for empirical 
research purposes. Acknowledging that trust reflects a multitude of roles, functions, and levels 
of analysis, and that it is applicable to different contexts, has been a recent turning point for 
theory and research. Despite this acknowledgment of the differences between 
conceptualisations, scholars are starting to concentrate on the common elements across 
perspectives in order to develop coherent knowledge with regard to trust (for example, Hosmer, 
1995; R. M. Kramer, 1999; Rousseau et al., 1998). Since it is not possible to give a complete 
overview of all definitions, conceptualisations, and theories on interorganisational trust 
throughout the literature, across and within different disciplines, this overview will be limited 
to those aspects recurring most frequently in present-day interorganisational trust research and 
can be considered state-of-the-art. Because trust is an abstract relational dimension, trying to 
define it leads to touching borders with other related abstract notions such as confidence, 
integrity, or reliability. The framework applied in this study might differ from frameworks used 
by other researchers. Nonetheless, it directs the reader towards the concepts and logical 
framework adhered to throughout the study. By using criteria to define trust, the meaning of 
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the concept trust can get a static and normative character that does not fully represent its true 
meaning, but those static and normative characteristics are needed to enable an evaluation of 
the trust experiences in the interorganisational relations in the youth protection chain. Only by 
providing substantive clarity to the concept, this study can be applied to real world evidence, 
and the results become accessible and informative to real world policy makers and planners 
(Markusen, 1999). 
2.2.1 A workable definition of trust 
Even though trust has been identified as necessary to maintain social interactions, there is no 
universal definition of trust (Costa, 2003; R. M. Kramer & Tyler, 1995; Momani & Challa, 2010; 
Rousseau et al., 1998; Watson, 2005). Trust appears to be an omnipresent influence in social life, 
but at the same time, it remains a fuzzy, elusive concept. It is a complex notion, and there is no 
congruence between the definitions of the different fields of study, and even within the different 
fields (Nooteboom, 2002). Numerous definitions have been proposed throughout various 
disciplines and in various contexts, and reports have been made of over 70 different existing 
definitions (Lyon et al., 2012). It is therefore favourable to treat trust as a highly complex 
phenomenon, a vague concept, lacking a fixed, precise meaning, without however being 
meaningless altogether. It has a meaning, but this only becomes clear through further 
specification of the context in which trust is used. According to Costa (2003, p. 106) “a 
delimitation of the domain of research is, therefore, necessary in order to understand what is 
meant by trust and how to define it”. McKnight & Chervany (2001, p. 27) cite Robert Kaplan on 
this aspect suggesting “researchers purposes may be better served if they focus on specific 
components of trust rather than the generalized case”. 
To define trust the definition of Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998, p. 395) is used, namely 
“a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. It implies that the willingness to be 
vulnerable towards the other will be affected by positive expectations of the counterpart. Trust 
between individual and/or collective actors is based on the decision of one party to rely on 
another party under conditions of risk. The trustor permits their fate to be determined by the 
trustee and risks that they will experience negative outcomes, i.e. injury or loss, if the trustee 
proves untrustworthy (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). 
A helpful way to define trust is to distinguish it from other concepts. For example, for a long 
time, distrust has been seen as the opposite of trust. In this sense, the result of decreased trust 
is inevitably an increase in distrust. Lewis & Weigert (1985, p. 970) added a middle position to 
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this continuum of lack of opinion to this noting, “trust is based on a cognitive process which 
discriminates among persons and institutions that are trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown”. 
Over the last 20 years there have been sporadic voices defying this notion, stating that trust and 
distrust are actually distinct concepts (Lewicki et al., 1998; Saunders et al., 2014; Sitkin & Roth, 
1993; Van De Walle & Six, 2013). The arguments are that trust and distrust have different 
determinants, different characteristics, and different implications, and therefore they should be 
measured by different items. For example, trust can be associated with feelings of hope, faith, 
and confidence and low trust with the absence of these feelings, while distrust is associated with 
fear, scepticism, and cynicism, and low distrust with a lack thereof (Lewicki et al., 1998, see 
Figure 2). In addition, a neurological study suggests that different brain areas are involved with 
trust and distrust, arguing they should be seen as distinct concepts (Dimoka, 2010). Similar to 
the definition of trust, distrust can then be defined as the intention to avoid vulnerability based 
upon negative expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another. A lack of trust could be 
due to the lack of information on the trustee, where the trustor remains unknowledgeable about 
the trustee. Distrust, however, happens when a vulnerability is not accepted based on an 
educated guess about the intentions and behaviours of the trustee. Without taking sides in this 
mainly semantic discussion, there is at least a pragmatic advantage to considering the two as 
distinct concepts. It is considered likely that the two attitudes towards the same object can 
coexist. In complex interactions actors might trust each other with respect to some aspects of 
the relation but distrust each other regarding other aspects (Lewicki et al., 1998). When 
measuring both as distinct concepts, it is possible to grasp this coexistence (Van De Walle & Six, 
2013). 
As a result, throughout this study, trust and distrust are considered separate constructs, because 
it allows for grasping more of the complexity of the fuzzy concept of trust. In addition, as was 
clear from the preliminary interviews (see Chapter 4), while a lack of trust was described by the 
respondents in an IOR, the respondents never went as far as to label this as true distrust. 
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Figure 5 Trust and distrust as two separate concepts (source: Lewicki et al., 1998, p. 445) 
2.2.2 Different components of trust 
Following the definitions above, trust and distrust are considered relational attributes targeted 
towards a trustee. These still broad definitions should further be conceptualised to make them 
workable in the current research project. Many authors have tried to distinguish the different 
components of trust, which has led to a number of different conceptualisations. Just as trust is 
difficult to define, it is not a simple phenomenon to study or observe, because it encompasses 
several diverse constructs, such as an attitude, emotions, and risk taking behaviour (Kasper-
Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 2001). Trust should not be viewed as a static concept that can be measured 
in one dimension, but rather as a dynamic concept that is the result of a process and can change 
with every interaction. It is a multidimensional concept consisting of different aspects. 
Lewicki & Brinsfield (2011) note that each discipline still tends to focus on aspects of trust that 
are consistent with its own dominant theoretical paradigms, but McEvily & Tortoriello (2011) 
note that at least the organisational literature is increasingly converging on common definitions 
and theoretical conceptualisations of trust. In general, it is suggested that trust stems from both 
cognition and affection (McAllister, 1995), is required in contingent situations (Das & Teng, 
23 
  
2004; Luhmann, 1979), is characterised by a willingness to be vulnerable (Currall & Judge, 1995), 
is based on positive expectations about a counterpart (Mayer et al., 1995), and leads to risk-
taking behaviour (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). In terms of terminology, it is useful to note that the 
trustor is the person who trusts, and is always an individual, while the object of trust, the trustee, 
can be a person or an object, such as an organisation. 
As a first conceptualisation, Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) note the usefulness to distinguish 
between levels-of-analysis based on three different types of targeted trustees: the individual, 
the team, and the organisation. In the context of organisations, interpersonal trust refers to 
trust in a specific other, or using the terminology of Zaheer et al. (1998), trust placed by the 
individual boundary spanner (a person who forms a bridge between their own organisation and 
the partnering organisation) in their counterpart of the partner organisation. The team referent 
concerns trust in a collective of interdependent people pursuing a shared goal. The organisation 
referent concerns trust in the entity of an organisation. On top of this, there is the notion of 
system trust, where a trustor places trust in a whole environment (Luhmann, 1979). Within the 
organisational literature trust has been studied with regard to interpersonal work-relationships, 
teams, organisations, governance structures and even societies as a whole. A delimitation of the 
domain of research is, therefore, necessary in order to understand what is meant by trust and 
how to define it (Costa, 2003). In general it is not advised to strictly separate all notions, because 
of the problem of embeddedness, according to which the behaviour of organisations, 
institutions, and individuals is affected and constrained by social relations and construing them 
as independent would be a grievous misunderstanding (Granovetter, 1985). This argument 
implies that an interorganisational relationship between two organisations is not merely the 
sum of the interpersonal relationships between individuals employed by these organisations 
and understanding relationships that exist between individuals and organisations can provide 
valuable insight into how transactions are organised. In our case, the targeted trustee will be a 
member of an organisation or the organisations itself. 
A second conceptual distinction applies to trust development before or during collaborative 
practices (Bryson et al., 2006). Previous experience is considered an advantage for future 
partnerships, while newly established relationships are characterised by low levels of 
interorganisational trust, which should be improved over time (Provan et al., 2007). While trust 
is also considered a prerequisite for network establishment (Lane & Bachmann, 1998), it is 
mainly trust that is developed after network formation that matters. Development of trust 
through interaction and communication in the developmental stages of networks is essential 
for successful collaborative networks (Huxham, 2003). This study looks at trust developed 
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during the collaborative practices and not beforehand, since the judicial youth protection is an 
already established form of cooperation. The study will use a retrospective account of trust 
evolutions during daily interactions with the counterparts. To get better insights into the 
developmental aspects of trust, a longitudinal study of (newly emerging) networks could be 
performed. 
A third noteworthy subdivision is the one by Lewis & Weigert (1985) who see trust as a 
combination of an affective, a cognitive, and a behavioural component which are merged into a 
unitary social experience. The cognitive dimension comprises the judgement one makes about 
the object of trust based on the available knowledge about the trustee. Lewis & Weigert (1985) 
see the cognitive element in trust as an experiential and rational platform from which a leap of 
faith, beyond the expectations is made. However, trust is not only the result of a rational process 
(Luhmann, 1979). The affective dimension concerns the trust one is willing to give irrespective 
of the available knowledge. Affective foundations of trust consist of the emotional bonds 
between individuals. Johnson & Grayson (2005) described this component perfectly as: 
The essence of affective trust is reliance on a partner based on emotions. As 
emotional connections deepen, trust in a partner may venture beyond that 
which is justified by available knowledge. This emotion-driven element of trust 
makes the relationship less transparent to objective risk assessments 
prescribed by economists. (p. 501) 
Hence, it is not the rational knowledge regarding someone’s trustworthiness that leads to trust 
someone; it is the irrational belief in someone’s trustworthiness. The affective component and 
the cognitive component are together the two main sources of information that add to the 
complete assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness by the trustor. The relative impact of these 
two components can vary depending on the context (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). The behavioural 
enactment of trust is about the social action that comes forth from the aforementioned 
knowledge and affections. These will mostly be in line with the expectations based on 
knowledge and affections, however, the relationship can become disturbed due to external 
factors such as the personality or the discretionary power of the trustor. Trust-related behaviour 
implies acceptance of risk, as Mayer et al. (1995) argued. Lewis & Weigert (1985) say in this sense:  
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Behaviorally, to trust is to act as if the uncertain future actions of others were 
indeed certain in circumstances wherein the violation of these expectations 
results in negative consequences for those involved. In other words, the 
behavioral content of trust is the undertaking of a risky course of action on the 
confident expectation that all persons involved in the action will act 
competently and dutifully. (p. 971) 
The behavioural component can be linked to the suspension of the risk in an uncertain 
situation, which is partly based on the perceived trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. Based 
on incomplete information the trustee needs to take a leap of faith before a constructive 
interaction can take place (Möllering, 2006). 
A fourth interesting typology is dividing trust into different forms depending on the cause of 
trust. Lewicki & Bunker (1995) advocated in this respect calculus/deterrence-based trust, 
knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust, where deterrence based trust would be 
the most fragile form of trust. Bachmann (2011) explicitly differentiates between interaction-
based trust and institutional-based trust, and Sako (1992) between contract trust, competence 
trust, and goodwill trust. However, these typologies are subject to the critique of Mayer, Davis, 
& Schoorman (1995), arguing that authors fail to differentiate between factors which contribute 
to trust and trust itself. 
A fifth and last important distinction in the conceptualisation of trust is the difference between 
trust and trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is the judgement one makes about the object of 
trust based on available knowledge about the trustee. This would be the result of cognitive and 
affective factors simultaneously playing a role. Studies on trust in organisational settings suggest 
that knowledge on ability, benevolence, and integrity (ABI) are the central elements of 
trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). The objective information on the trustworthiness of a 
trustee is what comprises this component; it is the subjective interpretation of that information 
by the trustor, coloured by their affections. The objective information and the interpreted 
information will not be the same, since the interpretation process will be moderated by other 
factors such as visibility of the objective information and personal characteristics, as well as 
affective and intuitive factors (Bless et al., 2014). Before the information is processed and 
translated into an attitude the objective facts are comprehended, fitted with existing knowledge, 
judged, and edited. Trusting someone builds on a decision which is based on an assessment of 
the other party’s trustworthiness in the form of their ability, integrity, and benevolence (Mayer 
et al., 1995; Sako, 1992), as well as a rough and quick semi-conscious assessment of the 
26 
  
unrecoverable costs that would occur if the other party turned out to be untrustworthy 
(Bachmann, 2001). The higher the costs, the more important a positive assessment of the other’s 
trustworthiness becomes. To reach a positive assessment it does not suffice that the trustee 
behaves in a trustworthy manner, in accordance with what the trustor values as trustworthy; 
they must also be perceived as such. People interpret their world by assigning meanings to their 
daily activities (Blaikie, 2009). It is based on the fraction of knowledge you have about the 
counterpart, processed through own past experiences, and compared to the expectations one 
holds of trustworthy behaviour. In the literature, an effort is made to distinguish 
trustworthiness from trust, although the difference is not always obvious. While trust can be 
defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395), 
trustworthiness is often seen as the last part of that definition, namely the positive expectations 
of the intentions and behaviour of the other (Colquitt et al., 2007). While trust can be seen as 
the willingness to take a leap of faith in an interaction, the decision to take this leap is partly 
based on the perception of the other actors involved in the interaction. Only partly, because 
other factors can influence a willingness to be vulnerable such as a trustor’s propensity to trust 
someone, the perceived risk within the interaction (Mayer et al., 1995), and consequences 
beyond the relationship (Dietz, 2011). Many times though, trust is assumed to follow 
automatically from a positive expectation of the other, making it harder to distinguish between 
the two concepts (Hardin, 2002). 
2.2.3 Antecedents of trust(worthiness) 
Trust and trustworthiness are influenced by a myriad of different factors that can either inhibit 
or support the formation of trust and the positive perception of trustworthiness. Trust is 
something that originates within relationships and occurs within a framework of interactions 
that is influenced by both personality and the social system, and cannot be exclusively 
associated with either (Luhmann, 1968). Trust is seen as a reciprocal process, complicating the 
distinction between causes and effects. Initial reasons to trust, mainly from sources other than 
the ones in the relationship soon are supplemented by other reasons such as experiences inside 
the relationship. In this way, an outcome of a trust relationship, such as open communication, 
can be a source for trust for the next relational interaction. In this study, trust relations will be 
examined as a consequence of all these characteristics, although it is likely also a cause of these 
characteristics. This mutual relationship suggests a correlation between trust and the various 
antecedents, though with different causalities. In addition, the specific factors influencing trust 
will differ depending on the context of the interorganisational alliance. The mechanisms of trust 
27 
  
encouragement are different, for example, in temporary networks compared to permanent 
networks (Meyerson et al., 1996), and in virtual networks compared to networks with personal 
contact between the individuals (Panteli & Sockalingam, 2005). 
Although initial attention has gone to determining the antecedents of trust, with less attention 
to what determines the perception of trustworthiness (Hardin, 2002), scientific research is now 
also seeing the importance of the latter (e.g. Dietz, 2011; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). Although 
these are sometimes proposed as antecedents of trust, the argumentation of Hardin (2002) is 
followed that they usually have a direct effect on perceived trustworthiness instead. Many of the 
earlier proposed antecedents of trust likely influence trust only indirectly through their 
influence on perceived trustworthiness. It is important to understand what factors allow an 
individual to perform competent work, to act benevolently, and to display honourable 
behaviour that is also perceived as such by the counterpart. 
The sources can be divided according to the level on which they reside. As a result, an analysis 
of the sources of trust calls for a multilevel analysis. Nonetheless, trust is believed to be the 
product of an infinite number of factors that will interact with each other in different ways. 
Therefore, a non-exhaustive list of factors will be described here, keeping in mind that in the 
exploration of the specific judicial context, again other factors might be influential. A more 
extensive account of possible sources can be found in Fulmer & Gelfand (2012). Our interests lie 
in how the setting in which these individuals with varying personal characteristics are 
stimulated or inhibited to behave trustworthy and to be perceived as trustworthy. 
2.2.3.1 Trustor characteristics 
The first interorganisational trust sources are the characteristics of the trustor. This can be the 
general propensity to trust others, and the willingness to form new relationships and to give 
others a second chance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Rotter, 1980). The trusting and distrusting 
predispositions of individuals (R. M. Kramer, 1999) is also referred to as general trust. Barber 
(1983, p. 9) describes general trust as the “expectation of the persistence and fulfilment of the 
natural and the moral orders”. Not everyone will have an equally high propensity to trust, since 
while trusting increases the chances to gather gains from cooperation and reduces the social 
complexity (Luhmann, 1979), but it also makes one vulnerable to inflicted damage by the trusted 
party. Similar to the hawk-dove game in game theory, the best performing strategy will depend 
on the intentions of the counterpart (Smith & Price, 1973). A second individual trustor 
characteristic that plays a role is the identification they feel with the counter-organisation, 
which will depend on the personal norms and values the trustor has (Deery et al., 2006). 
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2.2.3.2 Trustee characteristics and behaviour 
The personal abilities of the trustee, based on cognitive and technical capacities and prior 
education and experience, and individual variations in benevolence and integrity will play an 
important role in how they are perceived (Colquitt et al., 2007). When the trustee is an 
organisation, the abilities, benevolence, and integrity of the organisation will become important 
(Caldwell & Clapham, 2003). Which abilities are needed, what behaviour will be considered as 
benevolent, and what indicates integrity will depend on the requirements of the context. 
2.2.3.3 Relational sources 
The attitude towards the ‘trusted object’ develops in a specific dyadic interaction between a 
trustor and a trustee. In a personal relationship, two main sources of trust are frequently 
connected to trust formation: the calculative process and the relational interconnection. 
Concerning the calculative process, a cost-benefit analysis is performed. In this process, two 
things are considered: the trustor’s utility function and credible information. The utility 
function refers to in how far it is perceived that the actor has an interest in continuing a certain 
relationship (Hardin, 2001). Credible information can be found in third parties, the trustee’s 
reputation, institutional sources (e.g. performance reports and indicators) or in the trustees 
themselves. Relational sources are based on repeated interactions between actors that could 
lead to the formation of emotional attachments and on reciprocated interpersonal care and 
concern (Rousseau et al., 1998). These sources are slowly established, strengthened, and 
expanded because of repeated experiences with interaction in risky and uncertain 
environments. 
2.2.3.4 Organisational sources 
This section deals with the characteristics of the trustee organisation influencing the willingness 
to trust a trustee from that organisation. A cooperative organisational context but also a 
competitive organisational context can increase trust in co-workers (Hill et al., 2009). The 
presence of reward structures has been found to foster interpersonal trust when the partner is 
perceived to share common goals (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003). Organisational characteristics such as 
ongoing organisational changes (Kiefer, 2005), the extent to and the length in which an 
organisation uses temporary workers (George, 2003), and perceived politics in organisations 
have been negatively related to trust in organisations (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Perceived 
organisational support, on the other hand, has been positively related to individual trust in 
organisations (Whitener, 2001). 
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2.2.3.5 Network sources 
On the interorganisational level, formal and informal institutions present in the 
interorganisational cooperation were identified as sources of trustworthiness. Formal 
institutions are the rules and roles present in the organisations, and informal institutions are 
the organisational routines and the normative framework of the cooperation (Oomsels & 
Bouckaert, 2014). The presence of binding contracts between organisations, or the network 
density and heterogeneity also play a role (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). 
2.2.3.6 Contextual sources external to the interorganisational network 
Factors external to organisations also can exert an impact on interpersonal trust. Both the 
society in which a person lives as the organisations in which they work or with whom they 
interact, provide social institutions. An institution is any structure or mechanism of social order 
governing the behaviour of a set of individuals within a given community. At the national level, 
governments that provide structures to facilitate business transactions, including laws and 
regulations, increase interpersonal trust in business settings (Child & Mollering, 2003). Research 
on national political systems also showed that political systems affect employees’ interpersonal 
trust, mediated by differences in organisations’ HRM policies and practices (Pearce et al., 2000). 
From this perspective, part of the trusting attitude will be dependent on institutions that have 
surrounded the trustor, and which have institutionalised them with understandings about ‘how 
things are done’ (Zucker, 1986). These understandings are then shared by the community, which 
then renders these understandings to real outcomes, through the application of the Thomas 
theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & 
Thomas, 1928). In other words, the interpretation of a situation causes the action, and this 
interpretation is not objective. 
2.2.4 A comprehensive framework: The universal trust process 
There is some overlap between the conceptualisations described above. For example, the 
components of Lewis & Weigert's framework (1985) can be found in the other frameworks. The 
cognitive component involves knowledge on trustee’s abilities, resembling knowledge-based 
trust of Lewicki & Bunker (1995) and the calculative antecedents. The affective component can 
in turn be linked to the estimation of the benevolence of the trustee and to the identification-
based trust of Lewicki & Bunker (1995) and the affective relational antecedents. The behavioural 
component shows resemblance to the risk-taking acts described by other authors. 
Given all the complexities of trust an attempt to combine all of its intricacies into one universal 
model has been performed by Dietz (2011), applicable to all interactions involving vulnerability. 
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Be it with an organisation, a team, or an individual; in the beginning of a relationship or far into 
the relationship; and in any given context. Figure 6 illustrates the multi-dimensional, integrated 
framework for looking at the process of trust. It uses an open systems model where trust is 
viewed as a process, and puts all elements in a logical sequence, from the antecedents (inputs), 
to trustworthiness and trust (process), to risk taking behaviour (output). Dietz based his model 
on the existing literature and turned all different aspect into a comprehensive view. 
Nonetheless, with this framework he also goes against the notion that there are different types 
of trust depending on the cause of the trust, and concretely as a response to the article of 
Bachmann (2011) in the same issue of the Journal on trust research. Dietz defies Bachman’s 
notion that different types of trust have distinctive origins and dynamics. As he understands it, 
these various types of trust as merely variations in the first stage of the trust process, namely 
the inputs. Most decisions to trust are informed by evidence from both interactions and 
institutions, including reputation effects such as third party testimonies (Ferrin et al., 2006), 
and assumptions based on role (Meyerson et al., 1996). As such, trust is never just based on 
deterrence, or on knowledge alone. 
 
Figure 6 The universal trust process as depicted by Dietz (2011, p. 219) 
The first stage of the universal trust process comprises the different antecedents that play a role 
in shaping the perception of trustworthiness, all subdivided in separate categories. The trustor’s 
predisposition to trust, the trustee’s character, motives, abilities, and behaviours, the nature of 
the trustee-trustor relationship (the relational antecedents), the situational influences (both 
organisational, interorganisational, and external), and the domain specific concerns, meaning 
the concerns specific to the domain of the interaction (e.g. a car sale vs. a medical surgery). 
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The second stage involves the beliefs the trustor holds about the trustworthiness of the trustee. 
Many factors have been linked to trustworthiness, such as predictability (Rotter, 1967), or 
openness and fairness (Butler, 1991), but it is mostly limited to three components, namely 
ability, benevolence, and integrity (ABI in short). Mayer et al. (1995, pp. 717–719) define ability 
as “that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence 
within some specific domain”; benevolence as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want 
to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” and integrity as “the trustor’s 
perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable”. 
Trustworthiness should be understood as a continuum, rather than the trustee being either 
trustworthy or untrustworthy (Mayer et al., 1995). Each of the three factors can vary along a 
continuum and as such make for a more or less trustworthy individual. All three dimensions are 
assumed to be relevant in the perception of trustworthiness, while the comparative weights are 
likely to vary with respect to the context of trust (Nooteboom, 2002).  
From the perception follows a willingness to render oneself vulnerable, the actual decision to 
trust the other party. At this stage, the belief in the others’ trustworthiness is manifested in trust 
itself, and a trustor considers a trustee trustworthy, and further intends to allow themselves to 
be subject to the risk of potentially detrimental actions on the part of the trustee, on the basis 
that such outcomes are unlikely. However, this decision implies only an intention to act. For 
the trustor to demonstrate unequivocally their trust in the trustee, they must follow through on 
this decision by engaging in any of the trust-informed risk-taking behaviours. These acts provide 
new information for the next trust process that will take place between a trustor and a trustee, 
going back to the input stage of the process. Consequences beyond the relationship can distort 
the willingness to be vulnerable, where actor A might be willing to trust counterpart B, but there 
may nevertheless be consequences for A beyond their relationship with B that may forestall the 
decision, such as the impact on a third party C’s assessment of A, should A decide to trust B 
(Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006). 
While the universal trust process offers good concepts to frame each trust experience into, 
specific interactions will have a particular implementation. Certain inputs will be more available 
at the time of the interaction, and the importance of the ability, benevolence, or integrity 
dimension can differ depending on the domain of the interaction. Therefore, the framework 
offers a good lens to look at any interaction, but the specificities of that interaction will still 
need to be determined to fully understand the trust process taking place in that context. A gap 
that remains in the literature is how certain inputs influence the perception, and how the 
perception influences trust.  
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2.3 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the theoretical background was provided, needed to approach the subject of 
interorganisational trust in a judicial setting in a knowledgeable manner. The description of the 
background deliberately remained general, in the sense that the main concepts were introduced 
and the delineation of the conceptualisations adhered to in the exploratory study were provided. 
Since the goal of the study is not the narrow testing of preconceived theoretical hypothesis in a 
new setting, but rather the broad description of the trust process in this context and the 
gathering of new insights on trust in this organisational setting, there is no point in going into 
detail about specific findings in other contexts. This will be done only at the end of the research 
to link the findings in this context to possible earlier findings in other contexts. Moreover, it 
was important for the researcher to keep an open mind about the possible findings in this 
context, without too many predisposed assumptions. 
Regarding the main concepts, the exhibition of the theoretical framework started broadly by 
introducing the concept of interorganisational cooperation in a networked setting, where 
organisations try to cooperate in a non-hierarchical, horizontally organised manner. Judicial 
cooperation is seen as such networked cooperation, with the specific characteristics of being a 
non-voluntary network, with certain conflicting values and approaches, and with a prospect of 
indefinite cooperation. Information exchange was considered the main interdependency 
between these organisations, and the vulnerabilities and risks that stem from this interaction 
were described. 
Interorganisational trust was then introduced, given all its intricacies, and the complexity of the 
concept was displayed. From the myriad of existing definitions and conceptualisations, the 
definition of Rousseau et al. (1998) and conceptual framework of the universal trust model of 
Dietz (2011) were taken as starting points for the exploration. Rousseau et al. define trust as “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (1998, p. 395). Dietz (2011) sees trust as a 
dynamic process going through a universal set of steps for each interaction where a vulnerability 
is involved. Before the vulnerability is accepted, a trustor assesses the trustworthiness of the 
trustee, namely the ability, benevolence, integrity of the trustee, based on different input factors 
as pieces of information at the disposal of the trustor. Risk taking behaviour will result from a 
willingness to be vulnerable based on the positive assessment of the trustworthiness, also taking 
into account possible consequences beyond the trustor-trustee relationship. The experience 
from taking this risk can serve as a new piece of information for the assessment of the 
trustworthiness, making the process cyclical.  
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In the next chapter, the judicial youth care chain, the case in which the universal trust process 
will be explored, is first introduced, before the actual exploration of the trust process is reported 
on.
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Chapter 3 Introduction to the case: Judicial youth 
care in Flanders 
The case that will be studied for the exploration of the trust process in a judicial context is the 
Flemish judicial youth care chain. More details on the selection of this case and the six 
organisations are provided in the next chapter on the results of a first preliminary study within 
the field. To get a good understanding of the organisations that belong to the Flemish judicial 
youth care and the interdependencies between the organisations, a detailed description will be 
given of the organisations that belong to the demarcated case: the juvenile police, the mandated 
facilities OCJ and VK, the juvenile public prosecutor’ office (OM), the juvenile court, and the 
SDJ2. This description will be based primarily on the legislative documents governing the 
individual organisations as well as the links between the organisations in the chain. The most 
important documents that were examined are the Flemish decree on integrated youth care of 
2013, and the implementation act of the Flemish government of 2014, accompanying the decree. 
These legal documents provide the most recent and most detailed depiction of the 
interorganisational relations within the judicial youth care chain. Several other legal documents 
provide additional references to the relations between the organisations. The rules and 
regulations coordinating these interactions can have their influence on the emergence and 
evolution of the trust process, which is why it is deemed important to include these documents 
as a source of information. However, a legal document does not provide a complete picture of 
the ins and outs of these relationships, since they are a bare representation leaving out all 
aspects of the human dimension of social interactions, such as trust. While the document 
analysis as such will not provide an answer to the research questions on the manifestations of 
the trust process throughout daily interactions between the actors in the judicial youth care 
chain, it serves multiple purposes in this phase of the research. First, a thorough orientation 
within the field of judicial youth care aids the exploration of the case at hand and offers a better 
understanding of a complex and relatively closed and obscure research setting. Second, it offers 
an insight in the correct wording of all positions held within the organisations and the correct 
                                                     
2 The following abbreviations will be used throughout this dissertation: 
OCJ = Youth care support centre (Dutch: Ondersteuningscentrum jeugdzorg) 
VK = Confidential centre on child abuse and neglect (Dutch: Vertrouwenscentrum kindermishandeling) 
OM = Juvenile public prosecutor’s office (Dutch: Openbaar ministerie jeugdzaken/jeugdparket) 
SDJ = Social service for judicial youth care (Dutch: Sociale dienst gerechtelijke jeugdhulp). 
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terminologies in the processes of the organisations, important for the preparation of the 
interview scheme. Respondents appreciate a good knowledge of their working environment and 
this prior knowledge allowed the interviewer not to waste time in asking the respondents about 
their work processes. The analysis of the legal framework helped in preparing for the data 
collection, where it is important to show the respondent that the interviewer already knows 
something, but not everything, and is worth teaching (Weiss, 1995). 
The focus of the legal examination will go to the specifications of the interactions regarding 
information exchange and to the input provided by the actors in finding the best measure given 
the individual situation of the minor. First, a brief history of the Flemish youth protection is 
given, to understand better the background of how the organisations came to work together. 
Then, the current structure of each organisation included in the case is described in detail, 
including how each organisation is connected to the other organisations in the chain. A final 
summary gives an overview of the distinguished interactions regarding information exchange 
between the organisations. 
3.1 A brief history of the judicial youth care in Flanders 
Nowadays the child protection system in Flanders covers a wide variety of measures provided 
by an extensive network of organisations. However, children were not always protected by the 
government against neglect or maltreatment from their parents or their environment. For long, 
the choices regarding childrearing were seen as the sole responsibility of the parents and 
meddling from the government was seen as unnecessary. The church and charity institutions 
could provide help where needed. Moreover, children were generally treated equal to adults. 
Eventually, the vulnerability of children was being recognised, and in 1912, a law on child 
protection3 was established. This law focused only on minors that committed an offence, 
meaning that childcare could only be initiated after criminal behaviour. Since 1965, all minors4 
in Belgium are protected by the state from growing up in an unsafe environment, with the 
introduction of the notion of a ‘child in danger’ in the youth protection act of April 8, 19655. A 
child was considered in danger when the parents could no longer provide a healthy, safe, and 
protected environment for the child6. The federal government initially had the responsibility 
over this matter, but this authority was transferred to the Flemish community with two state 
                                                     
3 Law of May 15, 1912 regarding child protection (Belgian State Journal: May 27, 1912) 
4 In Belgium, an individual is considered a minor when they have not reached the age of 18 years (Article 388 Civil 
Code). 
5 Law of April 8, 1965 regarding youth protection, taking charge of minors who have committed an act defined as an 
offence, and the restoration of damage caused by this offence (Belgian State Journal: April 15, 1965) (This act was last 
amended in 2006). 
6 Article 2 Youth protection act. 
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reforms in 1980 and 1988. Two decrees regarding special youth support – one in 19857 and one 
in 19908, coordinated by another decree in 19909 – became concerned with children growing up 
in a ‘problematic upbringing situation’, replacing the term child in danger. These decrees 
installed a stricter separation between extra-judicial and judicial youth support, where judicial 
support was explicitly viewed as subsidiary to the extra-judicial approach (Put, 2015), a principle 
that has been upheld in all subsequent regulations. This principle states that judicial support 
can only be called into action either when extra-judicial support cannot resolve the problems 
or when there is a case of high urgency. The philosophy behind this approach is to first support 
the child and their environment to solve the problems from their own abilities, and only when 
all else fails, binding measures should be dictated from above, as an ultimum remedium. In 2008 
the two coordinated decrees were replaced by a new decree on special youth support10 which 
mainly further coordinated the existing regulation, but also added articles on the privacy of the 
users, the access to the case files, and the lowering of certain age restrictions from fourteen to 
twelve (Put, 2015). 
In the meantime, special youth support was integrated within the broader youth care in the 
form of ‘integrated youth care’, an intersectoral policy program of the Flemish government 
(Verhoest et al., 2014). This program aims to achieve a coordinated approach to offer minors, 
their parents, and others from their environment the necessary care and aid when there is a 
need for it. Integrated youth care coordinates several sectors, where besides special youth care, 
also the aspects of youth care concerning family care, care for individuals with a handicap, 
general welfare, mental healthcare, and centres for student counselling are involved. A first 
decree on integrated youth care appeared in 200411 accompanied by a decree on the legal 
position of minors in integrated youth care12.  
Since March 1, 2014, a new decree on integrated youth care (further IYC)13 determines the 
landscape of the Flemish youth care. It is complemented with a Flemish implementation order14 
(further order IYC) which further stipulates the articles of the new decree. Within this most 
                                                     
7 Flemish decree of June 27, 1985 regarding special youth support (Belgian State Journal: July 5, 1986). 
8 Flemish decree of March 28, 1990 to amend the decree of June 27, 1985 on special youth support (Belgian State 
Journal: April 7, 1990). 
9 Decision of the Flemish government of April 4, 1990 for the coordination of the decrees on special youth support 
(Belgian State Journal: May 8, 1990). 
10 Flemish decree of March 7, 2008 regarding special youth support (Belgian State Journal: April 15, 2008). 
11 Flemish decree of May 7, 2004 regarding integrated youth care (Belgian State Journal: October 11, 2004). 
12 Flemish decree of May 7, 2004 regarding the position of the minor in integrated youth care (Belgian State Journal: 
October 4, 2004). 
13 New Flemish decree of July 12, 2013 regarding integrated youth care (Belgian State Journal: September 13, 2013). 
14 Decision of the Flemish Government of October 21, 2014 regarding integrated youth care (Belgian State Journal: 
February 28, 2014). 
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recent integrated youth care framework, the special youth care deals with minors who find 
themselves in an ‘alarming situation’, which replaces the notion of a problematic upbringing 
situation. An alarming situation is defined by the IYC as “a situation threatening the normal 
development of the minor because his psychological, physical, or sexual integrity or that of one 
or more members of their family is violated, or because his affective, moral, or social 
developmental opportunities are threatened, which could pose a societal need to offer youth 
care.” (own translation).15 This can cover a wide variety of situations, for example, a 12 year old 
who declares to a teacher that they have been sexually abused at home, or a 17 year old who 
keeps running away from home and ignores parental authority. The case in this study – the 
Flemish judicial youth care chain – deals with the judicial side of special youth care. Judicial 
youth care does not refer to minors who have committed a crime. This is dealt with by the 
juvenile justice system, together forming the youth protection system (see Figure 7). In the 
event of an offending minor, the measures are referred to as measures of protection instead of 
measures of care16. The legal regulation for juvenile justice is still directed on the federal level 
by the federal youth protection act of 1965 (but is being transferred to the communal level), 
while judicial youth care is directed on the level of the Flemish community. In 2015 a little more 
than half of the cases entering the judicial system concerned alarming situations (56,96%), and 
less than half concerned acts categorised as offences (43,04%)17 (College of Prosecutors General, 
2015). The judicial youth care is thus on the one hand a segment of the integrated youth care 
and on the other a segment of the judicial youth protection system. 
                                                     
15 Article 2, § 1, 54° IYC: “verontrustende situatie: een situatie die de ontwikkeling van een minderjarige bedreigt 
doordat zijn psychische, fysieke of seksuele integriteit of die van een of meer leden van zijn gezin wordt aangetast of 
doordat zijn affectieve, morele, intellectuele of sociale ontplooiingskansen in het gedrang komen, waardoor het 
aanbieden van jeugdhulpverlening maatschappelijk noodzakelijk kan zijn” 
16 Minors are under Belgian law not deemed responsible for these actions, therefore the measures are not described 
as sanctions (aside from some exceptions such as traffic offences starting from the age of 16). 
17 In Dutch: ‘als misdrijf omschreven feit’ (MOF) and ‘verontrustende opvoedingssituatie’ (VOS). 
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Figure 7 Context of the judicial youth care in Flanders  
3.2 A demarcation of the Flemish judicial youth care chain 
Special youth care for children in alarming situations can be separated into two parts: voluntary 
youth care and involuntary or judicial youth care. Involuntary or judicial youth care concerns 
aid to a minor and its surroundings that is enforced by a juvenile judge. The motive to impose 
certain measurements is that the child finds itself in an alarming situation and there is no 
willingness from the minor or its close environment to accept the needed care, or the situation 
is too urgent to check for cooperation. To safeguard the subsidiary principle of judicial youth 
care there are many steps involved before the case of a minor in an alarming situation enters 
the judicial system. The case will need to pass several independent organisations offering their 
independent opinion on whether or not judicial care is indeed appropriate, and if so, which type 
of care is best suited. Once a measure is installed, careful follow-up of the situation will happen 
in order for the imposed care to remain relevant and adapted when necessary. 
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Figure 8 The integrated youth care, highlighting the demarcation of the organisations included in this 
study (adapted from: wvg.vlaanderen.be/jongerenwelzijn/jeugdhulp/jeugdhulplandschap/) 
In this study, the scope of the investigation is limited to the six organisations that are directly 
involved in the information gathering and/or decision-making on judicial youth care for minors 
in an alarming situation. The included organisations are the youth police, the mandated 
facilities OCJ and VK, the juvenile public prosecutor’s office (OM), the juvenile court, and the 
SDJ (see Figure 8). Judicial youth care entails a complex decision-making process on high risk-
cases involving many separate actors, each belonging to different policy domains, having 
separate tasks, functioning with a personal culture and philosophy, and with little authority 
over one another. The cooperation between the six organisations in the judicial youth care chain 
covers three policy domains and one non-profit organisation (youth police: federal Ministry of 
Internal Affairs; OCJ and SDJ: Flemish Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Family; OM and juvenile 
court: federal Ministry of Justice; VK: non-profit). There is also a line to be drawn between those 
actors focussing more on care provision (VK, SDJ, OCJ) and organisations focussing more on 
safety and protection (police, OM, court). 
3.2.1 Local juvenile police forces 
Youth cases are handled by the police on the local municipality level. Of the 188 local police 
districts in Belgium, 113 are situated in Flanders. Each district is governed locally by the mayor(s) 
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of the municipalities that belong to the police district. It is not mandatory for a police district 
to have a separate team for youth and family matters, and their presence depends greatly on the 
available capacity of the districts, which usually correlates positively with the size of the 
districts. In smaller districts, it is usual to have one officer appointed for youth and family cases, 
rather than a team, and this one officer can have other tasks on top of youth care. Often youth 
and family teams are occupied by social assistants responsible for investigating the social 
context of the child. In a significant number of cases, the police are one of the first actors coming 
across an alarming situation, and play an important role at the start of a possible judicial 
process. However, a number of cases will also enter a judicial care trajectory without the police 
ever being involved. Despite their importance, specific policies for police when encountering an 
alarming situation of a minor are not given by the IYC nor by other regulations, unless internal 
guidelines are set on the local level of a particular police force (De Schrijver & De Kimpe, 2009).  
Alarming situations can get to the attention of the police through four instances. First, a 
potential alarming situation can be picked up during routine police work, such as visiting a 
household for noise disturbances. Second, a neighbour, a family-member, a friend or other 
individual from the child’s environment, or the school can report possible dysfunctions within 
a family. Third, the police can be instructed to investigate further alarming situations by the 
public prosecutor for cases that were referred to them by the mandated facilities (see infra). The 
fourth possibility is that deviant behaviour of a minor (e.g. crime or truancy) or of their 
entourage reveals deeper-rooted dysfunctionalities within a family.  
Once an alarming situation is suspected, the police will continue investigations by means of 
unannounced visits to confirm or reject these suspicions. During these home visits, they pay 
attention to hygiene, the financial situation, the child-parent relation, occupation, hobbies of 
the parents, and so on. Moreover, they can also contact schools and care agencies where the 
family is known, to get a broad picture of the situation. When the situation turns out not to be 
as alarming as expected the police can offer the family some guidance towards voluntary youth 
care. When on the other hand a situation does seem alarming, a police officer will make an 
official report to the OM with a statement about what was observed. These police statements 
are official written documents of legally mandated police officials that contain a chronological 
precise and objective statement of the observations and investigations (Bockstaele, 2005). In 
court, these statements will be used as evidence for the deciding judge and the proceedings of 
a case will partly be determined by the precision, completeness, and reliability of these police 
statements (Van Nooten, 2003). 
42 
  
3.2.2 Mandated facilities (OCJ & VK) 
The mandated facilities – youth care support centre (OCJ) and confidential centre on child 
abuse and neglect (VK) – are newly created by the IYC in 201418. The OCJ is a completely new 
founded organisation, while the VK existed prior to the reforms and gained a new functionality 
next to their regular functioning as direct-accessible primary care provider through the IYC. 
There are 20 OCJ’s in Flanders, one per administrative district (apart from a few mergers)19. An 
OCJ is staffed by a team leader and counsellors, where the latter should hold a degree that 
confirms their pedagogical and social knowledge. Counsellors at the OCJ cannot be at the same 
time counsellors at the SDJ. There are six VK’s in Flanders, one per province. They are a non-
profit organisation, subsidised by the Flemish government for which guidelines have been 
published20. The main task of a mandated facility is to assess the situation of a minor and refer 
them and their family to the care path best appropriate to the situation. The tasks of the VK are 
restricted to cases of child abuse, defined by the IYC as “any form of physical, mental, or sexual 
violence of which a child is the victim, either actively by deeds of violence or passively by severe 
neglect of the parents or any person the child has a relation of dependency with.” (own 
translation).21 
The most common way for a family to come to the attention of a mandated facility is through 
primary youth care providers, who pick up a problem at the direct accessible care services where 
they work. These are services where a person can contact directly with a problem, for example 
a pupil guidance centre or a general practitioner. When these primary caregivers estimate that 
the direct accessible care does not suffice to help the child, they can bring the case to an 
intersectoral entrance gate: an independent coordinating entity that evaluates and indicates 
what non-directly accessible (non-judicial) youth care should be provided. When, however, 
individual (direct or non-direct accessible) care providers assess they can no longer protect the 
development or integrity of the child, they must refer the case to a mandated facility22. This can 
be done by sending a motivated document (M-doc) through an online system with the 
identification of the child and their parents, and the reason why the caregiver refers the case to 
the mandated facility and why they suspect a societal need for care23. The document can be 
                                                     
18 Article 32 to 43 IYC; article 54 to 72 Order IYC. 
19 Article 54 Order IYC. 
20 Decision of the Flemish Government of May 17, 2002 on the recognition and subsidising of the confidential centres 
on child abuse and neglect (Belgian State Journal: June 19, 2002). 
21 Article 2, § 1, 32° IYC: “kindermishandeling: elke vorm van lichamelijk, psychisch of seksueel geweld waar van een 
minderjarige het slachtoffer is, actief door het schadelijke optreden of passief door een ernstige nalatigheid van zijn 
ouders of van iedere andere persoon ten opzichte van wie de minderjarige in een relatie van afhankelijkheid staat”. 
22 Article 32 IYC. 
23 Article 62 & 63 Order IYC. 
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directed to either the OCJ or the VK, and the care provider should take the specific problem of 
the child into account when choosing the facility, depending on the specific expertise of each 
type of facility24. Especially when child abuse is an issue, they should opt for the VK. A referral 
can also be made by the public prosecutor, after reports on an alarming situation are received 
from the police (see infra). The OM does not use the same electronic motivated document as 
the care-providers, but they do follow a similar template. When one of the mandated facilities 
was in the past involved in the youth care of a minor and the minor is now registered with the 
other mandated facility, or when the youth care of another minor from the environment of the 
child is already registered with the other mandated facility, the OCJ and VK are obliged to 
negotiate the case with each other25. This negotiation is in the interest of the minor, and it is 
possible that during this negotiation, the mandated facilities decide to transfer a case from one 
to the other. If this happens, they should notify the referring party of this transfer. 
After receiving a referral from the care providers or the OM, the mandated facilities will 
investigate the alarming situation by mapping the situation of the minor, their parents, their 
guardians (when applicable) and the persons from their living environment, and by collecting 
the necessary information to adequately assess the societal need for care, including information 
on the current care provided26. A societal need is present when after this investigation the 
mandated facility qualifies that care is deemed necessary27, irrespective of the judgement of the 
child and the parent. During the investigation, the mandated facilities must maximally include 
the minor and their environment and should organise at least one meeting with the referring 
caregiver. The investigation can take a maximum of 65 workdays. The mandated facilities 
should guarantee to the magistrates responsible for youth cases that youth care is installed in 
an alarming situation28. 
The investigation should result in a motivated decision on whether or not there is a societal 
need for youth care29 and if so, an assessment whether there is cooperation from the child and 
their environment to accept this care. There are five possible scenarios after such investigation: 
1. The mandated facility concludes that there is no societal need for care offered by 
the government because there is no concern about the child’s safety and/or 
                                                     
24 Article 70 Order IYC. 
25 Article 71 Order IYC. 
26 Article 65 Order IYC. 
27 Article 2, § 1, 34° IYC: “maatschappelijke noodzaak: de kwalificatie die na het onderzoek, vermeld in artikel 34, door 
de gemandateerde voorziening aan een verontrustende situatie wordt gegeven en die de noodzaak vastlegt om 
jeugdhulpverlening in te schakelen”. 
28 Article 33 § 1, 3° IYC. 
29 Article 34 IYC. 
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development. In this case, the responsibility to deal with remaining problems is 
returned to the family. 
2. There is a societal need for care but the current care provided offers sufficient 
guarantees for further development of the minor and the clients cooperate and 
accept this care. The current care is continued and the mandated facility monitors 
the situation30. The adequacy of the care and the societal need are re-evaluated at 
least every six months, in consultation with the minor and their environment31. 
3. There is a societal need for care and the current care provided does not suffice 
for the assessed situation. The mandated facility will organise voluntary direct or 
non-direct accessible care and the clients voluntarily cooperate and accept the 
care. Here also, the adequacy of the care and the societal necessity are re-evaluated 
at least every six months, in consultation with the minor and their environment32. 
4. There is a societal need for youth care and the minor or their parents or guardians 
do not cooperate with or accept the proposed care. In this case, the mandated 
facility is obliged to refer the case to the OM33. 
5. The minor or their parents or guardians do not cooperate with the investigation 
into the societal need. The mandated facility can therefore not assess the societal 
need for care. Also in this instance, the case should be referred to the OM34. 
Sending the case to the public prosecutor in the two latter cases can only be done after inviting 
the involved individuals to a contestable debate. The objective of the referral to the OM is to 
get the case to a juvenile judge who then has the authority to impose the necessary care onto 
the family. This referral to the OM contains at least35: 
a) A description of the alarming situation from the perspective of the minor’s needs; 
b) The views of the minor, the parents and/or guardians, and persons involved in the 
minor’s social environment; 
c) Identification details of the minor, the parents and/or guardians, and persons 
involved in the minor’s social environment, including the minor’s national 
registration number and the youth care offered in the past to the involved persons. 
                                                     
30 Article 35 IYC. 
31 Article 37 IYC. 
32 Article 37 IYC. 
33 Article 39, 1° IYC & article 42 § 3 IYC. 
34 Article 39, 2° IYC & article 42, § 3 IYC. 
35 Article 40 IYC & Article 72 Order IYC. 
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All members included in the decree are bounded by a pledge of professional secrecy, of which a 
violation is punishable36. To allow for information sharing between the organisations, Article 74 
installs the notion of shared confidentiality. This allows for the actors of the integrated youth 
care to share client information between themselves, as long as it concerns only personal 
information on the client necessary for the youth care, it is shared only in the importance of the 
clients, and the consent of the client should be obtained as much as possible37. An important 
restriction is described in Article 75, that stipulates explicitly that information exchange 
between the mandated facilities on the one hand and the magistrates and the SDJ on the other 
is forbidden, unless it involves only basic information (identification and past care) or when the 
clients consent with the information exchange. 
3.2.3 Juvenile public prosecutor’s office (OM) 
The juvenile public prosecutor’s office is part of the public prosecutor’s office of first instance, 
and is staffed with juvenile public prosecutors, secretaries, and a criminologist. There are twelve 
juvenile OM’s in Flanders, each belonging to the judicial districts of a court of first instance. A 
juvenile public prosecutor will refer a case to court based on the information provided in the 
police reports and the referrals from the mandated facilities. In 2015, 70 percent of the initiated 
inflow of cases of alarming situations came from the police, while the other 30 percent includes 
inflow came from the mandated facilities or other sources, such as transfers of cases between 
territorial jurisdictions (College of Prosecutors General, 2015). 
The juvenile public prosecutor has the monopoly of referring cases to a juvenile judge, if they 
regard this appropriate. This means neither the caregivers, the entrance gate, the mandated 
facilities, an individual citizen, or the clients can bring an alarming situation in front of a judge. 
The juvenile public prosecutor can only refer the case to a juvenile court when certain 
conditions are met. There are two sets of cumulative conditions that make a case admissible for 
juvenile court: 
1. When it is not possible to install voluntary youth care and the possibilities for realising 
voluntary care are exhausted, meaning that the mandated facilities are consulted and 
these have referred the case to the public prosecutor38; 
2. When a judicial measure is urgently needed and there is sufficient evidence that the 
minor has to be protected immediately from any form of physical or psychological 
violence, abuse, neglect, including sexual abuse, and voluntary care cannot be offered 
                                                     
36 Article 7 IYC. 
37 Article 74 IYC. 
38 Article 47, 1° IYC. 
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immediately because the necessary consent is not received39. This is the legal ground for 
what is called an ‘urgent intervention’. 
This means that after a public prosecutor receives information from the police through their 
reports, they cannot yet refer this to court. They can choose to refer the case to a voluntary care-
providing facility, or they can choose to refer the case to the mandated facility. They will 
generally opt for the latter option when they have either already exhausted the voluntary care, 
the problem is too complex to opt for a certain voluntary facility, or they experience reluctance 
to cooperate with voluntary care from the persons involved. The mandated facility then 
becomes responsible for the investigation into the societal need for youth care (see supra). 
When these conditions do not apply, or when they do not deem a referral to court appropriate 
yet, the juvenile public prosecutor can choose between several other options. They can further 
instruct the police to gather additional information on the case, or wait until a new referral 
arrives from the mandated facilities. The public prosecutor can also give the assignment to the 
police to refer the case to the direct accessible youth care, and to check whether the client has 
accepted this voluntary youth care. They can also dismiss the case without the need to explain 
or justify their decision to the mandated facilities or other involved parties (Put, 2015), make use 
of crisis care40, or suggest to the clients to apply for direct-accessible youth care. However, in 
practice the prosecutors will not doubt the assessment of the societal need of the mandated 
facilities and will bring almost all cases to the judge. When they refer a case to court without 
abiding to these conditions the case can be declared inadmissible for court. This means the 
court will not handle the case and the public prosecutor must find another way to install the 
appropriate youth care. A referral to court contains the report of the mandated facility, the 
police reports when applicable, and a qualification of the case41.  
Moreover, the prosecutor can assign tasks of execution to the police, like the transport of a child 
to court, or to an institution. The public prosecutor does not have the freedom to choose which 
police-assistant they will employ for doing more investigation into a case; neither can they 
choose which judge will take on the case when a referral is made to the juvenile court. 
The referral from the public prosecutor to a mandated facility contains the following details42: 
- identification details of the minor and the parents (or guardians); 
- identification details of the referring magistrate; 
                                                     
39 Article 47, 2° IYC. 
40 Article 44, §1, 1° IYC. 
41 Article 47, 1° & 2° IYC. 
42 Based on Article 63 Order IYC stating the details required in a motivated document by voluntary care-providers, 
even though this does not strictly apply to the public prosecutor. 
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- the reason for referring to the mandated facility; 
- the confirmation that the involved parties are informed about the referral; 
- the confirmation of the suspicion of societal need, with documentation backing this 
suspicion. 
Together with the referral, the public prosecutor can choose to include the police statements 
within the file. Article 21bis of the Belgian code of criminal procedure43 states that consultation 
of a case file by non-directly involved interested parties can be decided upon by the public 
prosecutor. In practice, these are usually included. When the presence of a criminologist at the 
OM allows this, a summary of the case will be sent to the mandated facilities to facilitate the 
work for the counsellors. 
3.2.4 Juvenile court 
The juvenile court is part of the court of first instance and is staffed by one or more juvenile 
judges and their registrars. The juvenile judge is the actor in the judicial youth care chain that 
can impose – after being summoned by the juvenile public prosecutor – a measure on the child 
and their parents/guardians. The judge is again fully independent to assess whether there is 
indeed an alarming situation and which measures are best fit. They will search for a measure 
that best fits the situation of the minor at the time of the ruling, not at the time of the first 
contact with the youth care system (Put, 2015). Before they make their decision, a judge will 
gather more information about the situation of the minor with the help of the SDJ44. They will 
request the SDJ to perform another investigation into the social background of the minor and 
to propose the best fitting measure given their findings45. This information will be added to the 
file, and will constitute an additional source of information on which the judges base their 
decision, next to the information already in the file and the statements at the hearing. From the 
moment the referral from the OM is received, a preparatory judicial procedure commences 
during which the judge can install a temporary measure that can be in effect for a maximum of 
six months, until the judge makes a decision on the merits of the case46. The preparatory phase 
allows the judge to perform the necessary investigations to make an informed decision whether 
a measure is necessary, and if so, which is the best fitting measure (Van den Wyngaert, 2006). 
A juvenile judge, in the case of an alarming situation, can impose the following measures47: 
                                                     
43 Criminal Procedure Code of the Kingdom of Belgium of 1808, last amended in 2016 (Belgian official journal: 
November 27, 1808). 
44 Article 57 IYC. 
45 In theory also the public prosecutor can request this, but in practice the public prosecutor will ask the police. 
46 Article 51 IYC. 
47 Article 48 IYC. 
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a. Offer the parents or guardians pedagogic directives; 
b. Put the minor under the supervision of the social service for a maximum of 1 year; 
c. Impose context guidance for a maximum of 1 year; 
d. Impose an educational project to the minor, possibly together with the parents or 
guardians; 
e. Make the minor visit an ambulatory facility for a maximum of 1 year; 
f. Let the minor who has reached a minimum age of 17 and has sufficient income live 
independently for a maximum of 1 year; 
g. Let the minor who has reached a minimum age of 17 live in accommodations under 
permanent supervision; 
h. Put the minor under the guidance of an admission and orientation centre for a 
maximum of 30 days; 
i. Put the minor under the guidance of an observation centre for a maximum of 60 
days; 
j. Consigning the minor to foster care; 
k. Exceptionally, consigning the minor to an open facility for a maximum of one year; 
l. Exceptionally, consigning the minor who has reached a minimum age of 14 to a 
closed facility for a maximum of 3 months. This is only possible when the previous 
two measures have been rejected and a closed facility is necessary for the integrity 
of the child; 
m. Consign the minor to a psychiatric institution, if this is deemed necessary according 
to psychiatric expertise; 
A judge can also add additional conditions to the measures b trough m. These can only lead, 
however, to a specification of the measure48. The measures can be taken in the preparatory 
phase and after the hearing on the merits of the case, and can be retracted or replaced at any 
given time by the judge, at the request of the minor, their legal representative, the SDJ or the 
OM49. In case the referral was sent by the OM because of an urgent intervention, when there is 
no time to try voluntary care or no time to wait for the verdict of the mandated facilities, the 
judge can only impose measures c to m of the above list50. 
The decisions of the court should reach both the OM and the SDJ. The juvenile judge needs to 
motivate the chosen measure51. The public prosecutor needs to be able to appeal the decision, 
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50 Article 53 IYC. 
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or to execute the decision when applicable. In addition, when new police reports are received 
the OM needs to be aware whether there is already judicial youth care installed or not. The SDJ 
needs to be aware of the decision because they will be in many cases responsible for the actual 
instalment of the judicial care, and the follow-up of the care. 
3.2.5 Social service for judicial youth care (SDJ) 
The SDJ is founded by the Flemish decree concerning special youth support of 198552, and has 
been preserved in the subsequent legal documents ever since. Similar to the OCJ, they are 
staffed by a team leader and counsellors. The counsellors cannot be a member of the voluntary 
youth care or the mandated facilities53. There are 14 SDJ’s in Flanders, one for every judicial 
district. The SDJ will perform, at the request of a juvenile judge, an investigation on the social 
background of the minor54. The investigations should result in a written report containing the 
following information55: 
- particularities on the identity of the minor, the parents and/or guardians, and people 
involved in the environment of the minor; 
- an analysis of the situation of the above persons and the information necessary to assess 
the situation leading to the judicial measure; 
- an estimation of the need for a judicial measure; 
- if necessary, a report on the indication of the necessary care; 
- when possible, an appointment of the caregiver that can execute the indicated care in 
the above report, and the intended length of said care; 
- a mention of the natural or legal person bound to pay the costs of the care; 
- an estimation of the possible contribution to the costs by the minor or by others; 
- the intended use of a part of the child benefits; 
The indication of necessary care that needs to be mentioned in the report should meet the 
following quality requirements56: 
- To guarantee the multidisciplinarity and expertise in the assessment of the indication; 
- To arise completely independent of the available youth care; 
- To correspond as much as possible to the need for care; 
- To take into account the possibilities of the persons involved; 
                                                     
52 Article 29, § 2. 
53 Article 77 Order IYC. 
54 Article 57 IYC. 
55 Article 79 Order IYC. 
56 Article 31 Order IYC. 
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- To opt for the least drastic form of care in case of equal efficiency and effectiveness; 
- To be ready 30 days after assignment; 
After a measure has been imposed by a juvenile judge, the SDJ becomes responsible for the 
follow-up of the progression of the minor during the period of the measure. They should 
regularly visit the minor and the parents or guardians, check the reports on the evolution of the 
minor drafted by the judicial care-provider, and make sure the involved magistrates receive a 
copy of these reports57. The SDJ should also report to the judge when a drastic event takes place 
or when there is a change in environment that influences the course of the judicial care. When 
no drastic events happen, they should still draft up a report for the juvenile judge about the 
progress of the judicial youth care, at intervals of at least every six months. This report will 
contribute to the consideration of the judge in maintaining, replacing, withdrawing, or 
prolonging a measure. In addition, the juvenile public prosecutor should be updated through 
these reports, so that they can evaluate the situation and evaluate the measures of the judge 
given the current situation of the minor. 
The SDJ will receive the report of the mandated facilities58 that only contains limited 
information on past youth care. In the interest of the client, details about the history of past 
youth care are not readily shared from the voluntary youth care to the judicial youth care, to 
make sure the client gets a new and unbiased chance in the judicial youth care. Counsellors of 
the SDJ should not just continue the investigation from where the counsellor of the mandated 
facility left off, but has the liberty to construe their own view on the situation. On the other 
hand, it can be extremely useful for the SDJ to know more details on past events, to understand 
why a certain form of care was not successful, for example. This could save a lot of effort in 
proposing the same form of youth care to the same family when the reasons for failure remain 
unchanged. Therefore, a counsellor of the SDJ can ask for a transferal of the details about past 
youth care, but only when a signed agreement of the client is obtained. 
The legal articles governing the professional secrecy59 and the need to declare potential 
dangerous situations60 contain room for interpretation, leaving the OCJ, VK, and SDJ with many 
grey areas on how to behave in certain situations, and when information can or cannot be 
shared. There will always be a need for an individual assessment by the counsellors. Therefore, 
                                                     
57 Article 82 Order IYC. 
58 Article 75 IYC. 
59 Article 458 Criminal code, article 7 & article 72 - 77 IYC. 
60 Article 458bis Criminal code. 
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the recommendation is made that they always put in written their reasoning for disclosing or 
withholding certain information in case they need to justify their decisions. 
3.3 The constellation of the judicial youth care chain in theory and practice 
The overview of the legislation gives an impression about the links that exist between the 
organisations. Certain organisations are not expected to have contact with one another, while 
others are in close contact. In theory, the police are only in direct contact with the OM, where 
the OM sends instructions for further investigation to the police and the police send reports to 
the OM. Indirect contact occurs with the mandated facilities, the courts, and the SDJ because 
the OM can add the police reports to the case file when they refer a case to the mandated 
facilities, and must send it in the file to the court. In court, the counsellors of the SDJ can look 
into the files when needed. The mandated facilities are in direct contact with the OM, since 
they receive referrals from the OM and send referrals to the OM. They are also in direct contact 
with the SDJ when the SDJ asks for a detailed report on the past care, if they have the permission 
of the client. The OM has, next to the direct contact with the police and the mandated facilities, 
contact with the court when they refer cases to court. The court has additional contact with the 
SDJ when requesting an investigation into the social background of the client. The SDJ thus has 
direct contact only with the mandated facilities and the court. The picture of the theoretical 
contacts is represented in Figure 9. 
In practice, however, there is quite some direct contact between almost all the organisations in 
the chain, making it more of a network than a chain of organisations. The picture that emerged 
after asking the respondents in the study about their direct contacts (see Chapter 5) tells a 
different story about how the chain functions. In Figure 9 the actual contacts are presented, 
where only the court adheres to its theoretical contact, while all the other organisations have 
direct contact with all others, both initiated by themselves as well as by the counterpart. 
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Figure 9 Theoretical and practical contacts among the organisations of the judicial youth care chain 
3.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter the regulation coordinating the judicial youth care was reviewed with the aim of 
understanding which interactions legally take place between (the members of) the six 
organisations included in our case study. The organisations perform separate tasks. The police 
investigate the situation of a minor. It is the task of the mandated facilities to investigate and 
assess whether there is a societal need for care, and a willingness to cooperate with voluntary 
youth care. The public prosecutor objectively assesses whether the conditions are met to 
mandate a juvenile judge for a case, or instructs the mandated facilities and the police to gather 
more information to make a valid assessment. The juvenile judge has the responsibility to make 
a decision about which care should be mandated. The social service for judicial youth care 
assesses again the situation of the minor and advises the judge on the best appropriate youth 
care. They also monitor the implementation of the care measure.  
The interactions between these organisations, and especially the information that is shared 
across the boundaries of the organisations during these interactions, will have a large impact on 
the course of the case of a minor. The results of a case handling can seriously affect the life of a 
minor and their environment, and can have broader societal impacts by reducing the prevalence 
of minors growing up in alarming situations. Therefore, it remains crucial that the information 
transfer between the organisations flows smoothly and efficiently. This is not self-evident given 
that the different organisations belong to different policy domains, have separate tasks, and 
function with a personal culture and philosophy, all while there is little authority over one 
another. All interactions between the organisations involving information exchange are 
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summarised in Table 1. Remarkably, no form of regular meetings is arranged through the 
legislation, and this has to be organised ad hoc by the organisations. 
Table 1 Overview of the legally described information exchange between the organisations of the judicial 
youth care 
Information exchange Involved organisations 
Mandatory negotiation between the mandated facilities Provider: Mandated facility 
Receiver: Mandated facility 
The referral of a case to the public prosecutor Provider: Mandated facility 
Receiver: OM 
Passing on the details of past youth care to the social 
service for judicial youth care 
Provider: Mandated facility 
Receiver: SDJ 
Reports of the police to the OM Provider: Youth police 
Receiver: OM 
Referral of the case to a mandated facility for an 
investigation into societal necessity 
Provider: OM 
Receiver: Mandated facility 
Facultative sharing of the police report Provider: OM 
Receiver: Mandated facility 
Instructions to the police for further investigations or 
execution and follow up of an assignment 
Provider: OM 
Receiver: Police 
The referral of a case to court Provider: OM 
Receiver: Juvenile court 
Circulation of the decisions of the court Provider: Juvenile court 
Receiver: OM and SDJ 
Request for the start of the social investigation by the 
social service 
Provider: Juvenile court (or OM) 
Receiver: SDJ 
The report on the social background of the minor Provider: SDJ 
Receiver: Youth court (and OM) 
Follow up reports and evolution reports after a measure 
has been imposed 
Provider: SDJ 
Receiver: Juvenile court 
Limited feedback that care is installed in alarming 
situations 
Provider: Mandated facility 
Receiver: OM and court 
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In the next chapter, the first phase of the research is described in detail, namely the preliminary 
study that gave a lot of input for choosing the direction of the research in terms of specifying 
the research questions, choosing the appropriate research design, and demarcating the space 
and time limitations of the study.
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Chapter 4 Determination of the research focus: 
Preliminary study 
The judicial youth protection system can be considered an exemplary case of a high risk/high 
interdependency context. In an exploratory study by De Bruyn (2006) it was determined that in 
this particular segment of the judicial system the interactions are high and the 
interdependencies are particularly outspoken. However, based on the literature review not 
sufficient knowledge on the judicial field and the interdependencies between judicial actors 
could be gained. To demarcate the research project it was therefore necessary to gather more 
insights from the field. 
To recapitulate, after outlining of the research problem the following broad aims were defined 
in Chapter 1 before the start of the preliminary study: 
1. To detect what the current levels of trust and/or distrust between the organisations 
involved in the judicial youth protection system are; 
2. To understand how the level of interorganisational trust and/or distrust can best be 
measured for the judicial youth protection system in Belgium; 
3. To unveil the nature of interorganisational trust and/or distrust within the judicial youth 
protection system. 
It remained unclear how broad or how narrow the judicial youth protection system should be 
defined, which particular interdependencies exist between the organisations, and how 
accessible the organisations are for research purposes. Moreover, a methodological challenge 
concerned the matching of models to the research subject’s experiences. If frameworks are 
imposed unthinkingly, measurements may not reflect what really matters in the empirical 
reality of specific trustors and trustees. Some flexibility inherent to the method is an advantage, 
and less flexible methods could presuppose inputs, aspects, and vulnerabilities that may be 
invalid (Lyon et al., 2015). As mentioned, the trust process is deemed universal but variform, 
and trust could be different for every other context. Uninformed decisions about the design and 
the course of the study would decrease the chances of executing a successful study that also 
produces relevant knowledge. Therefore, a preliminary study was executed to solve the issues 
still apparent before the start of the main interviews. Piloting refers to the conduct of 
preliminary research, prior to the main study. It provides a structured opportunity for informed 
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reflection on, and modification of, the research design, the research instruments, costs, and 
timing. The central goals of the preliminary study were the following: 
1. To define which actors are the key actors in the judicial youth protection chain; 
2. To determine for which tasks these actors are most dependent on each other; 
3. Determine what aspects of the trust process are most relevant and how this process is 
experienced in the judicial context; 
4. To test the research methods that could be applied to study the trust process in the 
context of juvenile justice. 
During the preliminary study, the context of the judicial youth protection system was explored 
and several design options were piloted to resolve persisting dilemmas. Since interviews during 
the preliminary study and interviews during the main study targeted the same research topic, 
both interview phases contributed to answering the main research questions and to continually 
fine-tuning the approach it was not always straightforward to draw an exact line between where 
the preliminary study ended and where the main research started. However, the first eight semi-
structured interviews were especially decisive for addressing the questions of research focus and 
design, while the subsequent interviews offered more information to answer the narrowed 
research questions (see infra). It was deemed important to dedicate a separate chapter to this 
decision making process because it offers the reader more insight in why certain decisions were 
made, and can inform other researchers facing similar dilemmas in their own research. 
This chapter offers a detailed description of the preliminary phase of the research. First, the 
applied methodology of the study is presented, namely the use of exploratory in-depth 
interviewing. Second, the resulting choices on the demarcation of both the case and the 
conceptualisation, and the final design of the data collection methods are presented, as well as 
the resulting narrowed research questions guiding the subsequent main research phase. A 
summary is presented in the last section of this chapter. 
4.1 Preliminary study methodology: Exploratory interviews 
The exploration of the context and the piloting of the data collection methods were done 
through in-depth interviewing of actors involved in the judicial youth protection system. As a 
starting point, one judicial division was selected that was not an extreme case, easily reachable, 
and had good ties with the research institute. The initial scope was restricted to two 
organisations: the juvenile public prosecutor’s office (OM) and the juvenile court. The different 
positions held within the organisations of the preliminary case are depicted in Figure 10. Eight 
respondents participated, namely the Crown prosecutor of the district, two juvenile public 
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prosecutors, the criminologist of the OM, the head of the secretariat of the OM, two juvenile 
judges, and one registrar of the juvenile court. A meeting also took place with the administrator-
general of the youth welfare agency of the Flemish government to discuss the possibilities of 
including the OCJ and SDJ in the study and explore the interactions between these organisations 
and the judicial organisations. 
 
Figure 10 The different positions held within the preliminary-case organisations 
The semi-structured interviews contained broad questions on the structure of the respondent’s 
organisation, the respondent’s contacts with (the members of) their own and the other 
organisation, what trust and distrust meant to them in their context, what their intra-
organisational (I) and interorganisational (II) expectations were, which context-specific factors 
contribute to their levels of trust and distrust, and the possible advantages and disadvantages 
of trusting or distrusting the other in their professional context. A more detailed description of 
the data collection and analysis will be given in the next chapter describing the methodology of 
the entire study, since both phases followed a similar approach. 
4.2 Demarcation of the case 
The preliminary exploration of the field resulted in several decisions concerning the 
demarcation of the case. The most interesting pathways for studying trust in this context were 
chosen, taking into account both the possibility for gathering the most in-depth information on 
trust experiences in judicial interactions, and safeguarding the uniformity of the studied 
interactions. The decisions concerned the inclusion of six interconnected organisations, the 
restriction to observe only interactions on cases of alarming situations, the restriction to the 
Flemish community, and the restriction to only interdependencies involving information 
sharing on case level, all described in detail below. 
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4.2.1 Demarcation of the included organisations 
A first result of the preliminary interviews was that the number of incorporated organisations 
increased, while the type of included interactions decreased. For the preliminary study, only the 
OM and the juvenile court were included, interviewing both the magistrates and the supporting 
administrative personnel to explore where the actual dependencies between and within the 
organisations were positioned. This was motivated by the assumption that these two central 
organisations in the judicial decision-making process have many interactions and 
interdependencies, and that trust between and within these two organisations would have an 
important impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of how child-cases are handled. During the 
interviewing process, it became clear that although the organisations did interact and were 
dependent in certain respects, they were more dependent on other organisations in the chain. 
A juvenile public prosecutor would send the case to the court when the legal requirements were 
met without hesitation. They also add little information to the case, meaning that the judges 
rely only slightly on the discretionary power or the information-gathering abilities of the 
prosecutors. Also the prosecutors depend only faintly on the judges for the execution of their 
own tasks, since most of their tasks happen before the court is involved, and end once the court 
takes over. Only when the judges do not accept the case, their work is affected. The following 
quote illustrates how a prosecutor viewed the dependency between the OM and the court: 
There is not much dependence there, especially for alarming situations, once 
we refer the case to the court it will be continued there and the case is sort of 
gone from us. […] There is only dependence in whether they will accept the case, 
especially in cases of urgency they might not accept, and then you need to find 
a solution on your own, which is not easy because usually you refer to court 
when you don’t see a solution within your own power. (C) 
At the end of each interview, respondents were asked whether important aspects of their 
interactions were overlooked during the interview. It was stated by the prosecutors and judges 
that their work depends more on whether the mandated facilities decide to send a case to the 
judicial system, whether the police pick up a certain alarming situation, and whether the SDJ 
supports them with reliable information. Therefore, the scope of the case study was broadened 
from the OM and the court to include their direct partners: the juvenile police, the 
mandated facilities (OCJ and VK), and the SDJ. Next to this, it was also frequently stated 
that the prosecutors and judges depend on the direct and indirect accessible care providers who 
deliver large amounts of information about the evolution of a child under their care, however, 
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these were not included to maintain the feasibility of the study. The supporting administrative 
secretariat of the OM and the registry of the juvenile court were excluded from the main study 
because these interactions are of a more standardised nature where not many vulnerabilities 
could be detected, decreasing the depth of information obtained on the topic of trust. As such, 
the final included actors are the ones building cases by gathering information and making 
decisions on the case. They are not the ones involved in the actual provision of the youth care 
or the administrative support. 
4.2.2 Demarcation of the subject of the interactions 
Including more organisations for the case study meant that the included interactions became 
more versatile. To make sure that the studied interactions remained uniform and the interviews 
did not become scattered, one specific type of legal cases was chosen as the focus of the research: 
cases of minors in an alarming situation. Judicial youth protection handles two kinds of legal 
cases of minors: juvenile justice for minors who have committed an act that can be defined as 
an offence, and judicial youth care for minors who find themselves in an alarming situation. The 
interactions between the organisations when dealing with alarming situations differ from the 
interactions when dealing with offending minors in the sense that another legal framework 
applies and different actors are involved, creating different vulnerabilities. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that trust experiences depend on which type of case an interorganisational interaction 
concerns. Focussing on interactions concerning alarming situations provides the possibility for 
an in-depth study of trust in the context of complex interdependencies in two important ways. 
First, more actors are involved in the process, namely adding the mandated facilities, which 
makes judicial youth care a more complex cooperation than juvenile justice, offering more 
interdependencies to study. Second, youth care cases can be more complex and more sensitive, 
since an offence is easier defined, with less grey areas than in the case of an alarming situation. 
The decision whether a societal need for care is present is influenced even more by the 
background of the child, and the possibility for voluntary aid is continuously explored, resulting 
in more paths during the decision-making process and more insecurity for each actor. 
4.2.3 Geographical demarcation 
Considering only alarming situations also led to a decision on the geographical demarcation of 
the case. The study was restricted to the Flemish community because the regulations 
governing the processes and possibilities of judicial youth care are constructed on a communal 
level, meaning that the judicial authorities residing in the Flemish, French, or German-speaking 
communities of Belgium each have their separate legal framework and coordinating 
organisations. As such, there exist small but significant differences between the communities, 
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which could compromise the homogeneity of the research context. Additionally, pragmatic 
reasons guided the specific choice for the Flemish region. The existing familiarity of the 
researcher with the Flemish context, language, and culture is expected to contribute to 
improving the rapport between the interviewer and the respondents, which can benefit greatly 
the quality of the data gathering process (Leech, 2002). Despite these advantages, this also 
means that the results of the study will be less convincingly generalised to the whole of Belgium. 
4.2.4 Demarcation of the content of the interactions 
Finally, to contribute even more to the uniformity of the object of study, only one type of 
interaction taking place in the handling of cases of minors in alarming situations was focused 
on, namely case-information exchange. Due to the particularistic nature of trust (Luo, 2005), 
meaning that trust is directed towards a specific object, it can be assumed that general 
measurements of trust in the network might not provide many insights in the true nature of the 
trust process. The selection of the interactions involving information exchange was decided on 
the observation that most of the interactions and interdependencies described by the 
respondents already involved information exchange. Thus, not many interactions were 
excluded from the study; however, they are labelled more clearly. Excluded interactions where 
no information on cases is shared are the interactions during general meetings on the approach 
and coordination of the cooperation. Although trust will certainly have a large impact on the 
proceedings of these meetings, they were disregarded because they appeared to be less frequent 
and would scatter the focus of the interviews. 
The exchanged information between the organisations could be divided into three categories 
based on their content: mandatory information, optional information, and prohibited 
information. This categorisation is based on the preliminary interviews together with what was 
known from the legislation. The first distinguished form of exchanged information is 
mandatory information. It is standard information that legally has to be exchanged between 
the organisations and consists mainly of the information exchange set out in the legislation. 
Examples of mandatory information are client identification data that should be in the referral 
document send by a mandated facility to the OM, and the objective observations of a situation 
in the police statements to the OM. Mandatory information constitutes the core of the 
operational functioning of the judicial youth care, and many decisions are based on this type of 
information. When this information is not exchanged, cases will go unnoticed or will not be 
dealt with in a comprehensive manner by the successive organisations in the chain. 
Interorganisational exchange of mandatory information happens predominantly in writing 
often by mail, by standard forms and documents, leaving a transcript of the information. This 
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makes it an impersonal and formal manner of communication. This information sharing process 
can be slow, so when there is an urgent matter they can choose to transfer it verbally. However, 
a written transcript will be produced afterwards to make sure it can be added to the case file. 
This information is exchanged on a daily basis, and the protocols to be followed are clear, which 
makes it easier for both parties involved in the exchange to know what is expected of them. 
Therefore, there is quite some certainty involved in this exchange and it happens in a 
predictable, relatively stable environment (Smith, 2001), decreasing the interdependency and 
vulnerability in this interaction. The following quotes of respectively a public prosecutor and a 
counsellor of the VK illustrate how mandatory information is exchanged, and that it is done 
based on the legal directions: 
We pass on things, and most of it is on paper. We pass our file to the juvenile 
judge, no secrets there. When we call for a court referral and this is urgent then 
we will communicate by telephone and explain further. But then we compose a 
file for this case which they can read. (M) 
When we perform an investigation into the societal need for care, at times we 
need to send an e-mail to the public prosecutor to give notice we are working on 
it and where we’re at. It’s because this is part of the procedure we do this; if not 
we wouldn’t always send this. (J) 
The second form of exchanged information is optional information. This is information that 
can be shared between the organisations, but there is no legal obligation to do so. This was 
termed ‘soft information’ by one of our respondents and includes side information on pending 
cases and feedback on past decisions. Even though the organisations are not legally bound to 
share this information with each other, it has an important influence on the relationships 
between the organisations, the efficiency with which they cooperate, and the outcome of the 
decision-making process. The respondents acknowledge the importance of this type of 
information exchange and the crucial need for it to be shared on a voluntary basis. This more 
informal form of communication on pending cases can streamline the decision making process 
and save valuable time and effort, as the following counsellor of the SDJ and public prosecutor 
describe respectively: 
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If we want to advise a certain measure it is often explored beforehand whether 
the judge will follow the advice or not. In order not to put extra effort in making 
a document for the registration to the non-direct accessible youth care while 
you know it won’t happen anyway. So in this regard we try to align how they see 
it, how I see it, and can we come to a shared stance? (R) 
Sometimes I pick up the phone when a case is with the mandated facility while 
we keep receiving notifications from the police. Sometimes the counsellors 
don’t know about these notifications because clients don’t tell them. I think it’s 
important to notify them, for them to continue their work. And if for them a 
simple notification suffices, it’s not controlling them, it’s information flow 
which is – according to me – indispensable. (M) 
In the case of optional information exchange, the transfer depends on the individual goodwill 
of the holder of the information, and on the organisational features enabling or impeding this 
kind of information flow. The information exchange usually takes place in an informal setting, 
but the organisations can also create platforms where to share this subsidiary information, such 
as monthly meetings. It is information that is highly personal, subjective, and informal and 
tends to be local and not found in documents (Smith, 2001). 
The third form of information flow in the classification is prohibited information. In our 
specific interaction of case-information exchange, this includes information that falls under the 
professional confidentiality, but in other contexts, this can include other confidential 
information, such as gossip or business secrets. Examples are information on the criminal 
background of a client or detailed information on the course of the voluntary youth care without 
the consent of the client. In exceptional cases confidential information can be shared, namely 
when a clear and acute dangerous situation can only be averted by disclosing confidential 
information. The information exchange is then no longer prohibited and becomes mandatory. 
Respondents acknowledge that confidential information is sometimes shared to circumvent the 
restrictions put on them by the legislator, with the purpose of coming to better decisions. As 
was the case for the exchange of optional information, the exchange of prohibited information 
can improve the efficiency of the decision-making process and is believed to lead to better 
measures for the child and the family. The communication will happen in person, to make sure 
there is no written transcript available. It usually takes place by phone, which makes it a fast 
way of information exchange. This type of information will not be shared on a regular basis, and 
the conventions for doing so will be less clear, rendering the insecurities and vulnerabilities of 
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the exchange higher. Sometimes, creative solutions are sought to not overstep any boundaries 
but still be able to convey a message that maybe should not have been conveyed. An example is 
the communication of a counsellor of the SDJ circumventing an unnecessary registration of a 
minor: 
When we call to register a youngster for a residential institution, it normally 
happens trough an electronic system. And the persons operating this should in 
fact not tell us whether a place will become available or not, but what they can 
say is “If I were you I would make a registration and make sure it’s done in time.” 
Then you can deduct from that there is a good possibility a place will become 
available soon. Or when they say “you shouldn’t hurry too much with the 
registration” we also realise there is no place. Those are the tricks of the trade. 
(R) 
While the developed typology separates three categories of information, in practice this will be 
more of a continuum on which each information exchange can be positioned. For the 
information providers and receivers it will not always be clear to what category a certain piece 
of information belongs. Moreover, within one interaction, often a mix of different pieces of 
information belonging to different categories can be exchanged. Figure 11 represents this 
continuum together with the dimensional features that will vary between the different extremes 
on the axis. 
 
Figure 11 The information typology should be perceived on a continuum with varying dimensions from one 
end to the other 
4.3 Demarcation of the conceptualisation 
The preliminary interviews made it possible to assess what aspects associated with the broad 
notion of trust would be interesting to explore in-depth in the context of the judicial youth care, 
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and what aspects would better be left aside because of their limited significance. Four important 
conclusions were drawn from the preliminary exploration that had their impact on the 
theoretical demarcation and conceptualisation. First, the decision was made to no longer 
focus on the aspect of distrust. It was initially envisioned to consider this aspect throughout 
the entire study given the ongoing discussion on the difference between trust and distrust in 
the literature, and the need for additional knowledge to better distinguish distrust from trust. 
However, the respondents did not label any of their interactions as being characterised by 
distrust. Only variations between moderate to high trust were mentioned, without being 
accompanied by distrust. This was also visually established during the interviews, where the 
respondents were asked to place their intra- and interorganisational trust and distrust levels on 
a two-dimensional graph based on Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies (1998) (see Figure 12). All 
interviewee’s judgements, regarding either intra-organisational or interorganisational trust, 
were situated in the second quadrant, representing the situation of high trust and low distrust. 
 
Figure 12 Coordinated graph based on Lewicki et al. (1998, p. 445), first applied in this form by Oomsels 
(2016, p. 57). All judgements of the respondents from the preliminary study were situated in quadrant II, 
representing high levels of trust with low levels of distrust 
Second, the focus on intra-organisational trust was omitted from the research. The 
interorganisational interactions contained stronger interdependencies than the intra-
organisational interactions, since individuals within the studied organisations function 
predominantly on their own. They are more dependent on the input of the other organisations 
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than on the input of their own colleagues. Even though a good understanding between the 
colleagues was seen as important and useful, especially when one wanted to discuss their ideas 
about a case with a colleague, it was not needed for much else, as the following public prosecutor 
describes: 
I’m not that dependent of my colleagues, because we each strictly have our own 
cabinet, our own files, there is a clear division. We take on cases based on place 
of residence of the minor, and sometimes when they move there is a transfer, 
but the distribution of tasks is so clear for me that we are independent of each 
other. (C) 
Third, the focus on interorganisational trust was broadened with the inclusion of 
interpersonal trust. The interviews were set up to ask only about trust of the respondent in 
the counterpart organisation as a whole, based on the definition of Fulmer & Gelfand (2012, p. 
1174) as “a psychological state comprising willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of an organization”. The respondents, however, framed their experiences mostly 
in the context of interactions with particular members of the other organisation throughout 
their discourse. Apparently, due to the limited size of the organisations, each member of an 
organisation has personal interactions with most members of the other organisation. This 
makes the willingness to be vulnerable more based on the assessment one makes of the 
trustworthiness of the counter-individual than on the trustworthiness of the organisation as a 
whole. In that case, interpersonal trust is concerned, defined by Fulmer & Gelfand (2012, p. 1174) 
as “a psychological state comprising willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of a specific other or others”. In the main study, the notion of interorganisational 
trust is kept for the survey administration, since it was not possible to ask respondents about 
their trust experiences with each individual of the other organisation due to practical 
considerations. Interorganisational trust and interpersonal trust are not necessarily correlated 
to one another. The following respondent states this perfectly: 
In many cases, trust has to do with the cooperation, and this happens more 
with an individual than with an organisation. You work with a certain person 
from a department. You can have a department of which you believe their vision 
doesn’t suit yours, but with a person it can work perfectly fine. And the more 
the cooperation improves the more you understand what you can help each 
other with. (R) 
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Fourth, the choice was made to adhere to the conceptual framework of Dietz (2011), which 
was introduced in Chapter 2, as a lens for analysing the experiences of the respondents (see 
Figure 13). This decision carries far-reaching consequences since it also means leaving other 
conceptual frameworks behind. For example, while Dietz sees each form of trust originating 
from the same process (albeit with a possible different emphasis on the separate aspects), other 
authors see trust in different contexts to also be different in their content and how they originate 
(e.g. Bachmann, 2011). Another consequence is that trustworthiness will be strictly separated 
from the concept of trust, and both will be investigated separately. After coding the interviews 
without using a prior codebook, it was detected that all codes fitted the concepts that were 
described by Dietz in the universal trust model. The codes referring to trustworthiness caught 
mainly aspects of ability, benevolence, and integrity, (ABI), while the input factors could be 
labelled under the categories described by Dietz. The concepts of Dietz were approached as 
sensitising concepts for analysing the main interviews. A sensitising concept gives the user a 
general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances but lacks 
specification of attributes. Consequently, a sensitising concept does not enable the user to move 
directly to the instance and its relevant content and instead merely suggest directions along 
which to look (Blumer, 1954), which offers a good approach for inductive research. 
Not all aspects of Dietz’s framework were further investigated in the main study, since this was 
not possible or not relevant. For example, concerning trustworthiness, the three main 
dimensions (ability, benevolence, and integrity) were further zoomed in on, without an 
expansion as suggested by Dietz in his framework, made clear by adding “etc.” to ABI (see Figure 
13). Several scholars have suggested that other dimensions should be added such as 
predictability or familiarity. However, when using just the three dimensions (ABI) as sensitizing 
concepts during the analysis of the interviews most statements regarding perceived 
trustworthiness could be coded. There was no need to introduce a new concept to code certain 
undefined transcript segments. This supports the theoretical assumption that these are three 
sufficient dimensions to conceptualise an individual’s assessment of the other’s trustworthiness. 
The output-stage, containing the risk-taking behaviours, will not be included in this 
dissertation, since this behavioural component is difficult to observe and requires a completely 
different approach involving participatory observation, nor will the feedback mechanisms be 
part of the focus61. The input factors concerning individual factors of the trustor and the trustee 
                                                     
61 For the interested reader, another aspect, the positive and negative outcomes of trusting, has been attended to in 
an earlier co-authored article: Oomsels, P., Callens, M., Vanschoenwinkel, J., & Bouckaert, G. (2016). Functions and 
dysfunctions of interorganizational trust and distrust in the public sector. Administration & Society. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399716667973 
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were also disregarded since there was no assumption that in this particular context these factors 
would play a different role than in any other context. Especially the institutional and relational 
characteristics, specific to this context, were further evaluated. Figure 13 illustrates which parts 
of the trust process are explored in this study. 
 
Figure 13 The universal trust model depicted by Dietz (2011, p. 219), covering the segments that are not part 
of this research project 
4.4 Choices regarding the research methodology 
During the preliminary study, several data collection methods were considered and much was 
learned about the value and challenges of applying quantitative and qualitative research 
methods for studying the topic of interorganisational trust. The encountered drawbacks and 
potential benefits of both approaches are presented below, providing arguments for the choices 
towards the final research design. 
4.4.1 The benefits and limitations of a quantitative approach 
The preliminary interviews did not initially comprise a quantitative part, but they were of vital 
importance to determine further development of the quantitative part. It was envisioned that 
after the preliminary interviews, testable relevant hypotheses would have emerged, and a 
reliable measurement instrument could be developed in the form of a survey to be sent out to a 
sample of the population. However, it was quickly decided that more interviews would be 
required to explore the newly established directions described above further, by including also 
the other organisations and by focusing on the new interactions before a reliable survey 
instrument could be developed. 
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After further interviewing and attempts to develop a survey instrument, it was decided that an 
anonymous online or mail survey would most likely not be successful in this context. Special 
challenges for the design and application of a survey emerged because the case spanned 
different organisations and since trust is a relational trait, questions needed to be adapted to 
each of the relationships within the chain. Next to this, trust is a sensitive topic which could 
increase nonresponse (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007) and is also a broad topic, difficult to grasp with 
a limited number of standardised items in a questionnaire. Given the current state of knowledge 
about trust and the limited development of valid quantitative tools applicable in this context, it 
was deemed more valuable to keep part of the data collection by means of in-depth 
interviewing. However, a quantitative aspect remained in the study, which served two specific 
purposes. First, the quantitative part offers descriptive data on the background of the case and 
aids the interpretation and triangulation of the interview findings. Second, it contributes to the 
development of the measurement of interorganisational trust, especially since the included part 
contains an innovative approach of organisational network analysis, overcoming some of the 
challenges with studying interorganisational trust. 
After deciding a population wide survey had only small chances of success, the focus turned to 
performing a social network analysis (SNA) to map out the trust levels between the members of 
the organisations. Even though consensus hasn’t been reached on the definition of a social 
network (Bergenholtz & Waldstrom, 2011), one of the most often cited sources defines it as “a 
set of nodes (e.g. persons, organisations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g. friendships, 
transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a specified type” (Laumann et al., 1978, p. 458). 
The advantage of a network analysis over other techniques is that it looks at trust in a relational 
way, and not in an individual way. Social network analysis entails measuring the relationships 
between organisations, or between individuals from different organisations, depending on your 
unit of analysis. While exploring the possibility of applying SNA for this project, it became clear 
that surveying on the interpersonal level would generate a large problem of drop out and social 
desirable responses. Trust is a sensitive topic, and the need to include all individuals from all 
organisations into the study was a drawback, given the high workload of the respondents. 
However, the levels of trust between the organisations can be measured, to look for patterns 
occurring in the network and to link it to background variables, such as the trustor or trustee 
organisation. SNA is also a useful managerial tool to optimise relationships and structures in an 
organisation, to expose brokers or bottlenecks, or to estimate the effects of future changes in 
the organisation on information flow. Data collection takes place by means of a survey, where 
respondents are asked to give information about their relationships with the other 
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organisations. Since this type of data collection is particularly sensitive to missing data, it has 
to be executed with the greatest care.  
4.4.2 The benefits and limitations of a qualitative approach 
After analysing the merits and limits of a quantitative approach in our context, it was decided 
that adhering to a strictly quantitative approach would have resulted in invalid and invaluable 
results. Throughout the preliminary study, it also became clear that too little was known about 
the mechanisms behind the trust process. The interviewing approach as a data collection 
method was also more flexible and allowed for fully understanding the trust process in this 
particular context. Many new insights surfaced during the interviews, and a feeling remained 
that important insights would be missed when abandoning the qualitative approach. The 
importance of establishing rapport with the respondents before they open up about the more 
sensitive aspects of trust was also seen as a necessary condition for gathering valid and reliable 
information on the subject, which cannot be achieved with an anonymous survey. With 
interviews, it is easier to gain trust of the respondent and to allow the respondents to nuance 
their statements, with less risk of misinterpretation. The in-depth interviewing allowed for 
better adapting the questions to the situation of the respondent, given they came from different 
organisations and districts with different sizes. This made it possible to unveil the complex trust 
process. What interviewing does not allow for is to make convincing statements about the 
strength of correlations between certain variables. However, given the exploratory nature of the 
research, this is not yet the most relevant issue at hand. 
4.5 Narrowing of the research questions 
The initial aims of the study were based on the assumptions that, (1) interorganisational trust 
can have a serious impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the cooperation of a network of 
organisations; (2) that this might be problematic in a high risk, high autonomy, high 
interdependency network; and (3) the judicial youth protection system is a good example of 
such network. Hence, drawing a comprehensive picture of the interorganisational trust 
phenomenon in this context should add valuable knowledge to both the field of 
interorganisational trust and the field of judicial cooperation. 
The initial preliminary study offered new information regarding the initial questions, and there 
was a need to adapt the research questions according to the initial findings. Incorporating the 
new angles led to the formulation of the following four research questions: 
1. What is the general perceived trustworthiness of the members of the judicial youth care 
chain? 
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2. What qualities, in the context of the judicial youth care chain, make a member to be 
perceived as trustworthy? 
3. What context specific inputs influence the perception of trustworthiness, and how do 
these increase or decrease trustworthiness?  
4. What is the impact of perceived trustworthiness of (a member of) an organisation on 
the willingness to exchange mandatory, optional, or prohibited information with the 
members of that organisation? 
These research questions remain broadly formulated, and combine descriptive, exploratory, and 
explanatory questions. Therefore, the investigation by means of a mixed-method approach will 
be most fitting. 
4.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter gave an overview of what the preliminary phase at the beginning of the study 
entailed. Thorough piloting was necessary because many questions about the focus and 
direction of the study remained open after the literature review on both interorganisational 
trust and cooperation between (judicial) organisations. The first interviews contributed to a 
preliminary exploration of the field, and enabled to clear out many of these dilemmas. Because 
of the preliminary study, decisions could be made in four key areas of the study design: the 
scope of the case study, the conceptualisation of interorganisational trust, the data collection 
methods, and the refinement of the research questions. The scope was broadened to include six 
organisations, and restricted to only those actors linked to the judicial decision making process 
in cases of judicial youth care in the Flemish community, and to only those interactions 
involving information exchange on individual cases. The concepts of distrust and intra-
organisational trust have been discarded from the study, while the concept of interpersonal 
trust was included as a specific area of interest. After open coding of the initial interviews, all 
codes could be captured by the universal trust model of Graham Dietz, which was from then on 
used as conceptual framework guiding the further exploration. The intention of performing 
mainly quantitative data collection was left for a mixed-method approach after the discovery of 
the limitations and possibilities of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. The 
research questions were narrowed down according to the theoretical and practical findings 
above. In the next chapter, the methodology applied for the entire study is described in detail, 
before turning to the results of the main study, offering an answer to the narrowed but still 
highly exploratory research questions.
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Chapter 5 Methodology: A case study approach 
From Chapter 2 on the theoretical background is can be concluded that ever since trust has 
been identified as an interesting dimension in managing relations, be it between individuals or 
between (private or public) organisations, there has been a constant debate about what trust is, 
and how to measure it. This lack of agreement resulted in the gradual acceptance of the 
complexity of the concept of trust, together with the acceptance that numerous different 
methodologies can and should contribute to a broader understanding of the phenomenon 
(Isaeva et al., 2015). The simultaneous lack of convergence on what trust means in general with 
the lack of previous research on trust in a judicial context, fuelled the need to gain a deeper 
understanding of this phenomenon in this specific context. By combining the literature review 
and the results of the preliminary study, the research questions were shaped and refined. They 
remained rather broad, which dictated the adoption of an exploratory nature of the main study. 
As a reminder, these are the main research questions (RQ’s) formulated after the exploration of 
the relevant issues concerning interorganisational trust in a judicial setting: 
1. What is the general perception of trustworthiness of the members of the judicial youth 
care chain? 
2. What qualities, in the context of the judicial youth care chain, make a member to be 
perceived as trustworthy? 
3. What context specific inputs influence the perception of trustworthiness, and how do 
they increase or decrease trustworthiness? 
4. What is the impact of perceived trustworthiness of (a member of) an organisation on 
the willingness to exchange mandatory, optional, or prohibited information with the 
members of that organisation? 
These questions cover the trust process as depicted in Figure 14. RQ1 is descriptive in nature, 
RQ2 is an exploratory what question, RQ3 is partly exploratory, and partly explanatory, and RQ4 
is an explanatory research question. 
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Figure 14 The trust process under investigation with the subsequent research questions (adapted from 
Dietz (2011, p. 219)) 
In this chapter, the methodology of the study is described in detail, together with the arguments 
for the methodological choices made. It is explained how the research questions steered to a 
decision to perform a single-case study of the judicial youth care chain. The design of the single-
case study is clarified and the processes of data collection and data analysis are reported on, 
including due recognition of the blank and blind spots of the applied methodology. 
5.1 The application of iterative-inductive reasoning 
While RQ1 is mainly descriptive in nature and can be answered by applying quantitative 
methods, RQ2 and RQ3 are exploratory what and how question, best answered by an exploratory 
qualitative approach. RQ4 could be answered both by a quantitative correlation analysis to 
measure the strengths of the effects, or by an exploratory analysis to explore the mechanisms 
behind the links. When what and how questions are exploratory in nature it is justifiable to 
adopt an exploratory case research strategy (Yin, 2014). Exploratory research usually starts from 
inductive reasoning, where the goal is mainly to build new hypothesis and theories based on 
empirical evidence, rather than testing and refining existing hypothesis. Theories provide the 
means to understand how people interpret situations and why their world is as it is (Maxwell, 
2013). As such, the inductive approach starts with observations, and theories are proposed 
towards the end of the research process as a result of the observations (Goddard & Melville, 
2004). It involves “the search for patterns from observation and the development of 
explanations – theories – for those patterns through a series of hypotheses” (Bernard, 2013, p. 7) 
and the researcher is free in terms of altering the direction for the study after the research 
73 
  
process had commenced. Inductive reasoning is based on learning from experience and is often 
referred to as a “bottom-up” approach to knowing, in which the researcher uses observations to 
build an abstraction or to describe a picture of the phenomenon that is being studied (Lodico 
et al., 2010). 
However, the inductive approach does not imply disregarding theories when formulating 
research questions and objectives (Saunders & Lewis, 2012), and with respect to the issue of 
using existing theoretical constructs to guide theory-building research, two different 
approaches may be taken (Paré & Elam, 1997). In the first, the researcher works within an 
explicit conceptual framework that consists of a selection of concepts and relations among 
them, grouped to see the major concepts simultaneously in their relations to one another. 
Therefore, a conceptual framework becomes a “researcher's first cut at making some explicit 
theoretical statements” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 91). In the second approach, the researcher 
tries not to be constrained by prior theory and instead sees the development of relevant theory, 
hypotheses, and concepts as a purpose of the project. The first approach is applied in this study, 
hence it does not take the extreme position of not taking any prior theorising into account, as 
is the case for a grounded theory approach, where the researcher approaches a field without any 
prior knowledge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). While the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of interorganisational trust 
in a judicial context are indeed unknown, prior knowledge about the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of 
interorganisational trust in general, and in other contexts, put the investigations on track, 
specifically the universal trust process by Dietz (2011). However, it was kept in mind that, as 
stressed by Eisenhardt (1989), although early identification of possible constructs or factors 
allows them to be explicitly measured in interviews, it is equally important to recognise that the 
identification of constructs is tentative in theory-building research (Paré & Elam, 1997). 
An informed choice about the design of a research project starts with a consideration of the 
adopted epistemological positions. Although typologies diverge a great deal between different 
authors, broadly speaking, five epistemologies can be distinguished: positivism, critical realism, 
pragmatism, interpretivism/constructivism, and postmodernism (Isaeva et al., 2015). In this 
study, the realist approach will be taken, where the aim is to describe social observable facts in 
an objective way as natural facts, together with the acceptance that these observations will be 
biased (Gray, 2014). Influences of positivist research will shine through in terms of how trust is 
observed, namely as a phenomenon that exists outside of the researcher and can be measured 
as such. On the other hand, it is recognised that social facts are different from physical facts, 
but nevertheless researchers should try to be as objective and realistic as they can (Fleetwood, 
2005; Isaeva et al., 2015). Importantly, researchers conducting positivist studies see themselves 
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as impartial observers who can objectively evaluate or predict actions or processes, but who 
cannot engage in moral judgments or subjective opinion. They are detached from the 
phenomena of interest (Paré & Elam, 1997). Theories of unobservable social construct will be 
designed based the individual’s meaning of the world based on their life experiences. However, 
objectiveness in this context stems from constructing theories based on the average meaning 
that a group of individuals uses. Theories are constructs operationalised by the individual, based 
on their expectations and interpretations of the behaviour of the other persons in the given 
situation. The subjective meaning determines if, when, and how people decide to suspend the 
doubt and trust, “by leap of faith” and convert it to certainty in the subjective environment 
(Mollering, 2006). 
In Table 2 a non-exhaustive list of the different methodological stances encountered during the 
preparation of the study design is presented. The methodological labels that apply to this study 
are indicated in bold. 
Table 2 Non-exhaustive list of methodological labels that can be attached to a research project; the labels 
most appropriate to this research are in bold 
Research purpose Paradigms/epistemology Methods Design 
Descriptive Positivism Quantitative Case study 
Exploratory Constructivism Qualitative Narrative research 
Explanatory Critical realism Multi-method Phenomenology 
Mixed Pragmatism Mixed-method Grounded theory 
 Postmodernism  Ethnography     
Sampling/ 
Case Selection 
Techniques Data collection Qualitative data analysis Reasoning 
Typical Open-ended interview Content analysis Deductive 
Diverse Semi-structured interview Narrative analysis Inductive 
Extreme Survey Discourse analysis Cyclical 
Deviant Card sort Framework analysis Abductive 
Influential Focus group Grounded theory  
Most similar QCA Congruence analysis  
Most different Documents Thematic analysis  
Instrumental Observations   
 
5.2 Rationale for applying the case study method 
From the preliminary investigation it became clear that a qualitative strategy was best 
appropriate for the largest part of the aims of the study, while a quantitative part could 
complement the methods, for describing the setting and offering background and triangulation 
to the qualitative data. Moreover, further development of both methods can offer invaluable 
information for the progress of the field of trust research. In qualitative research, the inquirer 
makes knowledge claims based primarily on the multiple meanings of individual experiences, 
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with an intent of developing a theory or pattern. The researcher collects open-ended, emerging 
data with the primary intent of developing themes from the data, using strategies of inquiry 
such as narratives, phenomenologies, ethnographies, grounded theory studies, or case studies. 
In contrast a quantitative approach is one in which the researcher “primarily uses postpositive 
claims for developing knowledge (i.e. cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables 
and hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and observation, and the test of theories), 
employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys, and collect data on 
predetermined instruments that yield statistics data” (Creswell, 2013, p. 18). 
From the research questions the best suited research method should emerge quite naturally. 
Yin (2014, pp. 9–15) describes three conditions on which to base the selection of the appropriate 
research method, which are applied to the current research questions: 
(a) The type of research questions posed. The research questions mainly cover ‘what’ 
and ‘how’ type of questions dealing with operational links between concepts needing to 
be traced over time rather than looking for frequencies or incidences. This exploratory 
type of research calls for either case study research or the study of histories. 
(b) The extent of control required over behavioural events. When you can manipulate 
the behaviours of the persons involved in the events one can turn to experiments. When 
the behaviours cannot be manipulated and there is no access to these behaviours, one 
should turn to histories. When the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated but can 
be observed, then the case study is the appropriate method. While trust and information 
exchange are difficult to manipulate in a judicial context, they can be indirectly observed 
by probing the relevant actors about their experiences. 
(c) Focus on contemporary or historical events. Since the focus lies on contemporary 
events rather than historical events, the study of histories is not the appropriate method, 
while the case study method is. 
Thus, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, the possibility to indirectly observe the behaviour under 
study and the focus on a contemporary issue led to the choice of a case study. Case studies are 
widely used in organisational studies across the social sciences (Hartley, 2004), especially in the 
field of public administration (Haverland & Yanow, 2012). A case study can be defined as “an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2014, pp. 16–17) or as “the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of 
a single unit or small number of units (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand 
a larger class of similar units (a population of cases)” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 296). From 
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the latter definition, it can be determined that a case study does not limit itself to describing 
the phenomenon in one specific context, but should also seek to make inferences to outside the 
case’s context. An exploratory case study, whether based on single or multiple cases, is aimed at 
defining questions, constructs, propositions or hypotheses to be the object of a subsequent 
empirical study (Paré & Elam, 1997). Case research is useful when a phenomenon is broad and 
complex, where the existing body of knowledge is insufficient to permit the posing of causal 
questions, when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed, and when a phenomenon cannot 
be studied outside the context in which it occurs (Yin, 2014). 
5.3 Design of the case study 
Following Yin (2014), the next steps after deciding on the global research method of case studies 
are to identify the case(s) and establish the logic of the case study. 
5.3.1 Selection of the case 
The judicial system is a large system and cannot be investigated as a whole with an exploratory 
study. To investigate trust in a judicial context, where the actors are independent from one 
another, but where there is high interdependency and high risk involved, a specific case should 
be selected. The number of selected cases was limited to only one case, given the broadness of 
the cases and the need to make an in-depth exploration rather than a theoretical comparison or 
broad overview. The selected case should optimally assist in exploring the interorganisational 
trust phenomenon in a judicial context. The purpose was to select an instrumental case, which 
should provide a general understanding of the phenomenon under study (Stake, 1995). In a 
single instrumental case study, the researcher focuses on an issue or concern, and then selects 
one bounded case to illustrate this issue (Creswell, 2012). Single-case studies are rather common 
in trust research, due to the context-dependency of trust and the necessity of building rapport 
between the researcher and the respondent (Oomsels, 2016) in order to make sure that the 
respondent is willing to ‘open up’ and discuss the sensitive issues of trust (Lyon, 2012). Focusing 
on a particular segment of the judicial system, instead of trying to study a broader collection of 
the judicial system, was also useful to reduce the heterogeneity of the studied subjects, which 
allowed for easier discovery of congruent patterns, while increasing the internal validity of the 
study. The narrow scope avoids causal heterogeneity, increasing the potential for key causal 
relationships to be found and well specified in the developed theories (Mahoney & Goerts, 
2006). To make sure there is a depth of information about interorganisational cooperation and 
trust, intensity sampling was applied to select the case, a type of purposeful and instrumental 
sampling (as opposed to random sampling), where the selected case is an information-rich case, 
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which manifests the phenomenon intensely, but not extremely (Patton, 2015). Further, the case 
should be clearly confined by boundaries in terms of time, events, and processes (Creswell, 
2012). 
To make an educated choice it is good to map out the judicial system in Belgium. Within the 
judicial system, different interorganisational constellations exist, spread across different legal 
matters and different geographical areas. Figure 15 shows the different types of courts in Belgium 
and where they are located, all dealing with a specific branch of justice: the constitutional court, 
supreme courts, appellate courts, courts of first instance, police courts, court for the justices of 
the peace, administrative supreme court, court of audit, labour courts, labour appellate courts, 
and commercial courts. 
 
Figure 15 Map of the different types of courts in the Belgian judicial system and their geographical spread. 
(Source: www.lexadin.nl/wlg) 
Ultimately, the juvenile justice system was valued the best starting case for gathering insights 
in the interorganisational trust experiences in a judicial context. The juvenile court is part of the 
courts of first instance, next to the civil and correctional (criminal law) departments. Within 
the juvenile justice system there is a particular high interdependency between the organisations 
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(De Bruyn, 2006), where the different actors depend greatly on cooperation and information 
sharing from one organisation to the other. More than in other judicial branches, finding the 
right measure for a minor depends on the most recent state and evolutions of a minor’s 
personality and environment. Measures can be modified when the progress of the minor calls 
for an adaptation, causing the legal procedure to be a longer process than usual, requiring 
constant gathering and sharing of information. The decision making process in juvenile cases 
also requires a personal input from the members of the involved organisations, to seek creative 
solutions given the various situations of the minors. In other branches, the explanations on the 
background of the case can be given directly by the adult in a hearing, which is not always the 
case for minors. This judicial network brings many different actors together, because on top of 
the regular actors in case processing (judges, lawyers, and litigants), a public prosecutor, the 
police, and several judicial support services are involved, which form a complex network of 
interdependencies between the actors. As such, the juvenile justice chain served the purpose of 
an instrumental case, not because it is a typical case, but because the intensity of the 
interdependencies is particularly high. The external validity will therefore not lie in the findings 
being applicable in general to any judicial network, but it can provide more substance on 
otherwise more subtle interdependencies in other cases. There was also a pragmatic advantage 
to choosing the juvenile justice chain as the main case to focus on for an exploratory study. It 
was known that the judicial system could be closed towards outsiders when it comes to sharing 
internal affairs. Furthermore, the professionals employed in the judicial chain can be severely 
overburdened by caseloads, meetings, and participation to on-going scientific studies. While 
the juvenile justice chain also has its reservations towards opening up to an evaluation by an 
outsider affiliated to a university and suffers from a high workload, they are far less the focus of 
ongoing research projects than for example the criminal justice system. Therefore, it was 
expected that gaining access to this case would be less problematic than it would have been for 
other judicial networks. 
Concerning the geographical boundaries of the case, the restriction was made to focus only on 
the juvenile justice system organised in the Flemish community, to install legal homogeneity of 
cooperation, and for language and culture similarity between researcher and the context in 
which the study took place (see Chapter 4). The events that were selected are the cases of minors 
in alarming situations. As also resulted from the preliminary study, six organisations formed the 
boundary of the case, introduced in Chapter 3. 
Regarding the timeframe, the decision was made to perform a cross-sectional exploration of the 
context rather than a longitudinal follow-up of the trust development over time, since it this 
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not concern a network that did not exist prior to the study. Regarding the time boundaries of 
the case, the study of the information exchange was restricted to the present situation. 
In short, a cross-sectional single instrumental case study based on intensity sampling is 
performed, where the interactions between six organisations of the Flemish youth care chain in 
dealing with minors in alarming situations is the focus. This first step of case-selection, and the 
steps that will be described next, are illustrated in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Representation of the case selection and sampling techniques 
5.3.2 Unit of observation and unit of analysis 
In a research design, the unit of observation – the object where the data is gathered from – can 
be different from the unit of analysis – what is analysed to make conclusions and on what the 
results apply. Fulmer & Gelfand (2012) have reviewed research articles on interorganisational 
trust published between 2000 and 2011, and found that trust could be studied at three different 
levels, and targeted towards three different referents. Based on this they present a multilevel–
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multireferent framework that differentiates nine linkages between organisations. The level of 
observation can be the individual, the team, or the organisation, while the referent can also be 
an individual, a team, or an organisation. In this research, the level of observation is the 
individual trustor (Ai) and the referent for the quantitative data collection is the trustee 
organisation (B), and for the qualitative data collection the individual trustee (Bi). What is 
considered the unit of analysis are the interorganisational relationships occurring between the 
members of the included organisations (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17 The interorganisational relationships and the interpersonal relationships are the unit of analysis 
The interorganisational interactions are operationalised as the interactions between two people 
of different organisations. Because the included organisations were rather small, and a lot of the 
contact between the organisations was personal, trust in this setting is mostly a relational 
characteristic between two individuals. In a study of a network of organisations, there are 
several interorganisational trusting links. In this study, 30 types of interorganisational trust links 
(Ai → B) were encountered, displayed in Table 3. 
The analysis will be concentrated on findings that can be generalised to the judicial youth care 
system. However, when a finding is specific to only one of the above listed interactions, this will 
be stressed in the reporting. The focus was mainly on the general findings, since these are 
currently the most valuable given the nature of this thesis, which aims to contribute to a general 
idea about trust in judicial interorganisational relationships, and even broader to trust in 
interorganisational information exchange between any kind of organisation. Discussing the 
particularities of each interorganisational link would be more appropriate for a study with a 
more practical approach. 
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Table 3 All existing connections between a member of a trustor organisation with a trustee organisation 
Individual  Organisation 
Counsellor from a OCJ with the VK 
Counsellor from a OCJ ” juvenile police 
Counsellor from a OCJ ” OM 
Counsellor from a OCJ ” juvenile court 
Counsellor from a OCJ ” SDJ 
Counsellor from a VK ” OCJ 
Counsellor from a VK ” juvenile police 
Counsellor from a VK ” OM 
Counsellor from a VK ” juvenile court 
Counsellor from a VK ” SDJ 
Juvenile police officer  ” OCJ 
Juvenile police officer  ” VK 
Juvenile police officer  ” OM 
Juvenile police officer  ” juvenile court 
Juvenile police officer  ” SDJ 
Juvenile public prosecutor ” OCJ 
Juvenile public prosecutor ” VK 
Juvenile public prosecutor  ” juvenile police 
Juvenile public prosecutor  ” juvenile court 
Juvenile public prosecutor  ” SDJ 
Juvenile judge  ” OCJ 
Juvenile judge  ” VK 
Juvenile judge  ” juvenile police 
Juvenile judge  ” OM 
Juvenile judge  ” SDJ 
Counsellor from the SDJ ” OCJ 
Counsellor from the SDJ ” VK 
Counsellor from the SDJ ” juvenile police 
Counsellor from the SDJ ” OM 
Counsellor from the SDJ ” juvenile court 
  
5.3.3 Mixed-method design 
The data collection in case study research is typically extensive, drawing on multiple sources of 
information (Creswell, 2012). The purpose of employing several sources is to get a detailed and 
holistic view on the particular case. Collecting different types of data by different methods 
produces a wider scope of coverage and may result in a fuller picture of the phenomenon under 
study than would have been otherwise achieved (Bonoma, 1985). Construct validity, which is 
the degree to which a test measures what it claims to measure, can also be addressed using 
multiple sources of information, because it essentially provide multiple types of evidence of the 
same phenomenon. The development of converging lines of inquiry in this manner is better 
known as triangulation. Triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple 
perceptions to clarify meaning and verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation 
(Stake, 2000). Triangulation serves also to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being perceived (Flick, 1998; Paré, 2001). 
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Moreover, trust is seen as a multidimensional, dynamic, and often tacit and ambiguous concept 
(Ping Li, 2011) and the richness of the trust research field “constantly reminds us how no single 
method can provide the perfect understanding of such a multifaceted phenomenon” (Lyon et 
al., 2015, p. 2). Indeed the complexity of the trust phenomenon calls for an even greater use of 
research from different epistemological perspectives to generate innovative and practically 
meaningful results (Isaeva et al., 2015). As Isaeva et al. (2015, p. 13) further mention: “if trust 
indeed does not just exist but is a social process, its nature can usefully be viewed in many 
different ways”. Several researchers have recommended that both quantitative and qualitative 
data be used in any study if at all possible (e.g. Wynekoop, 1992). As stressed by Eisenhardt 
(1989, p. 538) quantitative data “can keep researchers from being carried away by vivid, but false, 
impressions in qualitative data, and it can bolster findings when it corroborates those findings 
from qualitative evidence”. A variety of types of data and methods are acceptable since theories 
and concepts never offer complete certain knowledge, and are inevitably too simplistic to 
represent the full richness of the social world (Isaeva et al., 2015). 
Given the rather rudimentary state of research methods on trust, the ongoing discussions about 
these research techniques, and the lack of application of interorganisational trust research in a 
judicial context, some creativity was required in the development of the data collection methods 
to answer the research questions. This was accompanied by a certain degree of trial and error. 
Finally, two methods were employed: in-depth interviews and an organisational network survey 
(see Figure 18). The purpose of the survey is mainly to get a better insight in the structure of the 
judicial network and to help interpreting the results from the analysis of the interview 
transcripts. Moreover, the development of the survey could also offer new tools for future 
researchers and managers interested in measuring and analysing trust in an organisational 
context. The interviews, in turn, gave in-depth insights in personal trust experiences in the 
regular work context of the operational actors. The survey data allows obtaining a measure of 
the trust and trustworthiness levels at the time of the exploration of the trust process. This is 
important to contextualise the interview findings and to compare the results from the interview 
data in a more standardised manner. While the survey allows gathering superficial information 
about all interorganisational relationships, the interviews provide in-depth information about 
a small number of the interorganisational relationships. When respondents offer the same 
general beliefs in either of the methods applied, the chances increase that this is the true 
expression of their experiences, and are less likely to be due to biases in either of the data-
collection methods. A dialectic between results of the two modes of data collection also offers 
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better insights in both datasets, and allows exploring the same research problem from different 
angles. 
 
Figure 18 An indication of the parts of the trust process that were investigated by the two different 
methods (adapted from Dietz (2011, p. 219)) 
Each method, however, has its own shortcomings, and should be complemented by the other. 
Interviews can be coloured by social desirability and an overemphasis on the positive 
experiences. Moreover, respondents are not always aware which factors influence their 
behaviour, especially if a factor has a more subtle or indirect influence. The single informant 
bias in research on interorganisational relations (Kumar et al., 1993; Zaheer et al., 1998), where 
a relational experience is only viewed from one side,  was avoided by including the stories of 
both parties in a dyadic relationship. Surveys, on the other hand, have the problem of having to 
measure broad and abstract notions on a unidimensional scale, which inevitably produces error, 
but they can show links between concepts that were not admitted by the respondents or not 
realised by the respondents. Questionnaire items are often developed after the researcher has 
analysed a series of interviews, observations, and documents. This strategy reflects a 
fundamental difference between mixed-method case studies and single methods (e.g., survey, 
laboratory experiment, field studies). In the former, the researcher may have less a priori 
knowledge of what the variables of interest will be and how they will be measured (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Whereas findings from qualitative research tend to be more stable than findings from 
quantitative research when one moves from a superset to particular subsets, quantitative 
findings tend to be more stable than qualitative findings when one moves from a subset to a 
superset (Mahoney & Goerts, 2006). Quantitative scholars often view the cases they analyse 
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simply as a sample of a potentially larger universe. The narrower scope adopted in qualitative 
analysis grows out of the conviction that causal heterogeneity is the norm for large populations 
(e.g. Ragin, 1987, 2000). As such, combining both approaches offers an advantage to the internal 
and external validity of the study. 
The fact that different types of data were collected from the same sources, namely the same 
respondents, is a limitation. Collecting the survey data from other respondents than the 
interviewees, could have given measurements that are more independent. However, to assure 
cooperation with the survey it was deemed necessary to administer the survey after the 
interviews, when there was already a relationship between the researches and the respondent.  
5.4 Data collection and analysis 
The mixed-method approach in this study means the application of two different methods of 
data collection to answer the research questions. The two methods are in-depth interviewing 
and the collection of survey data in the form of an organisational network study. The data 
collection of both methods happened at the same time, where the network survey was 
administered after the interview took place. Both data collection processes are discussed in 
detail in this section. 
5.4.1 In-depth interviewing 
The process of collecting and analysing the interview data for this study can roughly be divided 
into two consecutive phases. The first phase was the preliminary phase, which was less focused 
in terms of the research topic. It was designed to enable a demarcation of the research topic, a 
delineation of the boundaries of the case, and an exploration of the most appropriate study 
design. The insights gathered from the preliminary study were discussed in Chapter 4, since 
these significantly determined the choices made in the further phases of the research, and offer 
therefore important argumentations for the successive research design. The scope was 
broadened to include all organisations linked to the judicial decision making process in judicial 
youth care cases, and restricted to only those interactions involving information exchange on 
individual cases, and only in the Flemish community. Distrust and intra-organisational trust 
were discarded from the focus, while interpersonal trust was included. The universal trust 
model of Graham Dietz (Dietz, 2011) became the conceptual framework guiding the further 
exploration. The research questions were narrowed down according to the theoretical and 
practical findings. The second phase existed of more focussed interviewing and was determined 
by the information of the first phase. However, the second phase could also be divided into 
different phases, because inherent to qualitative research is that the data gathering and analysis 
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is a cyclical and iterative process where the approach is continuously adapted based on findings 
from earlier stages in the process. 
In both the preliminary and main interviewing phases, the selection of the embedded cases and 
respondents, and the interviewing procedure were similar. Therefore, they are discussed 
together in the section below. 
5.4.1.1 Selection of the embedded/nested cases: Divergent sampling 
In Flanders (Belgium), there is one judicial youth care chain per geographical judicial division, 
in the sense that each division has one juvenile public prosecutor’s office and one juvenile court. 
These usually cooperate with one VK, OCJ, and SDJ62, while there are several juvenile police 
departments for these divisions, one per police zone, corresponding to one or more 
municipalities. The police departments and social services included in the case were those 
located closest to the courthouse, for practical considerations. For the preliminary phase, 
different functionaries of the judicial youth care chain from one division of a judicial district63 
were interviewed (first only the court and OM as described in Chapter 4, later expanded with 
the new founded demarcation of the case). The judicial youth care chain in one judicial division 
is treated as an embedded or nested case of the population of judicial youth care chains. The 
restriction to the Flemish community resulted in a population of thirteen such embedded cases 
to choose from, namely the thirteen divisions of the five judicial districts in Flanders (see Figure 
19). The division for the preliminary study was not chosen randomly from the population of the 
thirteen Flemish divisions. The case had to be a typical one, not an extreme case, since this 
would be most instrumental for a first exploration (Seawright & Gerring, 2008), and would be 
most representative for the judicial youth care system. Since little to no prior knowledge was 
available on how trust was perceived in this case, and which factors could have an important 
influence on the experiences of the trust process, a medium sized division was chosen.  
                                                     
62 There are a few exceptions where two OCJ’s are in contact with one OM. 
63 In Dutch: Afdeling van een gerechtelijk arrondissement. 
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Figure 19 The 12 judicial districts in Belgium (shades) with their respective 27 divisions (dots); of which 13 
under Flemish decree (excluding bilingual Brussels). (source: http://justitie.belgium.be) 
The selection of the embedded cases for the main phase of the interviewing happened in 
several steps. From the 13 divisions in Flanders, excluding the case exhausted at the preliminary 
phase, 12 divisions were left to select from. These were partitioned into large, medium, and small 
divisions according to the available information. The yearly amount of youth care cases 
concerning alarming situations entering the OM per division was taken into account, retrieved 
from the statistical department of the general prosecutors` office. The average was taken over 
the course of 5 years (2011-2015), to make sure the influence of outlier years was cancelled out. 
The number of juvenile judges was also taken into account, since this gives an indication of the 
size of the division, and of how many different contacts will have to be maintained within the 
network. These numbers were obtained from the HR-department for court staff. Unfortunately, 
no counts of the number of public prosecutors or number of counsellors at the social services 
per division could be obtained from their respective administrative departments, however, it is 
expected this will be in line with the number of judges, and correlated with the caseload of the 
division. It was also taken into account that the divisions differed based on which judicial 
district they were part of, insofar this was possible. The characteristics of the judicial divisions 
are listed in Table 4. The identification of the divisions is withheld in the description of the 
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methodology, because anonymity was granted to the respondents to diminish the possibility of 
social desirable answers, given the sensitive nature of the interviews and to ensure the 
willingness to partake in the study. There is also little added value in revealing which divisions 
were included in the study. Therefore, only ranges of the figures are offered in Table 4 instead 
of the exact number of judges and cases to prevent identification of the divisions.  
The objective was maximum variation sampling, also called divergent sampling, where one 
seeks to obtain the broadest range of information and perspectives on the subject of study. Guba 
& Lincoln (1989) state that this is the preferred strategy for qualitative inquiry. By looking for 
this broad range of perspectives, investigators are purposefully challenging their own 
preconceived (and developing) understanding of the phenomenon under study (Paré & Elam, 
1997). From the categorisation, four embedded cases that were most different from each other 
were chosen, to be able to make a comparison based on the different aspects of the cases. In 
total, five out of the thirteen Flemish judicial youth care chains were included in the study, one 
for the preliminary interviews, and four for the main interviews. An advantage of contacting 
respondents within the same division is that it provides a deeper and more holistic 
understanding of the embedded case, improving the internal validity of the study. Experiences 
from one organisation in the division case could be juxtaposed against the experience from the 
counter organisation, offering two sides of the same experience. One limitation of not including 
all embedded cases is that external validity of the findings to the whole of the judicial youth 
care system will be lessened. However, five out of thirteen cases, which also varied maximally, 
should cover many of the possible experiences within this system. 
Table 4 Characteristics of the sampled embedded cases (Source: HR department of the judicial personnel & 
databank of the College of Prosecutors-general – statistical analysts) 
  
Pilot 
division 
(Medium) 
Smaller 
division 
Medium 
division 
Medium 
division 
Larger 
division 
# Judges 2 to 3 0 to 1 2 to 3 2 to 3 4 to 8 
Judicial district A B C D C 
Yearly # VOS cases incoming 
at OM (5y average) 
1500-3500 0-1500 1500-3500 1500-3500 3500-7500 
Yearly # of cases incoming at 
OM (VOS+MOF) (5y 
average) 
3000-6000 0-3000 3000-6000 3000-6000 6000-13000 
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5.4.1.2 Recruitment of the respondents 
Due to the closed nature of the judicial system, obtaining access for research purposes posed 
some challenges. The advantage of selecting respondents from only five distinct judicial 
divisions, instead of randomly choosing respondents from all divisions, was that access to the 
case only needed to be obtained for the selected divisions, not for all divisions, resulting in a 
time advantage. 
In total 67 interviews were administered with respondents from six different organisations in 
the judicial youth care chain (OCJ, VK, juvenile police, OM, juvenile court, and SDJ). Eight 
interviews can be counted as part of the preliminary study, and 59 are part of the main study. 
Four respondents taking part in the preliminary study were so kind as to participate again in 
the main study to be interviewed on the newly defined aspects, which means they participated 
in two interviews. This brings the total number of unique interviewees at 63 individuals. Two 
judges came from a non-sampled (small) division since the president of the Court of First 
Instance of that district forwarded the invitation letter also to this division. Instead of not 
accepting because this diverged from the sampling setup, they were gladly accepted as a 
welcome addition to the diversity of the dataset. 
For each division invitation letters or e-mails were sent containing the research plan and an 
indication of the envisioned type of respondents. This was directed to the president of the Court 
of First Instance, the Crown Public Prosecutor, the administrator-general of the youth welfare 
agency of the Flemish government, the central address of the selected VK’s, and the chief 
commissioner of the selected police departments. Contact was repeated until a reply on the 
willingness to participate was achieved. One contacted police department chose not to 
participate to the study due to a preoccupation with internal challenges of the organisation. 
This department was not replaced with another because already sufficient interviews could be 
obtained from the other organisations. After permission for the study was granted, 
appointments were made with the available respondents for a face-to-face interview. The 
contacted superiors could decide which members of their organisations would participate to 
the study with a minimum of two respondents per department, where possible. The result is a 
stratified self-selection sample, where the strata are the organisations, within which the 
members could choose to participate. In practice, most respondents likely volunteered to 
participate. This voluntary participation could lead to self-selection bias, where individuals who 
consent to be involved in interviews may be different to those who do not, in ways that are not 
related to sampling criteria (Costigan & Cox, 2001; Robinson, 2014). In interviews, extensive 
intimate self-disclosure is sometimes required and this is likely to lead to a sample containing 
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individuals who are more open, more patient, and more interested in the topic than the general 
population. The self-selection bias cannot be circumvented in interview-based research, as 
voluntary participation is central to ethical good practice. Therefore, all a researcher can do is 
be aware of the possibility for bias and consider it’s possible impact on findings and 
generalisability (Robinson, 2014). However, due to the relatively small size of the organisations, 
the participating respondents covered a large part of the total number of staff. Therefore, the 
effect of self-selection on the internal validity of the findings should remain small. 
Table 5 presents the distribution of the individual respondents in terms of division, 
organisation, and gender. A more detailed overview of the respondents and their identification 
code used in the results chapters, their background characteristics, and the interview length can 
be found in Appendix A. To reach saturation the aim was to gather at least 12 interviews per 
division and per organisation (Guest et al., 2006). While this did not appear to be feasible, a 
minimum of 6 interviews per division and per organisation was reached which should be 
sufficient to have at least the basic elements for metathemes to emerge (Guest et al., 2006). 
Viewing the judicial youth care case as a whole, the 67 interviews definitely sufficed to reach 
saturation on the themes.  
Table 5 Interviewee frequencies divided by division, organisation, and gender based on the 63 unique 
interviewees (excluding the repeated interviews). * = The unintentional non-sampled division 
 Police OCJ VK OM Court SDJ Total 
Division 
M F T M F T M F T M F T M F T M F T M F T 
1 1 1 2 . 2 2 1 1 2 2 5 7 . 3 3 1 1 2 5 13 18 
2 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 2 1 2 3 . 1 1 1 1 2 2 8 10 
3 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 2 . 1 1 . 1 1 2 2 4 2 8 10 
4 . 2 2 1 1 2 . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2 2 . 2 3 9 12 
5 . . . . 2 2 . 2 2 1 3 4 2 . 2 1 . 1 4 7 11 
6* . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 . . . . 2 2 
Total 1 5 6 1 7 8 1 9 10 4 13 17 2 9 11 7 4 11 16 47 63 
 
5.4.1.3 Interviewing procedure 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were administered, in which a general structure was set up 
about the main questions to be asked on each of the topics. The detailed structure was 
established during the interview, depending on the input of the interviewee (Drever, 1995). 
Since interpersonal trust is a directed sentiment towards another person, there are two directed 
trust assessments in one interpersonal connection. Two connected persons act simultaneously 
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as a trustor and as a trustee, and trust of person A in person B does not necessarily equal trust 
of B in A (e.g. Golbeck & Hendler, 2006). The respondents were queried about their experiences 
as a trustor, not as trustee. Although each interview differed from the other because each 
interview was adapted to insights from previous interviews and input of the individual 
respondent during the interview, the lead questions always covered the perceived 
trustworthiness within the most intense interaction, the trust levels within these interactions, 
the factors the respondents believed influenced the trust relations within their professional 
context, and the positive or negative consequences of trust in this context. Two respondents 
insisted to be interviewed together for a reduction of their time, and one preferred to do a 
telephone interview. Two respondents preferred not to be recorded, but detailed notes were 
collected during and after these two interviews. 
About a week prior to the interview, the respondents received an overview of the topics that 
would be discussed. This offered three clear advantages. First, the interview covered quite 
difficult questions about non-straightforward topics, which demanded a high effort from the 
respondents. Indeed, they often showed signs of mental fatigue when nearing the end of the 
interview. By knowing beforehand what the interview would encompass, the respondents were 
better prepared for the effort. Second, it offered the respondents a chance to think about the 
topics of trust and information sharing in their everyday work the week before the interview, 
increasing the chance of receiving substantial data on their personal experiences. Third, many 
respondents spontaneously asked whether they could receive the questions before the 
interview, so offering this possibly eased their prior concerns about the interview, starting the 
interview off with a more comfortable interviewee. This can also be considered a fundamental 
aspect of the informed consent process (Gill et al., 2008). This practice could also bring about 
some disadvantages, such as priming the respondent and offering them time to come up with 
the most acceptable answer, but this did not outweigh the advantages. 
5.4.1.4 Data analysis 
The 67 interviews were good for almost 76 hours (75 hours and 45 minutes) of voice recordings 
to analyse, with an average duration of an interview of 1 hour and 11 minutes. The interviews 
were analysed using thematic analysis. Since each interview has a different emphasis guided 
by the interviewee’s input and earlier insights, the interview data was not deemed fit for 
quantitative forms of analysis, such as content analysis. Thematic analysis allows the researcher 
to find recurring themes within the data. This can be inductive or deductive, depending on 
whether or not theory is applied to the process. In this case, theory was early on part of the 
research process, and initialised a deductive approach of analysis. The concepts from the 
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universal trust process as depicted by Dietz (2011) guided the initial coding scheme, where 
inputs, ability, benevolence, integrity, trust, and outcomes were used as sensitizing concepts. 
Since these concepts are still broad and abstract, and require a context specific interpretation 
and completion, the analysis was complemented with an inductive phase where more themes 
for each initial concept emerged from the data. 
Prior to analysis, the characteristics of the thematic analysis are clarified, based on 
recommendations by Braun & Clarke (2006). As said, the analysis is iterative, initially theory 
driven, but also partly inductive. The goal of the analysis is to give a rich description of the 
entire data set, rather than a detailed account of one particular aspect. Since the area of research 
is under-researched, it was deemed valuable to give a broad overview of the predominant 
patterns of the trust process in this particular context, before specific aspects could be 
investigated in a deeper sense. This initial broad description should inspire further research on 
the topic, going deeper into the important themes that were detected. The interviews were 
analysed applying the semantic approach, where themes are found exclusively within the 
explicit or surface meanings of the data. It was not the purpose to look for anything beyond 
what a respondent said. This latter approach is the latent approach, where the analysis searches 
for underlying ideas, assumptions, conceptualisations, and ideologies. The semantic approach 
follows from the realist epistemological view, where a largely unidirectional relationship is 
assumed between meaning and experiences, and language (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). As 
such, everything the respondents said is viewed as objective accounts of reality, of how the trust 
process actually takes place in their context. This is not to say that many of the expressed views 
will not be coloured by personal experiences and intrinsic motivations to respond in that 
manner, and that they are only subjective accounts of the true situation, however, they will be 
handled in that manner. The triangulation with survey data should partly account for this 
subjectivity bias, however, the results will need to be interpreted as a replication of subjective 
experiences rather than objective realities. 
For the execution of the data analysis, the step-by-step guide by Braun & Clarke (2006) was 
followed. The six phases of Braun & Clarke (2006) are: (1) familiarising yourself with the data, 
(2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, (5) defining and 
naming themes, and (6) producing the report. Phase one – familiarising with the data – started 
with the administration of the interviews. Certain interviews were assisted by students (around 
40% of the interviews), however, even then the researcher was present at the interviews 
whenever possible. The recordings, originally in Dutch, were transcribed verbatim and the 
transcriptions were analysed using the computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
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NVivo (version 11). The transcribing of the interviews was done verbatim by the researcher, with 
the exception of the interviews where a student had assisted. The process of transcription, 
although time-consuming, proved to be an extremely useful way of familiarising with the data, 
and allowing for a primary analysis in an active, lengthy, and gradual way, allowing ideas to 
simmer over time. I firmly agree with other researchers such as Bird (2005, p. 227) that 
transcription should be seen as “a key phase of data analysis within interpretative qualitative 
methodology”. It also helped discover the weaknesses in the interviewing techniques, which 
could be improved in later interviews to get the most out of each subsequent interview. During 
the interviews and the transcription process, the analysis of the data already started in the form 
of jotting down initial ideas in a notebook. For those interviews transcribed by a student, more 
time was spent familiarising with the data, including checking back the transcripts against the 
original audio recordings. This phase was pivotal but challenging since the ultimate data corpus 
was quite extensive due to the inclusion of different regional cases and different perspectives 
from different organisations. 
In phase two – generating initial codes – a tree structure was used. The coding scheme is used 
to organise segments of similar or related text for ease in interpretation and to search for 
confirming/disconfirming evidence of these interpretations (Paré & Elam, 1997). The concepts 
from the universal trust process of Dietz (2011) were used as parent-codes (upper level of the 
tree), and the contextual newly emerging codes as child-codes (lower level of the tree), 
alternating between deduction and induction. Dietz acknowledges that only the sequence of 
the trust process will be equal for all trust encounters, but the content of the separate steps will 
be unique according to the specific context in which the trust judgements take place (Dietz, 
2011). Newly found codes were further explored through relevant scholarly literature during the 
data collection and data analysis process to further sensitize the researcher to what may be 
found in the research setting (Blaikie, 2009). Through this iterative process of coding, recurring 
themes emerged. If theory-inspired concepts do not work in the field realities, alternations to 
the conceptual framework were possible, to work with the concepts that respondents use (as 
for example applied in Zirakzadeh, 2009). For example, where ability was a parent node, the 
child nodes (also called sibling-codes) were complete information, correct information, timely 
information, and communication skills. A child node can in turn serve as a parent node for new 
child nodes. Data analysis already started during the data collection since overlapping data 
analysis with data collection not only gives the researcher a head start in analysis but also, more 
importantly, allows researchers to take advantage of flexible data collection. Indeed, a key 
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feature of theory-building case research is the freedom to make adjustments during the data 
collection process (Paré & Elam, 1997). 
For phase three – the searching for themes – codes were inspected to gather around common 
themes. Since the universal trust process already guided the themes, especially child nodes were 
grouped together. The codes were organised into theme-piles. There are different levels of 
themes, including main overarching themes and sub-themes. Main overarching themes were in 
this case already deducted from the literature, namely the universal trust process, and sub-
themes were induced from the exploratory data analysis by the inductive coding process. Several 
codes applied only to a small amount of substantial interview transcripts. These were evaluated 
and either removed from the set or recoded into another existing node when applicable. Mind 
mapping was used to organise the remaining initial codes to overarching themes.  
For phase four – reviewing themes – certain codes were dismissed and others were merged. In 
phase five, the resulting codes were defined and named in a logical and coherent manner. 
Attention was also paid to preserve excerpts contradicting other coding themes. Phase six – 
writing the report – resulted in the next three results chapters, where the complex reality of the 
mind map is presented in a way that should make it easy to grasp, and where sufficient evidence 
of the arguments will be given in the form of interview excerpts. The final coding scheme and 
mind maps can be found in Appendix B & C. This should help to facilitate replication of a given 
study and allow the reader to see the logical link between the theoretical model and the codes 
(Paré & Elam, 1997). 
5.4.2 Interorganisational survey 
A survey was designed to measure certain variables of the universal trust model, in a judicial 
interorganisational setting. The piloting of the quantitative research design spanned a longer 
period than that of the qualitative design because it is less flexible and needs to be identically 
administered with all respondents to allow for valid comparisons. As such, no adaptations can 
be done once the final format was decided on.  
5.4.2.1 Survey development 
Three versions of a network survey were developed, two of which were adapted after piloting. 
The first attempt was administered to 3 respondents at the end of their interviews. The 
respondents were asked to list all their contact persons from the other organisations, to list the 
content of the interaction with each of these persons, and to order these interactions according 
to the level of trust in this interaction. In theory this would have made it possible to map out a 
detailed network of the judicial youth care chain, however, it became clear this would be a 
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tedious endeavour, and getting cooperation from the complete network would be difficult. One 
respondent would easily have 20 contacts with the other organisations that made answering 
questions on each of the contacts a long and repetitive process. Asking questions on a personal 
level, with the need for addressing the other members by name, caused some restraints to 
discuss negative sides of the interaction. A follow-up question showed that the respondents 
found the survey difficult and did not fully understand the point of the questions.  
Based on this, another survey was developed that focussed on the organisational level and 
included a more diverse set of questions related to the trust process. Given the realisation from 
the preliminary study that trust in the judicial context is a case of both trust on an interpersonal 
level and trust on an organisational level, this methodology was a compromise to have at least 
a part of the process successfully measured. The modified version was administered to 11 
respondent after their interviews. The survey included 20 questions on a broad range of topics 
that could be related to trust: the mode, frequency, and reasons of contact, interdependency, 
coordination, conflict resolution, value congruence, communication, transparency, ability, 
benevolence, integrity, predictability, work pressure, importance of trust, and willingness to 
share mandatory, optional, and prohibited information. These questions were asked for each of 
the five counter organisations, which totalled the amount of questions to answer to a maximum 
of 100. Although the survey in this format was better than the previous one, it still contained 
some serious issues. There were too many questions and the validity of the constructs was 
uncertain since they were only covered by one item. Individual measures of attitudes tend to be 
inaccurate because they only extract particular aspects of the general attitudes to measure, or 
because people’s answers to single-attitude questions are plagued by random inaccuracies 
(Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2010). 
Improvements were made by focussing on only a few topics, and including scales for each topic. 
The final survey was included at the end of the last 35 interviews (respondent #33 to #67). The 
survey included questions only on the ability, benevolence, and integrity, and on trust in 
information providing and receiving, for interorganisational relations, but not interpersonal 
ones. It included only nine questions about each partner organisation, which now totalled to a 
maximum of 40 questions when a respondent had contact with all five partner organisations in 
the chain. 
The limitation of the number of questions to only nine was important for two reasons. First, the 
same question was asked for each organisation the respondent interacts with, a maximum of 
five organisations. Therefore, each question has to be filled in a maximum of five times, which 
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brings the maximum total of questions to 40. Granted, filling in the same question five times, 
only chancing the object of the question will not require the same time or mental effort as filling 
in five completely different questions, meaning 40 questions remains certainly manageable. The 
second reason was that the survey was administered after an interview of, on average, more than 
one hour. Therefore, the survey presented an additional burden, and to ensure the full attention 
of the respondent, the survey had to be limited. The restriction to nine questions also meant a 
thorough evaluation of each question, to make sure the most is acquired from the survey. 
Unfortunately, the survey questions could not differentiate between the three different types of 
information known from the preliminary study (mandatory, optional, and prohibited), since 
this would have caused an increase of 20 additional questions to the survey (six questions 
instead of two, asked for each of the five counter organisations). 
The approach of surveying only those interviewed, with a shorter version and with questions 
not on individuals but on organisations, was a compromise. The advantage of this approach is 
that the response rate of all those incorporated in the sample will be high. A disadvantage is 
that the sample is not randomly chosen from the population of possible respondents, but is 
chosen according to the selection strategies applied for the interviewing process, as described 
earlier. Another disadvantage is that there is only outreach to a smaller sample, given that only 
measurements from the interviewees can be received. From the preliminary exploration, it was 
clear that it was difficult for respondents to answer items about trust without having the 
possibility to nuance their answers. 
5.4.2.2 Survey format 
The nine questions incorporated in the survey were scored on a 5-point Likert-scale from 
completely agree to completely disagree. To counter the inaccuracy of measuring concepts with 
only one item, two indicators were used for each construct (ability, benevolence, integrity, and 
trust) and the values of these indicator variables were combined into scales. The six survey 
questions on trustworthiness (ABI) were inspired by the items used by Mayer & Davis (1999). 
Since the focus is on a particular kind of trust, namely the willingness to exchange information, 
new measurement items had to be constructed. The items of the survey are listed in Table 6, 
and the exact (translated) format of the survey, allowing repeated answers for each question for 
the different organisations, can be found in Appendix C. The items represent a subjective 
measure of the opinions of the trustors, not an objective measure of the intentions and 
behaviours of the trustee organisation, which is most valuable since the perception of the 
trustee will influence the trustor’s behaviour. 
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Table 6 The items included in the interorganisational survey 
Contact (filter) With which of the following organisations do you exchange information on 
cases of alarming situations? 
Ability The following organisation does the best they can to execute their tasks in 
alarming situations. 
The following organisation possesses sufficient capacity and knowledge to 
execute these tasks. 
Benevolence The following organisation is generally willing to help me when needed. 
The following organisation does not hinder me in my task execution. 
Integrity The following organisation has a strong will to bring each case to a successful 
conclusion. 
Sound principles guide the other organisations behaviour. 
Trust in information 
exchange 
I easily share case information with the following organisation.  
I easily accept case information of the following organisation. 
 
As with the interviews, the survey data could be biased due to selection bias, where people with 
more trusting personalities may be more likely to return the survey (Currall & Judge, 1995). 
However, only one respondent did not return the survey after deciding to fill it out privately 
after the interview. 
5.4.2.3 Data structure 
The data was entered manually into a database from the completed paper surveys, where one 
respondent was entered on a data line, together with their responses to the questions. The data 
had to be transposed from a horizontal structure to a vertical structure so that the unit in a row 
was no longer the individual respondent, but became the relationship between the respondent 
and a particular organisation. An example of what this transformation looks like is displayed in 
Table 7 & Table 8 where the data of the first two respondents is presented on the first ability 
item in the survey. These respondents are from the police, which is why the ability of the own 
organisation is not measured, and receives a value of 7, which is labelled in the dataset as the 
value for ‘own organisation’. For the OCJ and the SDJ, this respondent neither agreed, nor 
disagreed with the statement, and for the OM, they agreed. For the VK and the court, this 
question was not applicable (=value 6) for this respondent since they had no contact with these 
organisations when dealing with alarming situations. 
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Table 7 Example of the horizontal data structure before transposition 
ID Ability_1_Pol Ability_1_OCJ Ability_1_VK Ability_1_OM Ability_1_Court Ability_1_SDJ 
AG 7 3 6 4 6 3 
AH 7 4 3 4 4 4 
 
After transposition, the data has a multilevel structure, meaning that several data points are 
linked to the same higher unit. In our example, the first six values are obtained from the same 
respondent, namely AG. This was taken into account when analysing the data. 
Table 8 Example of the vertical data structure after transposition 
ID Trustee 
organisation 
Ability 
AG Pol 7 
AG OCJ 3 
AG VK 6 
AG OM 4 
AG Court 6 
AG SDJ 3 
AH Pol 7 
AH OCJ 4 
AH VK 3 
AH OM 4 
AH Court 4 
AH SDJ 4 
 
5.4.2.4 Data analysis 
The trustworthiness items were transformed into scales by taking their average value. This is 
also called a mean score, which is a linear combination of different variables, where each item 
counts equally for the calculation of the score. Such summated scales can cover a wider range 
of manifestations of the relevant attitudes than single-attitude measures do, and positive 
random measurement errors can be offset by negative ones and vice versa. Furthermore, they 
have more values than their individual components and their values often have a distribution 
that is better adapted to linear regression analysis than single-attitude measurements are 
(Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2010). In most cases, it is advised to work with means 
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scores instead of sum-scores, because these scale scores have the same range as the original 
measurements, which eases the interpretation of the values, and the comparability between the 
scales. 
Only univariate and bivariate analyses will be used throughout this study. The analyses are done 
with IBM SPSS statistics 24. The multilevel structure of the data made the analysis less 
straightforward than is usually the case. The clustering of the data needed to be taken into 
account because answers of one individual are expected to correlate more than the answers 
between individuals. In the results chapters, the specifics on the data analysis method will be 
explained in further detail, because the applied method depends on the variables involved, and 
whether they are treated as nominal, ordinal, or metric variables.  
5.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the methodology applied in this study was described in detail. First, the use of 
the iterative approach was explained, where deductive and inductive approaches are both used, 
building new insights on top of what is already know from prior research. Then the use of the 
case study method is advocated, stating the reasons why this is the most appropriate method. 
The design of the case study was described, with the selection of the judicial youth care chain 
as an instrumental case, the use of embedded maximally divergent cases from within this case, 
and the self-selection sampling of respondents within the strata (organisations) of these 
embedded cases. The advantages of a mixed-method approach for this study are given, with a 
detailed description of the two applied methods: in-depth interviewing and an organisational 
survey. In total 67 interviews were administered, and the last 34 of these interviews ended with 
an administration of a survey. The interviews were analysed using thematic coding where the 
concepts of the universal trust model served as sensitising concepts, and new codes were 
generated that gave more concrete content to these abstract notions. The surveys were 
univariately analysed for descriptive purposes and bivariatly using correlation analysis, taking 
into account the multilevel structure of the data, and applying the relevant test depending on 
the structure of the variables involved in the binary analysis. In the next chapter, the first results 
are presented, answering the first and second research questions 
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Chapter 6 Perceived trustworthiness 
In this chapter, which starts a series of three separate chapters presenting the results of the 
study, perceived trustworthiness is the central concept that is focussed on, before the causes 
and consequences of these perceptions are explored. Recapitulating the universal trust model 
(see Figure 20), trustworthiness is conceptualised in this study as the belief the trustor has about 
the trustee’s ability, benevolence, and integrity (ABI). Someone is perceived as trustworthy 
when the trustor holds confident positive expectations about the trustee’s intentions and 
behaviour regarding these three dimensions. The findings provided in this chapter offer insights 
into how organisations in the judicial youth care chain are perceived in terms of 
trustworthiness, and what qualities make a member of these organisations to be perceived as 
trustworthy, covering research questions 1 and 2. In addition, mechanisms have been identified 
through which trustworthiness is perceived in a more or less positive way. The findings in this 
chapter are the result of descriptive analysis of the survey data and in-depth analysis of the 
experiences and perspectives of the members of the judicial youth care chain provided in the 
interviews. 
The units of analysis are the relationship between an individual trustor (Ai)64, member of trustor 
organisation (A) with an individual trustee (Bi), member of the trustee organisation (B); and the 
relationship between an individual trustor (Ai) and the trustee organisation (B). The reason for 
the levels not being similar is due to the different levels of a relationship that could be measured 
with the different data collection methods involved (see Chapter 4). The difference between the 
two methods is, however, an interesting finding, and can inform future researchers attempting 
a mixed-method approach to be wary of the fact that people talk easier about interpersonal 
relations than about interorganisational relations when interpersonal relations are present. For 
this exploratory study, it was decided not to limit the conversations to interorganisational 
experiences (Ai → B) but to allow the respondent to elaborate on their interpersonal experiences 
(Ai → Bi) when this got the respondent talking in a deeper sense about the trust process.  
In this study, six organisations act as a trustor and trustee in relationship to five counter-
organisations, resulting in 30 distinct directed interorganisational trustor-trustee relationships 
                                                     
64 The following notation is used: A = organisation of the trustor; B = organisation of the trustee; Ai = an individual 
trustor; Bi = an individual trustee. A member of an organisation is at the same time a trustor and a trustee, however, 
in this study they are only observed as trustors about their beliefs of the trustees (Ai → Bi) and not the other way 
around (Bi → Ai). 
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(A → B). Each of these relationships has its own specificities due to the different characteristics 
of the trustor and trustee organisations. The aim of the study, however, is not to perform a 
comparative analysis between each of the 30 different relationships, which would render the 
findings too scattered, but rather to find common patterns shared between all relationships 
within this network of the judicial youth care. Especially for the analysis of the qualitative data, 
the differentiation between all types of relationships would be difficult given that not all five 
interorganisational relationships one organisation has could be discussed with the same level of 
detail, and generally, only two of the deepest relationships were discussed. However, when 
certain (sets of) relationships stand out in terms of perceived trustworthiness these will be 
highlighted throughout the presentation of the findings. 
 
Figure 20 The universal trust process (Dietz, 2011, p. 219), indicating what part is explored in this chapter 
First, the results of the survey are presented to offer a description of the trustworthiness 
perceptions in the different interorganisational relationships that existed at the time of the 
exploration. Second, this is done for each of the three dimensions (ABI) separately. Next, these 
descriptive statistics are substantiated with the interview data, deepening the understanding of 
the qualities that are especially valued in this context concerning trustworthiness. Based on the 
interviews, a new conceptual model is proposed about the mechanisms that lead to positive 
assessments of the trustworthiness, termed the trustworthiness gap model. Variations in the 
perceptions of trustworthiness are explained by different gaps that are present between the 
beliefs of the trustor and the beliefs and behaviours of the trustee. 
6.1 The general and directed perceptions of trustworthiness 
In this first section, the perception of the trustworthiness is evaluated across and between the 
organisations. The results of the survey data on the perception of the trustworthiness are 
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presented based on 154 data points gathered from 34 respondents belonging to the six 
organisations in the judicial youth care chain. Each respondent was asked the same six 
trustworthiness items five times; once for each of the five partner organisations in the chain. As 
such, the responses refer to the trust process experienced by an individual member Ai of the 
trustor organisation A in the whole of trustee organisation B (i.e. Ai  B). Questions on the 
interpersonal level (Ai → Bi) were not feasible with the survey (see section 4.4.1). An item 
remained unanswered when a particular relation between two organisations was non-existing, 
in which case the item became irrelevant. This resulted in 154 valid measures for perceived 
trustworthiness. Of the six items measuring the perception of the trustworthiness of the 
organisations, two items covered ability, two benevolence, and two integrity (see section 
5.4.2.2). A new scale variable ‘perceived trustworthiness’ was computed on the basis of these 
items, by taking the mean score of all the six items. Values of the trustworthiness scale can take 
any real number ranging from one to five, and the scale is treated as a continuous variable. What 
follows is a description of the sample statistics, without trying to extrapolate these findings to 
the population. This is a choice made especially because breaking down the numbers between 
the organisations results in a low number of measurements per cell, which make them less fit 
for inferential statistics. 
Univariate descriptive analysis of the perceived trustworthiness scale shows that in general 
there is a positive perception of the trustworthiness in the interorganisational relationships. The 
grand mean on the trustworthiness scale is 4,07, with a standard deviation of 0,62. This average 
score is above the midpoint of the scale (3) and the standard deviation is small, indicating an 
average positive perception of trustworthiness with small individual variation. A histogram of 
the perceptions displayed in Figure 21 illustrates that indeed the values are predominantly 
situated near the positive end of the scale. Only two out of the 154 trustworthiness perceptions 
are below three, which is in the lower half of the scale. Based on these findings it can be assumed 
that the perceptions of the trustworthiness are positive within the interorganisational 
relationships of the judicial youth care chain. Although these results could be biased due to 
social desirability, at least four counter indications point out that the perceptions are truly 
positive. First, if the respondents answered more positive than is truly the case, it is likely that 
even after a correction for this effect the true values do not lie at the complete opposite end of 
the scale. Second, the lack of outliers suggests that this general positive trend is truly present, 
because not all respondents are equally influenced by social desirability, which would lead to at 
least some values to be at the negative side of the scale when truly negative perceptions were 
present. Third, the positive expectations are confirmed by the interviews, as discussed further. 
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Fourth, during the interviews another possibility was observed, where social desirability bias 
possibly worked in the opposite direction. Respondents tried to tone down their positive 
perceptions of each other to make sure they did not give the impression of being uncritical of 
one another, in that case the real picture might be even more positive. 
The empirical finding of extremely positive perceptions within this case is interesting and 
unexpected given the high-risk environment of the operating organisations. However, it also 
means that only fluctuations within the positive end of the scale can be examined, and not 
fluctuations between positive and negative perceptions of an organisation65. On the other hand, 
as further explained, for the perception of the trustworthiness in interpersonal rather than 
interorganisational relations, as was discussed during the interviews, more differentiation was 
found in how the counterparts were perceived, with positive and negative examples from the 
respondents. 
 
Figure 21 Histogram of the perceived trustworthiness scale (n = 154; mean = 4,07; SD = 0,62) 
Examining the means separately for the 30 distinct trustor-trustee relationships (=mean(Ai to 
An) → B) offers a clear picture on how the respondents perceive the trustworthiness. These 
directed means are presented in Table 9, together with the standard deviation for each mean 
                                                     
65 It is important to remind the reader that the exploratory case-study design of this study results in in-depth 
descriptions of what the respondents experience within this case. The fact that there is almost no untrustworthiness 
perceived merely means that this study cannot give deeper insights on that aspect of these judicial interactions 
because they did not exist. The lack of variation in the perception of trustworthiness towards organisations does not 
pose any problem for this study, as might have been the case in comparative or confirmatory research. 
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score as a measure of the variation of the numbers, and the number of individual measurements 
used for the calculation of said mean score. First, looking at the marginal cells of the crosstab, 
the column-means displayed in the last row represent the mean score a trustee organisation B 
receives from the individual trustors they interact with in the judicial youth care chain. 
Although all organisations receive a mean score above the midpoint of the scale (>3) the VK, 
police, and OCJ scored, in ascending order, below average (<4,07), while the OM, SDJ, and court 
scored, in ascending order, above average (>4,07). 
Table 9 Directed mean trustworthiness scores and their variance; N= number of measures available to 
calculate the mean 
 Trustee organisation 
 Police OCJ VK OM Court SDJ All 
Trustor 
organisation 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N 
Police . . 3,94 
(,42) 
3 3,33  
(.) 
1 3,94 
(,42) 
3 4,17 
(,24) 
2 3,94 
(,42) 
3 3,93 
(,38) 
12 
OCJ 3,43 
(,73) 
5 . . 3,27 
(,35) 
5 4,03 
(,70) 
5 4,17 
(1,18) 
2 4,17 
(,63) 
5 3,77 
(,72) 
22 
VK 3,61 
(,59) 
6 4,14 
(,64) 
6 . . 4,36 
(,40) 
6 4,06 
(,67) 
4 4,08 
(,52) 
6 4,05 
(,58) 
28 
OM 4,35 
(,47) 
9 3,96 
(,72) 
9 3,94 
(,71) 
9 . . 4,43 
(,48) 
9 4,22 
(,52) 
9 4,18 
(,60) 
45 
Court 4,13 
(,22) 
5 3,83 
(,61) 
4 3,54 
(,60) 
4 4,62 
(,36) 
7 . . 4,64 
(,46) 
7 4,26 
(,59) 
27 
SDJ 3,38 
(,63) 
4 4,25 
(,52) 
4 4,08 
(,17) 
4 3,71 
(,91) 
4 4,46 
(,42) 
4 . . 3,98 
(,65) 
20 
All 3,87 
(,65) 
29 4,03 
(,60) 
26 3,72 
(,60) 
23 4,21 
(,61) 
25 4,31 
(,53) 
21 4,26 
(,54) 
30 4,07 
(,62) 
154 
 
The row-means displayed in the last column of the table represent the scores given by all 
members of one particular trustor organisation A to all other trustee organisations in the chain. 
It reveals how the members of one particular organisation generally value their counterpart 
organisations. On average, the members of the OCJ have the least positive perception about 
their counterparts, followed by the SDJ, and the police scoring below average. The VK, OM, and 
court score above average, in ascending order. Comparing the column-means and the row-
means for each organisation shows that the police, the OM, and the court are perceived quite 
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similarly to how they perceive others (e.g. the police receives a mean score of 3,87 as a trustee, 
an give a mean score of 3,93 as a trustor). The OCJ and SDJ perceive the trustworthiness of their 
counterparts worse than they are perceived themselves, and the VK perceives others better than 
they are perceived. 
Finally, the inner cells of the crosstab display details about how the members of a specific trustor 
organisation (Ai to An) rate a specific trustee organisation B. The court’s trustworthiness is 
perceived above (or close to) average by all organisations, the SDJ only has a below average score 
from the police, while the OM is perceived lower by the police, OCJ, and SDJ. The mandated 
facilities (OCJ and VK) are well perceived by the SDJ, but not by the others. Between themselves 
there is a difference between how the VK perceives the OCJ (4,14) and how the OCJ perceives 
the VK (3,27).The police are perceived less than average trustworthy by all except the OM and 
the court. What is noticeable from these results is that the perception of the trustworthiness 
might be hampered by the context of the organisations (e.g. police (security) vs. OCJ (care)) but 
that certain organisations are also valued less trustworthy despite their shared background (e.g. 
OCJ vs. VK). What is also apparent is that the organisations with the longest history and well-
established foundations in the judicial youth care chain, namely the OM, the court, and the SDJ, 
are seen as the most trustworthy partners. Meanwhile, the police, the VK, and the OCJ - the 
three organisations with the lowest perceived trustworthiness - are the organisations that are 
less well established within the chain. The police are not included in the decree on integrated 
youth care while the VK and OCJ are newly founded by this decree and are only operational 
since 2014. These (inter)organisational characteristics could play a role in the variations in the 
perception of the trustworthiness and are further explored in the next chapter, where the inputs 
are discussed in more detail. 
The visual boxplot representation of the differences in perceptions in Figure 22 shows again 
where the differences in perceptions lie between the trustor and trustee organisations. The 
median score66 given by a member of the OCJ is clearly lower, while the median score given to 
the VK is the least positive. The court has both the highest median perception of others (as 
trustor), and receives the highest median perception by the others (as trustee), followed closely 
by the OM, the second best on both accounts. 
                                                     
66 This differs slightly from the mean scores in the table, since the median represents the middle value of the scale 
where 50 percent of the sample scores fall below, and 50 percent fall above, and is less influenced by outliers. In 
contrast, the mean takes the average of all values and is more influenced by the distribution of the values.  
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Figure 22 Boxplots of the distributions of the perceived trustworthiness. Left = Perceptions by trustor 
organisation A; Right = Perceptions about trustee organisation B 
The above presentations are useful descriptive statistics about the sample; however, inferential 
statistics can also be applied to estimate the size and significance of these organisation 
differences in the population. With 154 data-points, the continuous trustworthiness scale and 
the trustor or trustee organisation as nominal variable, an ANOVA-test would be fit to test 
whether the mean trustworthiness scores differ significantly between the organisations. This 
test (see Table 10) shows that there is no significant difference between how the different 
organisations perceive their counterparts (the row-means from Table 9), but that there is at 
least a significant difference between how two trustee organisations are perceived (the column-
means from Table 9). 
Table 10 Trustworthiness ANOVA results comparing mean trustworthiness between different trustor 
organisations and trustee organisations 
 Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean square F-statistic Significance 
Trustor organisation 3,992 5 ,798 2,167 ,061 
Trustee organisation 6,768 5 1,354 3,872 ,003 
 
However, since our observations are not independent (different trustworthiness perceptions 
stem from the same respondent Ai but target a different trustee organisation B), analytical 
techniques that take possible clustering into account need to be applied. If this clustering in the 
data is neglected, the standard errors of the estimates can be biased (usually underestimated), 
rendering significance tests invalid (Julian, 2001). The hierarchical structure of our data consists 
of 154 perceptions of trustworthiness from 34 respondents. First, to check if there is significant 
clustering in the data, a null-model with perceived trustworthiness as dependent variable (and 
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no independent variables entered in the model), and a random intercept is performed. Table 11 
with the results of the test shows that there is indeed significant intra-class correlation67 of 0,377, 
meaning that around 38% of the variation of the perceived trustworthiness scores can be 
explained by the correlation of the observations within respondents. Therefore, an analytical 
method taking this clustering into account is indeed required. 
Table 11 Variations on level 1 and 2 of the mixed-model ANOVA null-model with trustworthiness as 
dependent variable 
 Estimate Standard 
error 
Sig. 
Between observation 
variation 
,241 ,031 ,000 
Between respondent 
variation 
,146 ,050 ,004 
Intra-class correlation (ICC) ,377   
 
Therefore, a mixed-model ANOVA is performed to check if there is a significant difference in 
the perceived trustworthiness of the different trustee organisations. What this test does is 
statistically test whether the differences between the column-means in the last row of Table 9 
are significantly different from each other, taking into account the clustering of the responses. 
The mixed-model adds to a regular ANOVA an intercept that is allowed to vary for each 
respondent, called a random intercept. The required assumptions of normality of the dependent 
variable and homogeneity of variance for each combination of the groups of factors are satisfied 
(see Appendix E). 
Next, ‘trustor organisation’ is added as a fixed68 term to the model. This fixed term was not 
significant (p>0,05), meaning that the members of all six organisations perceive the 
trustworthiness of the counterpart organisation equally (see Table 12). In other words, it cannot 
be concluded that the differences in row-means in Table 9 are not due to chance. 
                                                     
67 Intra-class correlation = between respondent variation / (between respondent variation + between observation 
variation). 
68 Meaning only one parameter is estimated for this effect without being randomly estimated as was the case for the 
intercept. 
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Table 12 Results of the mixed ANOVA for trustworthiness as dependent variable and trustor organisation 
as group factor 
 Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 28,723 2384,829 ,000 
Trustor organisation 5 28,541 1,052 ,407 
 
If instead ‘trustee organisation’ is added as a fixed term to the model, the results show that there 
are indeed differences in the scores between the different trustee organisations (see Table 13).  
Table 13 Results of the mixed ANOVA for trustworthiness as dependent variable and trustee organisation 
as group factor 
 Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 33,298 2807,531 ,000 
Trustee organisation 5 119,041 6,993 ,000 
 
To check which scores between organisations differ significantly from one another a post-hoc 
test needs to be performed. The test, using Šidák correction69 for multiple comparisons, reveals 
that with 95% certainty in general, the police scores significantly lower on the trustworthiness 
scale compared to the OM, the court, and the SDJ and the same holds true for the VK (see Table 
14). As such, six out of 15 pairs of organisations are significantly different perceived in terms of 
their trustworthiness. Between the other nine pairs, the differences are not significant. The 
perception of trustworthiness of the organisations in the beginning of the chain (police and VK) 
is significantly less positive than for those at the end of it (OM, court, and SDJ). The lack of 
significant differences between the other pairs of organisations provide another argument not 
to further analyse all 30 trustor-trustee couples separately in the interview data to detect why 
they might vary, but rather look for patterns among groups of organisations with similar 
characteristics. 
                                                     
69 The Šidák correction, or Dunn–Šidák correction, is a method used to counteract the problem of multiple 
comparisons. The significance level is corrected using αnew=1−(1−αo)1/k (Šidák, 1967). 
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Table 14 Pairwise Comparisons of mean trustworthiness scores of the trustee organisations 
* The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Šidák 
 OCJ VK OM Court SDJ 
Mean difference 
(SD) 
Mean difference 
(SD) 
Mean difference 
(SD) 
Mean difference 
(SD) 
Mean difference 
(SD) 
Police -,132  (,121) ,153  (,124) -,390*  (,123) -,429*  (,129) -,382*  (,116) 
OCJ . ,285 (,129) -,258  (,127) -,297  (,131) -,250  (,120) 
VK . . -,544*  (,132) -,582*  (,136) -,535*  (,125) 
OM . . . -,039  (,136) ,008  (,121) 
Court . . . . ,047  (,129) 
SDJ . . . . .  
 
In the next section, trustworthiness is disentangled into its three different dimensions: ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. These concepts were each covered by two unique items in the 
survey, and served as sensitising concepts during the analysis of the interviews. In each sub-
section, a dimension is examined based on the quantitative data to learn how well each 
organisation is perceived on the different dimensions in the sample. This is complemented by 
an examination of the interview data to explain better the levels of perception, and to discover 
what the members of the judicial youth care chain understand by someone who is valued as 
trustworthy. This offers insight in what an actor is expected to act like in order to be perceived 
as trustworthy in this context. In the interviews, the question is not asked about whether or not 
the exchanged information is trustworthy, but whether the individual or organisation 
exchanging the information acts in a trustworthy manner. The difference is that the information 
can be unreliable (for example because the client did not reveal important details on their 
situation) but the trustworthiness of the information handler is not necessarily compromised, 
as long as they did not contribute to the unreliability of the information. 
6.1.1 Perceptions of the ability 
Ability refers in the literature to “that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that 
enable a party to have influence within some specific domain” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 717). Ability 
can be determined by the competence of those involved in an organisation but also by the 
environment of the organisation that supports or inhibits the ability of its members. The ability 
scale is computed similarly to the trustworthiness scale by calculating the mean score of the two 
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survey items covering ability70. The grand mean ability score coincides with the average 
trustworthiness score, with a value of 4,07. There is slightly more variation between the scores 
of the respondents, with a standard deviation of 0,74. From the column-means of the perceived 
abilities of the organisations in Table 15, representing how able trustee organisation B is 
perceived on average, it is clear that the police and the VK score below the mean ability score, 
while the OCJ, SDJ, OM, and court score above average, ascendingly. From the row-means, 
representing how able the members of trustor organisation A perceive their counterpart 
organisations, it becomes clear that the OCJ, SDJ, and VK have a lower perception of the ability 
of their counterparts than the average perception, while the impressions that the OM and court 
have of their counterparts’ are above average. Separating the overall measures between the 30 
distinct trustor-trustee relationships displayed in the remaining cells of Table 15, the lowest 
ability score is given to the police by the VK (3,00) and the highest score is given to the OM by 
the court (4,57). The police only received scores above average from judicial actors in the chain, 
and the VK only from the OM, which could indicate an effect of the distance between the 
organisations in the chain or of the paradigms of the organisations (care vs. safety). 
Table 15 Directed mean ability scores and their variance; N= number of measures available to calculate the 
mean 
 Trustee organisation 
 Police OCJ VK OM Court SDJ All 
Trustor 
organisation 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N 
Police . . 4,00 
(1,00) 
3 3,50  
(.) 
1 4,00 
(1,00) 
3 4,50 
(,71) 
2 4,00 
(1,00) 
3 4,04 
(,81) 
12 
OCJ 3,40 
(,65) 
5 . . 3,20 
(,45) 
5 4,20 
(,76) 
5 4,25 
(1,06) 
2 4,40 
(,65) 
5 3,84 
(,79) 
22 
VK 3,00 
(,89) 
6 4,17 
(,75) 
6 . . 4,42 
(,58) 
6 4,00 
(,71) 
4 4,08 
(,66) 
6 3,93 
(,85) 
28 
OM 4,28 
(,71) 
9 4,11 
(,65) 
9 4,11 
(,74) 
9 . . 4,33 
(,66) 
9 4,11 
(,70) 
9 4,19 
(,67) 
45 
Court 4,20 
(,45) 
5 4,38 
(,75) 
4 3,75 
(,65) 
4 4,57 
(,53) 
7 . . 4,57 
(,45) 
7 4,35 
(,59) 
27 
SDJ 3,38 
(,75) 
4 4,00 
(,71) 
4 3,88 
(,25) 
4 3,75 
(,87) 
4 4,50 
(,58) 
4 . . 3,90 
(,70) 
20 
All 3,72 
(,85) 
29 4,13 
(,69) 
26 3,78 
(,65) 
23 4,26 
(,71) 
25 4,31 
(,64) 
21 4,25 
(,65) 
30 4,07 
(,74) 
154 
 
                                                     
70 Item 1: The following organisation does the best they can to execute their tasks; Item 2: The following organisation 
possesses sufficient capacity and knowledge to execute their tasks. 
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To check whether the differences in our sample between the different trustor organisations or 
between the different trustee organisations hold true in inferential estimation for the 
population, a mixed-ANOVA could again be applied. However, the assumption of normal 
distribution of the ability scale for each group of the factor is not met rendering inferential 
analysis less convincing (see Appendix E). Therefore, these tests are not performed, however, 
the above sample descriptives should offer sufficient indication of the levels of perceived ability 
in the judicial youth care chain. 
With these numbers in mind, the interview parts explicitly dealing with the aspect of perceived 
ability were examined to understand how the ability is perceived, which abilities are important 
in this context, and which abilities are present or lacking. As mentioned, during the interviews 
the respondents generally described experiences that referred to interactions with specific 
members of the counter organisations (Ai → Bi) and less to interactions with the organisations 
as a whole (Ai → B), because members of the different organisations get to know one another 
on a personal level. Therefore, where the survey questions deliberately asked about the aspects 
of interorganisational trust, the interviews might refer to both aspects of interorganisational 
trust and interpersonal trust. These two aspects of a trustor’s experience are not necessarily the 
same, since an organisation as a trustee might evoke a different trust process than when the 
trustee is an individual. However, it is reasonable to expect that the trustworthiness of the 
members of an organisation will be reflected in the perception of the organisation, and vice 
versa. 
The qualities that are put forward by the respondents for the ability to be perceived positively 
are delivering information that is correct, complete, and shared in a timely and efficient 
manner, and possessing good communication skills. However, the abilities concerning the 
information sharing applies mostly to the police and the three social services (OCJ, VK, SDJ), 
not coincidentally the main information providers in this network. Meanwhile, the 
communication capabilities are most important for the OM and the court, the main decision 
makers in this network. 
Looking at the different qualities more into detail, first, providing complete and correct 
information requires that the delivered reports give a comprehensive and undistorted view of 
the situation of the minor. The ability to accomplish this task is estimated higher for the police 
than for the three social services (OCJ, VK, and SDJ). The judicial actors claim that the police 
have a broader perspective in a case because they combine a care perspective with a safety 
perspective, since the police have the additional ability to do unannounced visits to families, 
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while the social services can only do announced visits. Announced visits allow the client-system 
to adjust temporarily their environment, which can give an incomplete or distorted picture of 
the true situation. The police can also perform additional background checks within the police 
information system, while the counsellors depend solely on what the clients choose to disclose 
about their background. Indeed, as seen earlier, even though the police scored overall below 
average on the ability scale, they were judged more positively by the judicial actors. The 
following quote of a juvenile public prosecutor illustrates this point strikingly: 
The police combines the best of two worlds. I don’t want to turn them into 
saints, but they do have both, and when they make a report you notice this 
perspective. If the client is misleading them, they see through it. […] And this 
makes me appreciate the report of a police assistant more sometimes than the 
report of someone with less experience on this. (AX) 
Specifically for the VK, it was said that their approach is not ideal for gathering complete 
information, because, as one respondent said, “they do much less home visits than the OCJ, so 
more things are discussed in a conversation room, and inevitably there is a distortion between 
what people say and what they really do” (AE). This could explain the lower ability scores the 
VK received from the others in the survey. 
Timely and efficient information exchange entails finishing reports within the legal time 
frame, and establishing a smooth transferral of the reports. The final decision-makers in the 
judicial youth care chain – the OM and the court – complain that they do not always receive the 
reports on the latest status of the child’s situation from the SDJ before a hearing. At times they 
only receive the information at the hearing itself or there is no report at all, which obstructs a 
thorough preparation of the hearing. This statement from a counsellor from the SDJ illustrates 
the need for timely information sharing for trust to exist, next to just ‘getting along’: 
What encourages trust is the manner of contact, the amount of contact, the 
content, whether timely or not. Probably whether you ‘click’ with the person on 
a personal level. But I think much depends on whether documents arrive on 
time or whether people perform their jobs in a timely manner. (Q) 
The inability to exchange information timely and efficiently is mostly ascribed to a lack in ability 
of the counter organisation as a whole, but also on the ability of the individual members within 
the organisation preparing the report, as the following criminologist at the OM formulated: 
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You do notice that some counsellors take much more time to do an 
investigation of the societal need for care than others. […] You will always have 
a personal preference for certain counsellors that are more efficient, or who are 
more on board with our way of thinking than others. (AM) 
When too much work flows in, people can’t cope with it anymore. Then I don’t 
have distrust towards them because it’s due to the external conditions. It’s not 
the fault of the people you need to work with, but due to the conditions. […] 
Those people are not the cause of that, it’s the organisation. (G) 
Regarding the efficiency, it is felt that certain organisations, mostly the judicial ones, are not up 
to date with modern ways of communication, and that this hampers a smooth information 
exchange between the organisations, slowing down the process. This juvenile judge realises they 
might be perceived as less able due to the limitations set by the organisation: 
The courts still work with a fax machine, and most institutions complain 
because they don’t use that anymore since a long time. And yes, everything 
needs to be signed, but in the meantime there are so many ways to secure that. 
So that is very annoying. It is from the 20th century, and should be removed. 
(BN) 
While the former qualities applied mainly to the social services and the police, since they collect 
information on the minor and the situation of the minor, what is most appreciated from the 
judicial actors, the ones making the main decisions about the situation of the minor and the 
applied measures, is the ability to communicate in an open and correct manner. It is 
important that the motivations behind the decisions are provided, especially when a decision 
goes against what the information provider had expected. Proper communication allows for a 
deepening of the case, and exhibits professionalism on the side of the decision-maker. As a 
counsellor of the SDJ clearly puts it: “for me it is very important that a judge can communicate 
and that the communication is nuanced”. This particular counsellor also made the comparison 
with the functioning of former judges, and continued: “People need this but it is not always easy 
with the current judge. The first judge I worked with had this, and this meant he could explore 
things in depth with us” (BJ). 
6.1.2 Perceptions of the benevolence 
Benevolence can be defined as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to 
the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 718). In our case, this 
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could mean that one organisation is willing to help another organisation when this is required. 
Also the benevolence scale is computed similarly to the trustworthiness scale by calculating the 
mean score of the two survey items covering ability71.The overall benevolence score of 4,06 is 
close to the grand mean trustworthiness score, and to the ability score. However, when looking 
more into detail into the different relational scores, there are some differences to be found in 
how the scores are distributed. Looking at the split average scores per trustee organisation in 
the columns-means, the quantitative findings show that contrary to the ability picture, the 
police score higher, namely close to the sample average, while the OCJ now scores below 
average. The VK has the lowest score, while OM, SDJ, and the court reach again above average, 
in ascending order. From the row-means in the last column, it is noticed that this time OCJ and 
police are the least positive in their perceptions of the others respectively, SDJ falls close to the 
sample mean, while VK, OM, and court perceive the others’ benevolence as most positive, in 
ascending order. The average within the different trustor-trustee relationships is shown in the 
remaining cells of Table 16. For the first and the only time in the trustworthiness data the court 
scores below four on the mean scale, namely in the perception of their benevolence by the VK. 
Mainly the OCJ and the VK take a hit in benevolence compared to their perceived abilities, 
receiving lower scores from the judicial actors (police, OM, and court). 
Table 16 Directed mean benevolence scores and their variance; N= number of measures available to 
calculate the mean 
 Trustee organisation 
 Police OCJ VK OM Court SDJ All 
Trustor 
organisation 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N 
Police . . 3,83 
(,29) 
3 3,00  
(.) 
1 4,00 
(,00) 
3 4,00 
(,00) 
2 3,83 
(,29) 
3 3,83 
(,33) 
12 
OCJ 3,60 
(,74) 
5 . . 3,20 
(,67) 
5 4,10 
(,82) 
5 4,25 
(1,06) 
2 3,90 
(,74) 
5 3,75 
(,78) 
22 
VK 4,17 
(,93) 
6 4,25 
(,76) 
6 . . 4,17 
(,26) 
6 3,83 
(,29) 
3 4,08 
(,38) 
6 4,13 
(,58) 
27 
OM 4,44 
(,68) 
9 3,78 
(,97) 
9 3,78 
(,94) 
9 . . 4,44 
(,68) 
9 4,28 
(,71) 
9 4,14 
(,83) 
45 
Court 4,20 
(,27) 
5 3,38 
(,75) 
4 3,38 
(,75) 
4 4,64 
(,48) 
7 . . 4,71 
(,49) 
7 4,20 
(,76) 
27 
SDJ 3,38 
(,63) 
4 4,50 
(,41) 
4 4,25 
(,29) 
4 3,63 
(1,11) 
4 4,38 
(,48) 
4 . . 4,03 
(,73) 
20 
All 4,05 
(,76) 
29 3,94 
(,80) 
26 3,63 
(,80) 
23 4,18 
(,68) 
25 4,28 
(,60) 
20 4,23 
(,63) 
30 4,06 
(,74) 
153 
                                                     
71 Item 1: The following organisation is generally willing to help me when needed; Item 2: The following organisation 
does not hinder me in my task execution. 
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Keeping the above in mind, the excerpts about the other’s benevolence during the interviews 
can be examined. The qualitative data makes it clear that to be perceived as benevolent in the 
context of the judicial youth care chain means showing a willingness to cooperate with the 
other party, even when this cooperation is not mandatory, flexibility, and to make an effort 
not to complicate the work of the trustor, or to facilitate it. 
An example of willingness to cooperate beyond the mandatory tasks is the police agreeing to 
assist the SDJ on a visit when the safety of the counsellor cannot be assured. One counsellor 
knew that strictly speaking the police could decline this request from the counsellors, at least 
when they ask them directly: 
I don’t think [police assistance] is an obligation and it rather depends on their 
benevolence. That’s my impression, or my experience. It’s nowhere written on 
paper what we can expect from each other. As a matter of fact they always told 
me or taught me that you shouldn’t even contact the police directly, and 
everything has to go via the public prosecutor. (AF) 
A negative example of benevolence is the perceived rigid and inflexible attitude of the 
mandated facilities towards the others, or perceived unwillingness to share information when 
asked to do so. This could explain why they scored lower on the benevolence scale compared to 
their abilities. This was expressed by one of the counsellors of the SDJ explaining why they had 
only little contact with the VK: “They already don’t share much information with us anyhow. 
[…] So then we won’t take any contact either” (BJ). This attitude can be explained by the fact 
that the mandated facilities take their professional confidentiality very seriously, which pleads 
for their trustworthiness towards their clients. However, different stakeholders can have a 
different expectation, which means they will each evaluate certain behaviours in a different way. 
Positive examples of facilitating the other’s work are taking into account each other’s 
schedules, consulting each other before drastic measures are advised or imposed onto a client, 
and notifying each other when a referral of an acute case is on the way. A negative example of 
one organisation complicating the other’s work is the mandated facilities transferring escalating 
cases at the end of the week, on Friday afternoon. This causes distress among the successive 
organisations who are, at that time, not in the best position to find a solution for a child, given 
that many care-services do not have permanent opening hours during the weekend. Therefore, 
the successive organisations perceive this action as the mandated facilities evading their 
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responsibilities, and passing on the problem to the judicial system, since escalating cases do not 
suddenly arise on Friday afternoon, and could be either reported earlier, or are not that acute 
that they cannot be handled by the voluntary care over the weekend. Despite countless 
complaints about this issue, this problem does not get resolved, and affects the perceived 
benevolence of the mandated facilities: 
At times, when the VK or OCJ make a very late referral, or refers a case but then 
obstructs us, or the classical, on Friday afternoon. When you are on duty on 
Friday between 2 and 4 pm, keep your breath. Because then the VK’s will do 
urgent referrals, for example, a child that has to go to the mother or father over 
the weekend while they find this is unsafe for the moment. And when you ask 
‘since when are you working on it?’, it turns out already from Monday. […] This 
late reporting is an old issue between us. (AI)  
6.1.3 Perceptions of the integrity 
Integrity involves “the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the 
trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). The integrity scale is computed similarly to 
the previous scales by calculating the mean score of the two survey items covering ability72.The 
survey results show a similar picture for integrity as for the overall trustworthiness scale (see 
Table 17). The police and VK receive below average judgement on their integrity, as was the case 
with the ability, followed by the OCJ. The OM, SDJ, and court are increasingly perceived the 
best on integrity. The row-means in the last column show that the VK, OM, and court have 
above average appreciation of their counterparts’ integrity, contrary to the below average 
appreciation by the SDJ, police, and OCJ respectively. Looking at the directed relational integrity 
judgements, the positive evaluation of the SDJ and the court come from relatively high scores 
received from all of the other organisations, with not one sticking out with a less positive 
perception. In many cases a below average perception occurs in relations where the trustor and 
the trustee might adhere to other values when it comes to dealing with alarming situations for 
minors, namely the care perspective (OCJ, VK, SDJ) and the security perspective (police, OM, 
court). 
                                                     
72 Item 1: The following organisation has a strong will to bring each case to a successful conclusion; Item 2: Sound 
principles guide the other organisations behaviour. 
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Table 17 Directed mean integrity scores and their variance; N= number of measures available to calculate 
the mean 
 Trustee organisation 
 Police OCJ VK OM Court SDJ All 
Trustor 
organisation 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N Mean 
(S.D.) 
N 
Police . . 4,00 
(,00) 
3 3,50  
(.) 
1 3,83 
(,29) 
3 4,00 
(,00) 
2 4,00 
(,00) 
3 3,92 
(,19) 
12 
OCJ 3,30 
(,97) 
5 . . 3,40 
(,65) 
5 3,80 
(,76) 
5 4,00 
(1,41) 
2 4,20 
(,91) 
5 3,70 
(,87) 
22 
VK 3,67 
(,82) 
6 4,00 
(,84) 
6 . . 4,50 
(,55) 
6 4,13 
(,85) 
4 4,08 
(,58) 
6 4,07 
(,73) 
28 
OM 4,33 
(,56) 
9 4,00 
(,66) 
9 3,94 
(,73) 
9 . . 4,50 
(,50) 
9 4,28 
(,57) 
9 4,21 
(,62) 
45 
Court 4,00 
(,00) 
5 3,75 
(,65) 
4 3,50 
(,58) 
4 4,64 
(,38) 
7 . . 4,64 
(,48) 
7 4,22 
(,63) 
27 
SDJ 3,38 
(,85) 
4 4,25 
(,65) 
4 4,13 
(,25) 
4 3,75 
(,87) 
4 4,50 
(,41) 
4 . . 4,00 
(,71) 
20 
All 3,83 
(,77) 
29 4,00 
(,63) 
26 3,76 
(,64) 
23 4,20 
(,68) 
25 4,33 
(,62) 
21 4,28 
(,60) 
30 4,06 
(,69) 
154 
 
The qualitative findings can again tell us more about what is expected from a member of an 
organisation in order for them to be perceived as acting with integrity. Someone with integrity 
is described in the context of the judicial youth care as someone who is discreet, does not leak 
information, and does not have a habit of gossiping about clients. It was also linked to 
professionalism and following deontological ethics in their profession, and to 
conscientious decision-making. Honesty and taking responsibility are also necessary 
characteristics, as well as taking the interest of the child as absolute priority, without 
having ulterior motives. Some of these aspects are illustrated below. 
The following quote of a criminologist at the OM about the public prosecutors illustrates well 
how conscientious decision-making can improve the perception of the integrity. This quote 
also reveals how decision that might be perceived as bad options, can be understood as resulting 
from honest intentions, when the conditions of the decision-making are better understood: 
They are definitely aware that they are dealing with children and not with 
objects. So you don’t just decide something about the life of a child. You have to 
take everything into account and often there is not a good solution available for 
the child. You have to choose the least bad option. Those are very tough 
decisions to make. And they deal with this upright and serene. (H) 
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Regarding professionalism, it was raised that despite the close relationship between the 
members of the different organisations, everyone was responsible enough to keep a professional 
distance when needed. When a judge decides against the advice of a counsellor, this was 
understood by the counsellor and not interpreted as a personal attack or as a decrease of the 
benevolence of the judge because as a respondent put it, ‘everyone knows the rules of the game’ 
(BO). The same holds true when the public prosecutor appeals a decision of the court when 
they do not agree or when a judge does not follow the public prosecutor’s demands: 
I observed that everyone can, on a professional level, keep the necessary 
distance and keep the focus on their own tasks. This implies that the public 
prosecutor is not always proven right in court, even when there was a good 
relationship between prosecutor and judge. But nobody resented anyone for 
that. (BI) 
Concerning the ulterior motives it was mentioned that magistrates or counsellors who are 
confronted with a personal involvement with a client, for example, a neighbour, where the 
independence could be at stake, they will raise this issue and transfer the case to another person: 
I have the impression that public prosecutors know very well what their 
deontology entails, and when they assert they cannot take part in court because 
of a personal interest in the case, they will report this and make sure they are 
replaced by a colleague. (BI) 
With regard to honesty, one respondent had a negative experience with the integrity of the 
counsellors by catching them on lies: ‘yes, there have been blatant lies, such as saying they had 
a consultation with a client, and afterwards it turns out this meeting never took place’ (BI). This 
seemed to have left a serious mark on the cooperation. Others acknowledge that honesty is 
more valued than covering up for certain mistakes: 
I have indeed a large trust in certain counsellors that they will look at the cases 
with a fresh view, and that they can admit when they viewed things wrongly and 
that based on new information they need to revise their point of view. (BN) 
6.2 Trustworthiness gap-model 
The analysis of the survey and interview data revealed how trustworthiness is perceived on its 
three basic dimensions (ABI) and what specific abilities, benevolent behaviour, and displays of 
integrity were identified by the trustors as valuable characteristics to have in this context. 
Through further examination of the interview data certain mechanism were detected that make 
118 
  
the trustworthiness to be evaluated positively. Four interrelated elements were detected that 
play an important role in the determination of a positive or negative trustworthiness evaluation: 
(1) the trustor’s expectations of the trustee’s trustworthiness73, (2) the trustor’s perception of the 
trustee’s trustworthiness, (3) the trustee’s intentions and behaviour, and (4) the trustee’s 
perception of the trustor’s expectations of the trustee’s trustworthiness. The first two can be 
attributed to the beliefs of the trustor, while the last two reside within the trustee. When the 
distance between these four elements increases, the likelihood of a negative assessment of the 
trustworthiness is also increased. 
 
Figure 23 The trustworthiness gap model 
As such, to be perceived as trustworthy, it does not suffice that trustees behave trustworthy 
according to their own standards. As soon as the perception of this behaviour is not in line with 
what the trustor expects from a trustworthy counterpart this perception will be evaluated less 
positively. Therefore, the main alignment necessary for a positive perception is the one between 
the expectations of the trustor, and the perception by the trustor. The gap between these two 
aspects will further be called the trustworthiness gap, as displayed in Figure 23. The more the 
perception about how a particular trustee will behave is aligned with the expectation of how a 
                                                     
73 These expectations about how a trustee should behave, should not to be confused with the expectations of how a 
trustee will behave, which could be positive or negative, as found in the definition of trust by Rousseau et al. (1998) 
and in the universal trust model under perceived trustworthiness (Dietz, 2011). The perception of trustworthiness 
(expectation of how trustworthy a trustee will be in a certain interaction) is expected to be a function of a trustor’s 
prior expectations of what should transpire during interaction with the trustee. 
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trustee should behave, the more trustworthy the particular trustee will be perceived. For 
example, when the trustor expects certain information to be complete rather than on time, but 
perceives information to be on time but not complete, there is a gap between the expectation 
and the perception. 
Three other gaps that directly contribute to the width of this trustworthiness gap were detected 
(also displayed in Figure 23). A first gap can exist between the perception of the intentions and 
behaviour of the trustee and the actual intentions and behaviour of the trustee. These two 
factors are not aligned when there is a bias in the perception. The trustee is then perceived 
differently from how they actually are, since this perception is only based on the limited 
information a trustor receives from the trustee. This distortion can take on different 
proportions, and will inevitably always be present due to the bounded rationality making it 
impossible for the trustor to be aware of every detail about the intentions and behaviour of the 
counterpart. Especially when the trustee works in another organisation as the trustor, the 
chances of observing each other’s behaviour or communicating intentions decrease. A negative 
bias emerges when actual trustworthy behaviour remains unobserved. In the judicial youth care, 
this can for example happen when a report is sent in time by a member of an organisation but 
due to a failure in the delivery system the report is received late by the receiving organisation, 
who then perceives the information provider as untrustworthy and becomes less willing to rely 
on them for future reports. A positive bias in perception can happen when, for example, 
untrustworthy behaviour is masked. An example is the above-mentioned experience where a 
counsellor was caught lying about having consultations with clients. This lie, as long as it 
remains covered, indeed creates a more trustworthy perception about the abilities of the 
counsellor. However, once the truth came out, not only is the ability perceived more negatively, 
the integrity will also take a hit. 
A second gap exists between the trustor’s expectation of a trustee, and the actual intentions 
and behaviour of the trustee. Indeed, when the intentions and behaviours of an individual do 
not align with what is expected by the trustor, the chances increase they will not be perceived 
as trustworthy. This is the case when a trustee does not perform the tasks in a trustworthy 
manner, but also when the trustor has unrealistic expectations of the trustee or the trustor and 
trustee have different views on what a trustworthy person should do in the trustee’s situation. 
When expectations are moderate it will be easier for a trustee to meet these expectations than 
when the expectations are high.  
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A tension we sometimes have is that we have the expectation that the SDJ can 
solve anything, which is not true. They also bump into problems, they will also 
need to try and come to an agreement with the clients first. (AL) 
This gap can exist independent of whether the first gap is present or not, and even when the 
second gap is absent, the first gap can still occur due to the distortion between how someone 
behaves and how they are perceived. 
The third gap detected in the interviews is between the prior expectations of the trustor and 
the perception the trustee has about these expectations. This perception can also be biased, and 
as a result, the trustee can be unaware of what behaviour would be appreciated by the trustor. 
When a trustee then behaves according to the biased perception they hold, the second gap can 
become wider, and ultimately the trustworthiness gap will be affected. An example from the 
judicial youth care chain is the situation where a counsellor assumes that a police assistant 
asking for additional information on a case will appreciate it when this counsellor holds strictly 
true to what legally can and should be shared, and does not reveal extra information. While 
their might indeed be members of the police that appreciate rigorously respecting the legal 
limitations, there might be others that put more emphasis on the necessity of flexible 
information sharing. Depending on what the trustor expects, the integrity of the respondent 
can be evaluated positively, or the benevolence can be evaluated positively. Within an 
interaction, the trustor should make clear which expectations are held. This is illustrated by the 
following quote of one police-assistant who expects a counsellor not to share too much 
information: 
Competence does play a role, because you have these grey areas where you 
could be inclined to cross a line. So you need to trust the other and you can only 
do that when there is competence, which is the case. […] And I can count on 
their integrity, because the fact that these lines are not crossed is the clearest 
sign of integrity. If I call and they say “I can’t tell you that”, I’m like “nice”! […] 
Benevolence is less important to me and this has to do with the same thing. 
Whenever we reach the line of the professional confidentiality you need to 
assume there is benevolence but you won’t see it. You will hit a wall but you 
shouldn’t assume there is no benevolence, you need to trust that this stems 
from competence and integrity. (W) 
Each closure of these gaps can contribute to the closure of the trustworthiness gap, where the 
expectations and the perception by the trustor are better aligned. There will also be a hierarchy 
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between the different aspects that need to be aligned. First, as long as the expectations of the 
trustor are not realistic, the trustworthiness gap will not be able to close because the trustee will 
never be able to pose behaviour that meets the expectations of the trustor. Second, it should be 
clear to the trustee what these expectations are, since otherwise the behaviour and the 
perception of the behaviour will not be favourable to the trustee. Third, the trustee should 
behave according to these expectations, and fourth, and last, the behaviour should be perceived 
correctly as trustworthy behaviour, with as little negative bias as possible. 
The fact that the expectations and perceptions stem from one person – the trustor – and the 
behaviour and the perception of the expectations from another – the trustee – and both reside 
in different organisations, opens up the possibilities for these dimensions to be misaligned. A 
lack of communication from both sides could be the root cause of any existing disagreement. 
The four elements of the gap model, together with the possible gaps existing between them are 
difficult to observe in trust situations and to keep separate. It is possible that certain gaps exist 
without the relevant parties being aware of this. Distrust will generally always be attributed by 
the trustor to the behaviour of the trustee. However, this is only one element that plays a role, 
and the other three elements should be taken into account. Therefore, a gap analysis can be a 
first step when trust problems arise, to check where possible misalignments are present. To 
perform such gap-analysis a checklist was developed for organisations to go over to detect 
possible misalignments between each of the elements, presented in Figure 19. First should be 
checked whether there is indeed a gap between what the trustor expects and what they perceive. 
When this is the case further analysis can reveal what might be the issue causing this 
discrepancy. It is important to keep in mind that because different stakeholders might have 
different and possibly contradicting expectations from the trustee it is an illusion that the gaps 
can be totally eliminated. As such, it can occur that the same person is perceived as trustworthy 
by one person and as untrustworthy by the other, due to a difference in prior expectations from 
both trustors. However, the mere awareness of a gap could offer a better understanding of why 
certain tensions exist, open up communication about possible tensions, and prevent further 
escalations due to frustrations and misunderstandings. As will also become clear in the next 
chapter, by merely the experience of working together, many of the aspects of the gap-analysis 
will come to the attention. For example, when working together with the same organisation for 
several years, someone will become aware of the expectations of the counterpart, and many of 
the gaps will tighten over time. Therefore, the format of this gap-analysis is only a tool to speed 
up and structure processes that would otherwise gradually happen as well. It can also offer a 
common language between the parties to talk about an otherwise sensitive topic to bring up. 
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Table 18 Checklist for the trustworthiness gap-analysis 
 Ability Benevolence Integrity 
Expected 
“How does the 
trustor think the 
trustee should 
act?” 
What do the trustors 
expect from an able 
trustee and does this 
outweigh the 
benevolence and 
integrity? Are these 
expectations realistic? 
What do the trustors 
expect from a benevolent 
trustee and does this 
outweigh the ability and 
integrity? Are these 
expectations realistic? 
What do the trustors 
expect from the integrity 
of the trustee and does 
this outweigh the ability 
and benevolence? Are 
these expectations 
realistic? 
Perceived 
“How does the 
trustor think the 
trustee will act?” 
How is the trustee’s 
ability perceived by the 
trustor, does this match 
the expectations, and is it 
a correct reflection of the 
trustee’s behaviour? 
How is the trustee’s 
benevolence perceived by 
the trustor, does this 
match the expectations, 
and is it a correct 
reflection of the trustee’s 
behaviour? 
How is the trustee’s 
integrity perceived by the 
trustor, does this match 
the expectations, and is it 
a correct reflection of the 
trustee’s behaviour? 
Manifested 
“How does a 
trustee (intent to) 
behave?” 
How able does the 
trustee behave in certain 
situations, and does this 
match what the trustee 
and trustor both value? 
How benevolent does the 
trustee behave in certain 
situations, and does this 
match what the trustee 
and trustor both value? 
Does the trustee behave 
with integrity in certain 
situations, and does this 
match what the trustee 
and trustor both value? 
Perceived 
expectation 
“How does the 
trustee think he 
should behave?” 
What does the trustee 
think that the trustor 
expects and values 
concerning the ability of 
the trustee? 
What does the trustee 
think that the trustor 
expects and values 
concerning the 
benevolence of the 
trustee? 
What does the trustee 
think that the trustor 
expects and values 
concerning the integrity 
of the trustee? 
 
It is also possible that expectations concerning the different dimensions of trustworthiness are 
contradicting. For example, a trustor can expect that the trustee gives both timely and complete 
reports (expected ability) and at the same time is ready to help the other whenever necessary 
(expected benevolence). Alternatively, a trustor might expect the trustee never to make any 
mistakes (expected ability), and at the same time expect the trustee to be honest and admit 
mistakes when they are made (expected integrity). For the trustee it might be impossible to 
adhere to both at the same time, and might get into conflicting situations when dealing with 
the trustor. Therefore, it is also important to point these contradicting expectations out to the 
123 
  
trustor, and to clear out which expectation outweighs the other, so the trustee has better 
direction about how to behave towards the counterpart. 
With the earlier identification of which qualities are appreciated in this context, the first row of 
this checklist is filled out for the judicial youth care chain. Another application of this checklist 
in practice can be illustrated by a situation of a misalignment described in the interviews. The 
judges reported that the counsellors of the SDJ should be always reachable (expected 
reachability) but that this was not always the case (perceived reachability). This lack of 
reachability was attributed to the fact that counsellors work part-time, work from home, or are 
not flexible enough to be reachable when they are not at their desk. The counsellors reported 
that they are indeed sometimes unreachable (manifested reachability) when they are away for 
vocational training. They might be under the impression that the judges do not expect them to 
be reachable at those times because the judges would also appreciate them building their 
competency (perceived expected reachability). After a discussion between the two parties using 
the above framework, the trustors (the judges) can understand that the unreachability is due to 
another trustworthy behaviour, namely getting more trained counsellors (adjusted perceived), 
and they might correct their expectations to being always reachable, except when they are in 
training (adjusted expected reachability). The trustees, here the SDJ counsellors, can learn about 
how important it is for the judges that they are reachable as much as possible (adjusted 
perceived expected reachability) and they can agree to make sure to inform the judges when 
they are in training, or to make sure that even during training they are reachable all the time 
(adjusted manifested reachability). 
It should be noted that there are also possible disadvantages to the assimilation by closing these 
gaps. For example, after a while the expectations can be tuned down so much by everyone that 
the standard of work decreases and that no efforts are done anymore to improve behaviour that 
does not meet the expectations. As a police assistant describes, he no longer gets frustrated 
when they perceive their efforts in a case are undone further in the chain, when no action or the 
wrong action is taken: “It’s not necessary that the judges are transparent, that they explain to 
me their argumentation. […] Maybe that’s a deformity on my part, that after a while you realise 
it is pointless to have that expectation. In my eyes this is now an unjust expectation” (W). 
Therefore, parties will need to find a balance between the optimal distance that can occur 
between the different factors. 
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6.3 Chapter summary and discussion 
In this chapter, it was described that in general the individuals working in the judicial youth 
care chain are perceived as trustworthy. Each organisation is perceived as able to perform their 
tasks. For individual members of these organisations this means exchanging information that is 
correct and complete, in a timely and efficient way, and having good communication skills. They 
are perceived as benevolent and willing to take the needs and requirements of the others into 
account. The former is more applicable to the information gatherers, while the latter to the 
decision makers. In this case, this entails a willingness to cooperate, a flexible attitude, and 
facilitate the other’s work. There is no doubt that there is sufficient integrity among all those 
working in the chain. In this case, this means a trustee is discreet, professional, honest, and has 
the right priorities. The trustworthiness of the police differs significantly with that of the OM, 
court, and SDJ, mainly due to a lower mean score on ability and integrity, but not on 
benevolence. The significantly different trustworthiness of the VK, compared to that of the OM, 
court and SDJ is due to a lower score on all three aspects of the scale. When there is a lack of 
trustworthiness detected this is not attributed to traits of the individual actors, but rather to 
restrictions linked with the organisation of the work, procedural regulations, or legal 
restrictions. 
After describing the levels of trustworthiness in the case and the qualities that contribute to 
ability, benevolence, and integrity, the mechanisms that cause a positive perception were also 
identified. This gave rise to the trustworthiness gap model, where four factors need to be aligned 
before a positive perception of trustworthiness is achieved: (1) the trustor’s expectations of the 
trustee’s trustworthiness, (2) the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s trustworthiness, (3) the 
trustee’s intentions and behaviour, and (4) the trustee’s perception of the trustor’s expectations 
of the trustee’s trustworthiness. Someone is perceived as trustworthy when they behave the way 
they are expected to behave, so when the motives and behaviours are in line with or even exceed 
what is expected. The second part of this statement informs that not only the behaviour of the 
trustee influences the perception, but also the expectations of the trustor. As such, one’s 
behaviour can be perceived as trustworthy by one trustor, and untrustworthy to another, 
depending on the expectations of the trustor. Dietz (2011, p. 218) described something similar 
saying “social workers and investment bankers look for different indicators of trustworthiness; 
what may be a bold innovation at Google might be viewed as unconscionable recklessness at 
IBM”.  
Similar gap models have been proposed in other fields, such as the SERVQUAL model in retail 
marketing research, where the quality of service delivery is described (Parasuraman et al., 1988). 
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These researchers have developed a measurement tool to measure the extent to which 
consumers' pre-consumption expectations of quality are confirmed or disconfirmed by their 
actual perceptions of the service experience. This model aided in the refinement of the 
trustworthiness gap model by splitting the manifestation and the perceived expected 
manifestation into two concepts instead of one behaviour component. Another example is the 
audit expectation gap where there is a difference between what the public and financial 
statement users believe auditors are responsible for and what auditors themselves believe their 
responsibilities are (Liggio, 1974). Or even the strain theory of Robert Merton, where strains 
exist because individuals have higher expectations than what they can personally achieve 
(Merton, 1938), which can eventually lead to criminal behaviour. 
Even though many scholars agree that the perception of the trustworthiness is influenced by 
other factors than the actual motives and behaviour of the trustee (as seen in the model of Dietz, 
with many various input factors), the expectations of the trustor has never been theorised as 
such. The only part that is usually included on the individual level of the trustor is the general 
propensity to trust, while here the task-specific expectations of a trustworthy individual are 
added, which constitutes an important contribution to the field. 
In the next chapter, an evaluation of the factors contributing to this overall positive perception, 
and which factors still hinder a positive perception is performed. The earlier proposed gap 
model is used to show the mechanism through which these factors have contributed to the 
perception, namely by closing one or more of the gaps between expectation, perception, and 
manifestation of the ability, the benevolence, and the integrity of the trustee.
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Chapter 7 Inputs of perceived trustworthiness 
In the previous chapter, the perceived trustworthiness of the members of the judicial youth care 
chain was discussed. It was determined – based on both quantitative and qualitative data – that 
this perception was generally high for the organisations, and for the individuals within these 
organisations, apart from some incidental negative experiences. The qualities contributing to a 
trustworthy image in this context were also revealed together with an assessment of whether 
they were present or not. At the end of the chapter, a gap-model was designed, where it was 
assumed that for a positive perception to arise, the perception of the trustee’s ability, 
benevolence, and integrity should closely match what the trustor expects from a trustworthy 
person. When this is the case, the gap between expectation and perception, i.e. the 
trustworthiness gap, is small. When the gap between the perception and the prior expectation 
is wide, the evaluation of the trustworthiness will be negative. Next to the trustworthiness gap, 
three other gaps were detected that affect the widening or narrowing of this gap: (1) a gap 
between the actual intentions and behaviour of the trustee and the perception of this by the 
trustor, (2) a gap between the actual intentions and behaviour of the trustee and the 
expectations of the trustor, and (3) a gap between the expectations of the trustor and the 
perception of these expectations by the trustee. 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer research question 3 on what context specific inputs 
influence the perception of the trustworthiness, and how they increase or decrease the 
trustworthiness. It will unveil which characteristics of the judicial youth care chain cause these 
positive perceptions of trustworthiness, despite the high levels of risk, the lack of hierarchy, and 
the diversity of the cooperating organisations. These inputs are often referred to as antecedents 
of trustworthiness, while the term inputs will be used here, coinciding with the term used in 
the universal trust model. Building on the trustworthiness gap model developed in Chapter 6, 
it is also analysed in which way the inputs contribute to widening or narrowing the gaps 
between the different aspects of the trustworthiness perception. These insights help to 
understand better the possible managerial approaches to increasing trust, a field that until now 
remained elusive and unapproachable, and offers guidance for future research. Following the 
universal trust process of Dietz (2011) the characteristics influencing the perceived 
trustworthiness constitute the input section of the trust process, i.e. “the sources of evidence 
for the foundational trustworthiness beliefs” (Dietz, 2011, p. 216). Dietz differentiates between 
different categories of inputs (see Figure 24), and in the current chapter the focus will lie on the 
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context specific inputs present in this chain: the relational, institutional, and organisational 
determinants that shape the relationship between the trustor and trustee, and inhibit or support 
a positive perception of the trustworthiness. The micro-level individual aspects (trustor’s 
predisposition to trust and trustee’s character, motives, abilities, and behaviours) were 
disregarded because there is no expectation that these will have a context-specific impact on 
the perception of trustworthiness. The focus will go exclusively to the nature of the trustor-
trustee relationship (i.e. common values, common goals, interdependence, risk in the 
relationship, strength of the relationship (Gillespie, 2003)), and the situational influences in the 
form of organisational constraints (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006). Institutions are to be understood 
as formal or informal rules of behaviour that represent structural arrangements in a certain 
context. Collectives of people in a common environment could understand, thanks to these 
institutions, how they should act and can predict how others will act in a relationship with them. 
This gives more room for trusting someone, and taking chances. The presence, and strength of 
these institutions can differ greatly according to the context, and empirical cases will most likely 
vary from each other (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). 
 
Figure 24 The universal trust process (Dietz, 2011, p. 219), indicating the input segment which is explored in 
this chapter 
The input factors emerged from the qualitative data rather than the quantitative data. During 
the interviews, the respondents were asked to explain why they viewed their relations in a 
certain way concerning trustworthiness, and how their perception of the trustworthiness was 
influenced by the organisational and relational features of the cooperation. Items on the 
different input factors were not included in the final survey, since little prior knowledge was 
available on which inputs would play a role in this context. 
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In this chapter, it is first described how the factors emerged from the interviews and how they 
were organised in different categories and sub-categories. Each of the characteristics that 
received sufficient substance throughout the interviews are then presented, with illustrations 
of the empirical foundations of these findings by quotes of the respondents. For each factor it is 
checked how it affects the perception of trustworthiness, namely by linking it to the gap model 
and its effect on the different gaps. Every section on a specific factor is concluded with 
propositions recapitulating how an input factor is expected to affect trustworthiness 
perceptions. A final summary of the findings is found at the end of this chapter, where the 
inductive findings are also connected to prior research on these particular inputs. 
7.1 Categorisation of the different input factors 
The interview transcripts were analysed using thematic coding as described in Chapter 5, in 
order to detect the inputs recurring throughout the respondents’ dialogue. These could be 
categorised in a logical manner in two sets of factors: one set contains organisational 
characteristics, while the other set contains interorganisational characteristics (see Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25 The parent and child input-nodes that emerged from in-depth thematic analysis of the interview 
transcripts 
The set of organisational characteristics refers to features of the organisation of the trustee. 
These are the principles that each organisation adopts, depending on the choices made by the 
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internal management, the specific type of organisation and the work they perform, or the 
budgetary and legal restrictions. Four organisational characteristics emerged from the 
interviews: communication strategy, personnel management, internal process control, and 
workload. 
The set of interorganisational characteristics refers to features of the links between the 
different trustor and trustee organisations. These are the overarching principles of the network 
governing the relations between the cooperating parties. Some features are the result of 
deliberate choices made by the administration of the alliance; others are inherent to this type 
of cooperation. Similarly, four interorganisational characteristics emerged from the interviews: 
the stipulation of a shared (societal) goal, the separation of duties, the continuity of the alliance, 
and the proximity between the involved organisations. 
Some of these inputs are manageable while others are not, but awareness of their presence can 
help in understanding and accepting why certain levels of trust are present. Certain inputs on 
the interorganisational level shape the organisational inputs and the interplay between both 
sets of inputs will be underlined when describing the separate factors. What is ultimately looked 
at in this chapter is the perception of the trustworthiness on the interpersonal level (Ai → Bi)74, 
and how this is influenced by the organisational features of the trustee organisation, B*, and the 
interorganisational features, (A ↔ B)* (see Figure 26). The features of the trustor organisation, 
A*, such as the administrational burden or the trusting culture of organisation A, did not surface 
as important determining factors of the perception Ai has of Bi, and are not further discussed. 
As said, the micro-level determinants, Ai*, Bi*, and (Ai ↔ Bi)*, were not part of the focus of this 
study. 
 
Figure 26 The perceived trustworthiness of trustee Bi assessed by trustor Ai as influenced by (among 
others) the characteristics of organisation B and the characteristics of the link between organisation A 
and B 
                                                     
74 The following notation is used: A = organisation of the trustor; B = organisation of the trustee; Ai = an individual 
trustor; Bi = an individual trustee. A star (*) stands for the characteristics of that entity. 
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Certain factors received more attention than others did, as can be seen from the coding 
hierarchy in Figure 27. Overall, the organisational characteristics received more coding than the 
interorganisational characteristics. The communication strategy of the trustee organisation 
received the most attention during the interviews while the proximity was covered the least by 
the respondents. This coding hierarchy only serves as a first impression of how much the 
respondents actually talked about a certain factor relative to the others. It can be an indication 
of the relative importance of this input factor, but this is not necessarily the case, since other 
reasons why topics get more coverage during an interview are the ease of communicating about 
a certain topic, the ease to observe a certain topic, or the lack of sensitive nature of the topic. 
 
Figure 27 The coding hierarchy of the different sub-categories 
Some input factors that emerged during the initial coding round were not included in further 
analysis. These were left out because of the limited coverage during the interviews, which 
prevented making convincing statements about those factors. Nonetheless, an overview of the 
omitted inputs that did not make the cut is given in Table 19, since it might be of interest to 
practitioners to know what other factors had (a smaller) influence, and to researchers in other 
contexts, where these inputs might have a larger impact. Table 19 displays the deleted nodes (a 
node is a collection of references within the interviews about a specific theme), together with 
how many times respondents mentioned this node, and in how many references (a reference is 
an interview segment about the node). 
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Table 19 Nodes excluded from further analysis due to their low significance 
Node 
Number of 
respondents 
Number of 
references 
Deontology 2 5 
External process control  3 5 
Rejuvenation 2 4 
Common enemy 2 3 
Digitalisation 1 3 
Flexibility 1 3 
Boundary spanner 1 1 
Risk society 1 1 
 
7.2 Organisational characteristics of the trustee organisation 
The management of the trustee organisation influences the perception of its members by the 
members of the other organisations. In the judicial youth care chain trustors from other 
organisations have a limited say about how the trustee organisation should be managed, 
therefore, the management of the trustee organisation should keep in mind what (unintended) 
effects its policies may have on the perception of the trustworthiness of their members in their 
external relationships. The four identified organisational characteristics will be discussed in 
order of decreasing frequency of being mentioned during the interviews, as can be seen in Table 
20. 
Table 20 Number of references per sub-category of organisational inputs 
Node # respondents # references 
Communication strategy 43 357 
Personnel management 35 118 
Internal process control 31 90 
Workload 27 44 
 
7.2.1 Communication strategy 
How an organisation sets up communication towards the other partners in the chain has an 
important impact on how trustworthy the members are perceived in the long run. Generally, a 
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personal and informal style of communication, together with open communication can have a 
positive effect on the perception of the individuals within these organisations. 
7.2.1.1 Support frequent personal and informal communication 
Familiarity breeds trust. 
An organisation can influence the way and the frequency in which their members communicate 
with the members of the other organisations in several ways. The members of the judicial youth 
care chain currently have many opportunities to communicate with each other, in person, via 
telephone, e-mail, and through paper contacts (post or fax). The majority of the contacts happen 
during operational encounters when working on cases, and during policy meetings. During 
these times of contact, many different mechanisms directly contribute to the perception of the 
trustworthiness of the counterparts. These moments of contact between the cooperating 
members allow the trustor and trustee to get to know each other on a personal level and to 
remove some boundaries between the individuals. Moreover, it increases the personal 
information available to assess another’s intentions and behaviours within the relationship, as 
asserted by this OCJ team leader: 
Meetings are very important, because there you get to know each other in a 
broader sense than on case-level. And there you can talk about expectations 
that are present at both sides, and whether or not these expectations can be 
met and answered. (AK) 
Through frequent personal encounters, you indeed get to know the other on a personal level 
and assess the trustworthiness from first-hand experience. When it turns out there is something 
off with the ability, benevolence, or integrity of one of the trustees, this behaviour can be 
detected, and the individual can be corrected or even removed from the system, as the following 
judge describes: 
Only through frequent personal contact you can assess the integrity of the 
other. So there should always be personal contact. As such, dishonest 
individuals can be detected. When these are detected, I would immediately 
report this to the head of the social service. We are only as strong as the weakest 
link in the chain. (BO) 
Informal contacts were found to be important for the exchange of extra information to find 
the best solution for a child faster. Moreover, individuals get to know the counterparts’ 
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personalities, which can smooth further cooperation between these individuals. A counsellor of 
the SDJ sees for example benefits in seeing the police in ways that are more informal: 
I believe the youth and family police section has often a lot of information about 
a family that we don’t have, so you need to pick up the phone, the person needs 
to be there, we need to be accessible when they need us. So more informal 
contacts would certainly be an added value. Not in a setting where we see each 
other once a month with all youth sections and all counsellors. This wouldn't 
result in anything, when it’s this formal. (P) 
It was mentioned that there has already been a shift from formality to informality, especially 
concerning the magistrates, that are felt to have left their ivory tower. On the other hand, some 
reported a shift back towards more formal procedures, because of the formalisation of the tasks, 
and the increased administrative requirements. Younger employees also start with a more 
formal attitude than those that have been around for a while and know each other on a more 
personal level. 
Proposition: Meetings between the organisations offer an opportunity to share the expectations 
that the counter organisation holds (gap 3). 
Proposition: Supporting personal encounters with members of an organisation can remove bias 
between the manifestation and the perception of the behaviour (gap 1), and adding an informal 
dimension to the personal encounters will enforce this effect. 
7.2.1.2 Support open and transparent communication 
Seeing is believing. 
Communication between the organisations can have an effect on the perception of the 
trustworthiness of the involved organisations. Recurring forms of communication that are 
induce trustworthiness that were detected are (a) providing feedback, (b) negotiating about 
issues and making agreements, and (c) rectifying misunderstandings that might exist between 
the organisations.  
Providing feedback about cases, work processes, or past events was mentioned frequently as 
a factor that improves trust between the organisations. However, providing feedback is not 
extensively foreseen in the legal governing guidelines of the cooperation and sometimes even 
prohibited. Because of this, much depends on the benevolence of the one who can give the 
feedback and the way in which this is encouraged by the organisation. As such, a party providing 
feedback will be viewed as more benevolent. Next to this, providing feedback can also create a 
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better understanding for undertaken actions. As such, it can remove some bias between the 
actual behaviour and the perception of that behaviour by the trustor. Behaviour that is perceived 
as incompetent, for example, can then be interpreted as competent behaviour due to the 
additional available information used for assessing the other’s trustworthiness. The following 
quote illustrates how feedback on decisions by a judge that differ from the advice of the 
counsellor can only be understood when the judge shares the reasons behind the decision: 
I believe trust should be about respect for each other’s point of view, so that you 
are able to speak your mind. And that decisions are also framed as to why they 
are taken. If you give an advice, and the judge takes another decision, it should 
be outlined why this was the case. Because you need to continue with the 
clients, so you need to understand where the judge is coming from. This is trust, 
that you can stand behind each other’s decisions. […] And if the decision is 
different from what you advised, and then you understand, “ok, this has been 
viewed from a different angle”, then you can understand it, but you need to 
know it before you can understand it. (O) 
In personal contacts, certain problems about the workflow and the interaction between the 
organisations can be discussed. This can lead to mutual agreements between two or more 
organisations to increase the performance of the judicial youth care, and to improve the working 
conditions of either organisation, by reducing the workload for example. The agreements can 
emerge from formal or informal contact, and the more personal contact there is, the more 
opportunities for these kind of mutual agreements to originate and form. Once an agreement is 
formed, it can go a long way in improving the interactions between the organisations. 
Agreements signal what is expected from individuals in the cooperation and offer guidelines to 
the trustee on the desired behaviour, allowing them to adjust their actual intentions and 
behaviour, as the following judge and team leader of the SDJ report: 
Competence is a matter of experience. And I once had a counsellor, a younger 
one, and I said “I would prefer you to notify me sooner or keep me posted more 
often” and that was that. In time this became one of the best counsellors. (BM) 
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We have to try to give the court a report around one month in advance of a 
hearing, but for that it is important that we know which date the hearing is. 
And for things like that it is important to coordinate this and sit together to see 
how we can improve our functioning, how the OM and the court can improve 
their functioning, and form an agreement on this. This is not an official 
agreement, these are just good practices that we see somewhere else and try to 
implement here. (R) 
When individuals from the different organisations have plenty of opportunities to encounter 
each other and maintain a professional personal relationship with each other, there is also more 
opportunity to discuss certain discordances or disagreements, to allow for rectifications. This 
can help to prevent frustrations from growing and fester. The following criminologist at the OM 
describes such situation: 
It has happened for example that a case didn’t go smoothly, something went 
wrong here and also at the mandated facilities. So we contacted them to explain 
what had happened, and to discuss this, because this caused frustration from 
both sides. They might think “Damn it, why haven’t they acted in this case?” 
and we think “Well, why didn’t you do anything?” And that is rectified, which 
was necessary, otherwise the relationship might turn sour. (AJ) 
When a small frustration or problem can be communicated openly and in a friendly matter, 
there are more chances that this frustration can be corrected. This will offer the possibility to 
both parties to display trustworthy behaviour, which would otherwise be unlikely. The 
‘complaining’ party could explain the issue in a calm manner before things explode, while the 
receiving party gets the chance to show its benevolence in adjusting their behaviour according 
to the complaint, and to improve long-term perceptions of its abilities. These things are easier 
discussed in moments of close personal contact, where third parties unrelated to the issue are 
not present, as this criminologist adds: 
The counsellors came to meet our new colleague, and then we discussed a few 
issues, and what they expected from us in those cases. To clarify those issues 
and what to do with them. There are large policy meetings as well but there are 
other actors there too, that’s not the time to discuss this sort of things. (AJ) 
Moreover, through communication the trustor gets to know more details about the 
technicalities of the trustee’s conditions and working procedures. This can make the trustor 
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more aware of the possibilities and limitations of the counterpart, which helps managing the 
expectations of the trustor towards the trustee, and helps align the expectations within the 
cooperation. Being able to communicate your limitations makes the trustor understand better 
why they should not be expecting certain things from the trustee, and thus avoid constant 
disappointment. Behaviour that was ascribed to someone’s lack of abilities, benevolence, or 
integrity, can now rightfully be ascribed to factors external to the trustee. In addition, when an 
open discourse is installed about possible dysfunctions and the origins of these dysfunctions, 
such as understaffing, then there can be a better understanding of why certain mistakes happen, 
without ascribing it to the untrustworthiness of an individual. This can correct existing 
misperceptions about the trustworthiness of the counterpart. The following coordinator of a VK 
and judge describe a positive and negative experience with open communication respectively: 
We frequently sit together with them where we get to know them. It is of course 
subjective but it helps to get to know each other and you get clarity on what we 
can expect from each other and what not. Trust can grow because of this. (AZ) 
The team leader in general does take responsibility and dares to reprimand his 
personnel, but in one certain case it was covered up. […] Which is annoying if 
you want to avoid the same problem from happening again, since it seemed 
impossible to discuss this afterwards. (BI) 
Proposition: Providing feedback is a manifestation of benevolent behaviour and removes some 
bias in the perception (gap 1 & 2). 
Proposition: During personal contact agreements can emerge which create guidelines for the 
trustee about what is expected from them by the trustor (gap 3). 
Proposition: Open communication can remove bias from the perception by clearing out 
misinterpretations of behaviour (gap 1). 
7.2.2 Personnel management 
An organisation is responsible for hiring and supporting their employees, a process through 
which the organisation’s trustworthiness can be build. This starts with the selection of 
trustworthy individuals, and continues with integrating the members in the deontological 
culture of the organisation and supporting them with continuous feedback and training to 
preserve and improve their ability, benevolence, and integrity. Finally, trustworthy members 
should be valued and untrustworthy behaviour should be corrected. Within most of the 
organisations in the judicial youth care, however, there is quite a rigid system for hiring and 
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firing individuals, with a system of exams and allocation of employees to local districts by the 
general administration, and with permanent tenure within the different functions within the 
chain. These processes are described separately in more detail below. 
7.2.2.1 Selection of trustworthy members 
Birds of a feather flock together. 
What was mentioned frequently is that, despite the fact that there is little autonomy of a 
department over the selection and removal of the members of their organisation, there is a 
system of self-selection in place for caring and socially engaged individuals. Persons applying to 
the positions of counsellors, youth police, juvenile magistrates, or criminologists are likely 
already committed to the shared cause. This is because the shared goal of childcare is seen as 
an important public task, where the stakes are high when not well performed. It is seen as an 
essential obligation, which can have an important impact on the lives of children in need, their 
family, and the society as a whole. This appeals to a sense of integrity and work ethic, increasing 
the commitment of those involved. 
It has to do with involvement. It is very hard to work in this line of work when 
you couldn’t care less about the fate of these minors. You wouldn’t last even 
four months without being exposed. Because you can’t just put in the required 
hours and not care. And because this involvement with the fate of the minors is 
a requirement to be able to function, in the long run only the right people will 
be in the right place. (BI) 
I generally have positive experiences. Our matters ensure that the people want 
to do the extra effort to achieve cooperation, to realise the best solution for a 
family, keeping in mind this is in the interest of the children. So I believe the 
subject matter of our work helps to just do something extra. (J) 
In case a less devoted individual does enter the organisation, it is expected they will not remain 
in the position for a long time. These professions are demanding, requiring them to deal with 
tragic issues at times, while the returns might be limited (financially, but also in the 
improvements of the minors). A high level of intrinsic motivation is needed to keep the 
individuals in their positions.  
I’m sure most of them are motivated, when you see how hard these counsellors 
need to work, they don’t really earn much, so they must be motivated, otherwise 
you will soon look for something else. (BA) 
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For the magistrates (prosecutors and judges) this was apparently not always the case, where 
recollections were made about times where the juvenile sections in the courts were not 
spontaneously occupied, and magistrates were appointed to these functions, often against their 
wishes. Nowadays, this is said to be less the case. 
Proposition: A shared goal with high social stakes increases the integrity of the participants, 
both through internal motivation and self-selection of trustworthy members (gap 2). 
7.2.2.2 Supporting trustworthy members: Initiation, training, and expertise 
One bad apple can spoil the bunch. 
After the selection of trustworthy people, their intentions and behaviour should be maintained 
and increased trough training and support. To establish this, first it is important to inaugurate 
newly employed members of the organisation, which speeds up the process of mastering the 
details of the profession. In the judicial youth care chain specifically, the observation was made 
that this can still be improved in some respects. As one judge remarked, the transition of tasks 
to new counsellors, for example, could be improved: 
When you just start you always start from scratch in a way, and for the 
counsellors this will be no different. […] You have counsellors who leave, maybe 
to an SDJ in another district, you have those who are on sick leave, or on 
maternity leave, and they should try and reduce the amount of transfers of a 
case between counsellors. This should be managed according to the time of 
absence, to avoid that counsellors need to familiarise with a new case again. 
(BI) 
A second way to support trustworthiness in the organisation is by providing vocational 
training to the members to keep up to date with the latest evolutions in their field and to 
improve permanently their skills and expertise. The following judge explains how this can affect 
the actual abilities of the counsellors: 
There is competence, but I do believe that continuous mentoring is needed, 
certainly for the younger employees, but also the older ones. As the legislation 
changes, also certain insights change. I believe there is a need of education 
there. But also for us, for me. (BN) 
A third way to ensure the team of an organisation has the expertise is by allowing them to 
specialise in certain tasks, and to organise the team in a way that members have time and 
resources to become specialised in their field. In the judicial youth care chain, two specific 
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situations were detected where this was problematic. The first is the difference in specialisation 
between large and small police districts, where in smaller districts one police-assistant is 
responsible for all alarming cases in their area, and has additional tasks assigned to them. In 
larger police districts, designated police-assistants are full-time assigned for these tasks, because 
alarming situations happen more frequently and there is more staff. These assistants become 
more knowledgeable over time in how to deal with these kinds of cases, because there is more 
opportunity to gain experience. A similar difference was mentioned between police officers that 
were not part of the youth brigade and police assistants from the youth brigade. The reports of 
the former were said to be less well composed, with less feeling for the particular matter. 
In a police district with less experienced police officers compared to the youth 
brigade in a large district working with real social assistants – even though this 
is being done in the smaller districts as well now, so in the last years it has 
improved – but ten years ago there was a serious difference in quality, between 
the large city and the outer zones. Now not anymore, but they do miss that 
‘Fingerspitzengeful’ to take certain risks. (AX) 
The second problematic situation that was observed was that increasingly juvenile public 
prosecutors are replaced by designated lawyers, notaries, or university professors when there 
are not sufficient prosecutors available. These deputy public prosecutors are less acquainted 
with juvenile matters, which jeopardises their trustworthiness. 
The is a worrisome evolution, in the sense that nowadays more use is made of 
deputy magistrates that need to help out at the juvenile public prosecutor’s 
office. […] They are les knowledgeable and are less inclined to think along. The 
added value at the hearings is not as big because they miss certain reflexes of a 
professional magistrate working with this matter for years and years. […] It’s 
not out of bad will, but you notice the approach is totally different, less 
thorough, and less in-depth. (BI) 
Certain calls for austerity and flexibility might increase these trends in shaping more 
interchangeable workforces, however, caution is warranted for possible unwanted effects on the 
perception of the trustworthiness and ultimately on the trust levels between the organisations. 
Proposition: Inauguration, training, and specialisation ensure that the actual intentions and 
behaviour of the members remain trustworthy (gap 2). 
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7.2.2.3 Preserving trustworthy members: Turnover rates 
Never change a winning team. 
Another challenge for the organisations is to hold onto the trustworthy employees in the 
organisation. Especially since indeed the lack of financial motivation and the high work-
pressure and emotional distress encountered in these types of professions might cause them to 
leave voluntarily. Those who are sufficiently intrinsically motivated to stay should therefore be 
treasured, together with their knowledge about the cases, about the functioning of the 
organisation, and about how to work together with the other organisations. As one respondent 
puts it “they are acquainted with the cases, they are acquainted with all those involved, so I 
don’t like to see them leave” (BA). A counsellor from the VK described a current situation where 
a valuable member of the police will soon retire: 
With the police, there is benevolence from both sides. The more you trust the 
person you need to call, the less you eventually think about the fact it 
[information sharing] might not be allowed. But when you hear, like now, in 
police zone X someone is retiring after 30 years, you think ‘oh no, who will 
replace them?’ and you have to explore and detect whether you can still do the 
same. (J) 
Our respondents, however, saw an emerging trend where people could stay less long in the 
profession than they used to, especially in the supporting services of the Flemish government 
(OCJ and SDJ). Again, the central personnel policies of the Flemish government take away the 
autonomy of the organisations to choose who can stay and get tenured. On top of that, the 
mentality of younger employees has changed, where it has become standard practice to change 
jobs more frequently, and the government supports this job rotation. 
I find that the system of the Flemish community doesn’t allow people to stay for 
long periods of time. We have been through many personnel shifts already! And 
it will happen again. There are two close to retirement, and one other is tenured, 
and all the others are contractual [not tenured] and will have to pass an exam. 
If they do not succeed someone else will take their place. Next year there will be 
a completely other team, no one will be tenured. That does not help at all. (BJ) 
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We had a counsellor who worked super well, had many capacities, did a 
fantastic job, but there was insecurity whether she could stay or not when the 
year ended. […] And it’s this insecurity of not being tenured that makes 
counsellors look for something else and leave. This is very regrettable. (BB) 
Proposition: Human resource practices that focus on retaining the members in the organisation 
for longer periods should improve the trustworthiness of these members (gap 2). 
7.2.3 Internal process control 
Trust, but verify. ~ Ronald Reagan 
A question in network research is why individual organisations would take responsibility for 
their tasks in the network, and put effort in cooperating, when there are no real individual 
consequences to underperforming (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). In the judicial youth care chain, 
the cooperation happens between organisations that function completely autonomous from 
each other, and have no power to sanction or to control the working processes. As such, an 
organisation might lack the will to perform well, or might prioritise internal performance over 
external cooperation. Therefore, it is important that all organisations take self-responsibility for 
its own functioning. Several self-governance systems were mentioned by the respondents to 
increase the perception of the trustworthiness of the members of the organisations. 
One example of such internal control mechanism in the care organisations (VK, OCJ, and SDJ), 
is that a referral to the prosecutor or an advice to a judge is discussed at team level within the 
organisation. This means a decision is not dependent on just one individual counsellor and is 
checked by the team. This ensures accidental misjudgements or personal feuds will be picked 
up by the team, and corrected before being transferred to another organisation. This check can 
refrain counsellors from letting personal motives play in their work, or to double-check for 
mistakes before finalising a referral or advice, improving their ability and integrity. In addition, 
when the trustor is aware of these internal control measures, the perception of the integrity of 
the counsellors will increase, as the following member of the VK asserts about the SDJ: 
Integrity for me also means that they work together in a team, and don’t make 
decision all by themselves. And I believe that is going well, that they do have 
good teamwork. (AY) 
Another such mechanism is the refutable debate in the presence of a team leader, where the 
clients are invited for a discussion at the mandated facilities before they are referred to the OM. 
143 
  
Any misrepresentations from the side of the counsellor can be contested in this context. A 
counsellor of the SDJ said the following about the OCJ: 
No [members cannot do what they want], because when a case is transferred to 
court, at the OCJ there has to be first a refutable debate so the clients get to 
have their say. And the team leader is there as well. So imagine a counsellor has 
made up all sorts of things about, for example, the parents that do not follow 
certain agreements, and in that debate they can say this is not correct. I don’t 
think any case can go to court without a good reason anymore. (AN) 
The internal control mechanisms need to be guarded strictly though, since they are not 
foolproof and could give a false impression of the lawfulness of certain actions. For example, 
before counsellors of the mandated facilities can give extensive information to the counsellors 
of the SDJ, the counsellor from the SDJ needs to have the agreement of the clients. When the 
SDJ goes to the mandated facilities, however, it was said that it is enough when they say they 
obtained agreement, they do not have to get this written down or proven in any way as 
illustrated below. In these cases, the SDJ counsellors can easily take advantage of the system 
and ask for information when this was not agreed upon by the client. 
Mostly they come by and ask if we can discuss the case for fifteen minutes. And 
then you just tell them what is in the file. When they ask whether they went to 
an orientation centre and they want to see that report, then they received 
permission from the parents for this. […] No, I don’t think we ask for that 
permission in written. If they ask for information, we don’t ask for an official 
written document. (AT) 
The earlier described open communication strategy can also make sure that the internal control 
measures that improve trustworthiness become apparent to the other organisation. Certain 
managerial measures and controls are not necessarily known to the members of the trustor 
organisation. During personal contacts, these measures can be brought up, offering the trustor 
new insights in internal organisational structures relevant to the cooperation. This can offer 
new information increasing the positive evaluation of the counterpart, or even clear up 
misunderstandings about the working of the counterpart. One example is noticing that the 
members of the organisation are sometimes unreachable for no apparent reason, but then 
learning through interaction with a member of that organisation that every month on Monday 
these members take a training course to improve their professional competencies. This changes 
the available information on which their trustworthiness is evaluated. There are still cases in 
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which the trustor is not aware of certain trustworthiness increasing measures. Here, there is 
room for improving the perceived trustworthiness of the counsellors’ advice by the judges. 
 I heard that the counsellors are sometimes not present because they are in 
training that day. Or that the more experienced ones pass on their knowledge 
to the less experienced. And also the fact that there are team meetings among 
the counsellors, and that each advice is a team supported advice, adds to the 
trustworthiness of their information. (BO) 
It’s not clear to me whether everything is discussed at team level, or only when 
a counsellor asks for this. Then they could choose not to discuss certain cases. 
Maybe they work with random samples, or the head of the team decides which 
cases to discuss? I have no idea. (AQ) 
Proposition: Internal control processes assure the trustee to refrain from untrustworthy 
behaviour (gap 2). 
7.2.4 Workload 
To do two things at once is to do neither. 
A high workload, a problematic case backlog, high administrative burden, and a lack of means 
and political support are often heard complaints concerning the judicial system as a whole 
(Depré & Hondeghem, 2000). An organisation where there is a lot of work pressure can cause 
untrustworthy behaviour from the members of that organisation, irrespective of the possible 
trustworthy nature of the individuals. Also in the judicial youth care chain there is a realisation 
that the own workload and that of the other organisations is quite substantial. There is also the 
feeling that the workload increased in recent years, due to the reorganisation of 2014 bringing 
about an increased administrative load and a recent increase in cases of alarming situations. A 
high workload had a negative effect on the perception of the ability of the other since there is a 
feeling that when one needs to depend on a person from the other organisation, they might not 
have had the time to do a good enough job, as the following public prosecutor and judge are 
aware of: 
The work pressure, the workload, has an influence on the way tasks are 
executed. It will definitely have an influence, and when more staff and resources 
are available, everyone can work more comfortable. […] You can expect that 
when the work pressure decreases you will be able to work more focused, more 
attentively, and more precise, and this will affect trust. (D) 
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When there is not enough staff to cover the workload I worry whether 
everything will be fine. I think that’s really important for trust in the 
functioning. (F) 
Another consequence of the heavy workload is that there is less time for communication and 
personal contact, which can affect the perception of the benevolence of the other, but also 
inhibit gathering more information for a clearer picture of the other’s trustworthiness, for the 
trustor to share their expectations, and for the trustee to share their limitations. One solution 
to this is the OM designating the criminologist to deal with all the personal communication 
with the other organisation, which can increase the trustworthiness of the OM: “Where the 
cooperation works very well is with the criminologists of the OM, that is really an added value 
(AR)”.  
The negative effect of the high workload could, however, be compensated for through the 
presence of extremely motivated individuals in these organisations. The limitation of the 
members’ abilities was adjusted for by the displayed extra effort not to let a heavy workload lead 
to neglect of any tasks. The following judge remembers this was the case when previously 
working at the OM: 
I have worked at the OM myself as part of my internship, for one and a half 
years. Then I have noticed that you constantly need to step on the gas to 
manage your cases. There is definitely not an over-capacity of magistrates at 
the OM at this time. But they do keep on pushing to be able to do their tasks 
properly. […] Thanks to their work ethic and their passion. (BI) 
Proposition: A high workload of the trustee can decrease trustworthy behaviour, because time 
pressure obstructs the performing (gap 2). This is partly countered by the high integrity of the 
members, which prevents them from allowing negligence in the dealing with the cases. 
7.3 Interorganisational characteristics 
The second set of factors extracted after analysis of the interviews comprises the 
interorganisational principles that govern the interactions between the organisations of the 
judicial youth care. This suggests that to be perceived as trustworthy is not the sole 
responsibility of the individual within the organisation, or of the organisation in the network, 
but also of the rules applied to the interactions between the organisations. The four factors are 
stipulation of a shared goal, separation of tasks, continuity, and proximity. Next, the factors are 
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described one by one, in descending order of number of references about a certain factor as 
presented in Table 21. 
Table 21 Number of references per sub-category of interorganisational inputs 
Node # sources # references 
Shared goal 36 127 
Separation of duties 40 112 
Continuity 30 61 
Proximity 19 38 
 
7.3.1 Stipulation of a shared goal 
Get everyone rowing in the same direction. 
Among all members involved in judicial youth care, there is a strong awareness that everyone 
works towards one shared goal: protecting minors who find themselves in alarming situations. 
Alarming situations include, for example, neglected or abused children, children with insurgent 
behaviour, or gang membership of a minor. Next to protecting minors, the different 
organisations do have other goals, such as the judges who also dictate societal values, however, 
protecting the minors was said to be the primary concern. The members of the different 
organisations are “much attuned to each other because of the goal of installing care for a certain 
minor” (AU).  
I believe the expectation is that we are all involved in the same philosophy and 
that for everyone the interest of the child is priority. And this should be the 
underlying principle for all decisions, in files as well as in the cooperation; this 
has to be the critical factor. (C) 
This goal congruence is underlined by mandating each actor in the chain of judicial youth care 
by the same legislative decree on integrated youth care (IYC), which coordinates the actions of 
the different actors towards this shared goal. It creates a set of shared values and a shared 
language among the cooperating organisations. The only exception among the organisations 
involved in the judicial decision-making process is the youth police, which is not coordinated 
by the IYC decree, and which is felt as a missed opportunity for the police. It was also 
acknowledged that the difference in approaches to youth care were still apparent in certain 
situations, especially between the actors linked closely with the voluntary youth care and those 
without these links. This refrains certain actors from closely cooperating with the other actors, 
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or lowers their perception of the trustworthiness of the others. However, these differences are 
felt more between the judicial youth care and the voluntary youth care providers. The following 
judge describes such difference in approach between the court and the SDJ: 
There is a different approach between a care giver and someone from the 
judicial system. I have an example on this, of a case where a boy was under 
court surveillance. […] And every year the SDJ asks to close the case because 
the boy does not have any problems. […] And I say surveillance is still necessary, 
because the father is practically a mobster. I said: “Doesn’t that bother you?” 
They said: “If he takes good care of his children, than there is no longer an issue 
for us.” So yeah, there is a tension field. (BA) 
There are still some organisational relations where the congruence of values and norms is not 
that strong. Especially towards the VK there is some concern about in how far they share the 
values of cooperation and openness that is present in the rest of the chain, which was reflected 
in the lowest score of 3,63 on the benevolence scale (see Chapter 6). Also towards the mandated 
facilities there is less the feeling that they are working for the same goal. Of course, between the 
organisations there can still be a tension in how a minor is best protected. The care 
organisations might be more inclined to solve the problems within a family through 
deliberation, even when the threat to the child comes from within the family, while the 
magistrates and police might be more inclined to protect the child by removing them 
immediately from the threat. 
Cooperation with the magistrates is varying, I find. It’s harder than it used to 
be. Also a number of new, younger magistrates who are very on the legal part, 
which is their task in fact. They think in terms of criminal law and 
investigations, and the care part is more subsidiary to that. (AR) 
You do notice that in meetings with the VK and the OM, with the magistrates 
there, that the VK had a different train of thought than us, the police. We had 
a small discussion about this, that the police and OM don’t only work 
repressive. That we are certainly there to try and get care delivered, and to help 
the children, not just to tackle a momentary situation. But apparently they 
can’t agree with that. (AG)  
Proposition: Defining a shared goal between the organisations increases the trustworthy 
behaviour of the participants, through value congruence and cooperation, closing gap 2. 
148 
  
7.3.2 Separation of duties 
A typical characteristic of judicial decision-making is that the tasks of investigation and 
adjudication are not devoted to one single person or a single organisation. To protect citizens 
against accidental errors or even deliberate harm from the judicial power, many checks and 
balances are incorporated in the system. In the judicial youth care, this is also the case. Each 
party has been assigned a distinct task to pursue the common goal, which they help accomplish 
by contributing their part to the expertise required for protecting a child (as laid out in Chapter 
3). From the interviews, it became clear that the strict segregation of duties has a strong impact 
on the perceived trustworthiness. It was also clear that where the separation of the duties is not 
well organised friction could occur between the organisations. This strict separation of duties 
has three important consequences: autonomy of each organisation, interdependency between 
the organisations, and clarity of roles and responsibilities. These are described in more detail 
below. 
7.3.2.1 Autonomy 
The best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them. 
~ Ernest Hemingway 
Between each of the organisations there is almost absolute autonomy in the way they organise 
themselves and the way they execute the tasks. There is no hierarchical structure between the 
six organisations. In a way, there is a hierarchy between the OM and the police, with the former 
giving tasks to the latter, and between the juvenile judge and the SDJ, again with the former 
enquiring a task from the latter. However, the commanding party cannot choose which person 
executes the tasks, how many resources will be devoted to the task execution, when the task 
should be executed, etc. In addition, the respondents did not experience this as a real 
hierarchical relationship, describing themselves more as “equals” in the process, as this 
counsellor of the SDJ did:  
The juvenile judge cannot in any way, or may not in any way, under no 
circumstances tell the counsellor “you should give me this advice”. And the 
juvenile judge can, may, take a completely different decision than what we 
propose. Because a judge also hears the juvenile lawyer, also hears the parents… 
(AU) 
This lack of control over the other organisation means there is no possibility to correct the 
behaviour to the liking of the trustor. It could be expected that this sustains a gap between the 
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expectations of the trustor and the behaviour of the trustee. It seems, however, that this 
autonomy actually has a positive effect on the perception of the trustworthiness of the other. 
The lack of control over the other could have the effect that the trustees take more responsibility 
over their actions, and can contain a sense of integrity and pride over their work. 
Everyone performs their own task in good conscience and feels responsible for 
their task, to do it autonomously. […] You need to trust the SDJ a lot, they are 
the eyes and the ears, the right-hand of the judge. You need to trust their 
information, and base your decision on this. But in the end the judge is still 
responsible for the decision. (BO) 
Sometimes, however, some organisations do try to steer other organisations into the direction 
they prefer. However, the autonomy forces the parties to come to agreements on how the other 
should operate through mutual negotiation. When the judges, for example, do not agree with a 
certain practice of the SDJ, they can bring this up with the superior of the SDJ, and only by 
mutual agreement can things be considered for change. 
It happened that we, me and my colleague, we had remarks about the 
functioning of a certain counsellor, and then this was discussed with the team 
leader, who picked it up with the counsellor. And in this case this really led to 
an improvement. (BN) 
One negative effect of the autonomy is that there are little control mechanisms left to control 
the outcomes or behaviour of the other organisation. This means trust is not always based on 
rational considerations, but rather on a limitation of power leading up to forced trust, and trust 
as a coping mechanism rather than a logical consequence of the cooperation. Trust based on 
good perceptions of the trustworthiness is likely to be more durable than forced trust. A 
counsellor of the OCJ describes such situation: 
There have been periods where we felt with certain prosecutors that they did 
not take us seriously. And then you feel powerless, you also feel like falling short 
towards the families. (AL) 
Proposition: Autonomy makes the counterpart take responsibility for their actions (gap 2), and 
promotes the need for making mutual agreements which all parties agree upon (gap 3).  
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7.3.2.2 Interdependency 
I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine. 
The clear task division creates another important feature of this network, namely that each 
organisation is dependent on the work and on the goodwill of the other organisation. Together 
with the earlier factor of autonomy, the interdependence can ensure a power balance between 
organisations. Cooperating with the partners is then required to accomplish the common goal. 
They could “sit on their island, but when you need something for yourself, then you won’t be 
able to get it either” (BB) as one judge puts it. All the organisations directly in contact with each 
other experience bilateral interdependency (see Figure 9 in Chapter 3), in the sense that at one 
point in the handling of the cases they are directly dependent on the work of the other, without 
the possibility to take over the task by themselves. Moreover, they cannot choose to cooperate 
with another organisation, since there is only one organisation who has the mandate to perform 
this task in a certain district. All this makes for a stable and durable interdependency, which 
was also acknowledged by the respondents. 
There is no other way than to cooperate with each other. We are truly 
dependent of one another, we need each other. Even though we might 
sometimes not agree or have a different opinion in an individual case, they need 
us and we need them. That’s why we will try our best to keep the cooperation 
optimal and to always continue to engage in dialogue. (AM) 
This interdependency installs a quid pro quo situation: an expectation that trustworthy 
behaviour will be reciprocated in future interactions. As such untrustworthy behaviour will pose 
long-term disadvantages by rendering future cooperation more difficult and therefore impeding 
the own work. The egalitarian relationship creates a good ground for information exchange, 
cooperation, and openness, without fearing any punitive consequences of the cooperating 
partners. So working together closely and being open is promoted by these factors, as there are 
little consequences to being too open and too cooperative. A partner will act more reliable when 
they expect something in return in the future, based on reciprocity. For example, the first line 
help is less keen than the mandated facilities on giving information to the public prosecutor, 
although they have the same barriers of confidentiality. First-line help does not need anything 
back from the public prosecutor in the future, while the mandated facilities and public 
prosecutors are mutually dependent on each other. 
Proposition: A balanced interdependency ensures that each party will behave their best, to 
ensure cooperation will be reciprocated in future interactions (gap 2). 
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7.3.2.3 Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
Good agreements make good friends. 
The decree on IYC, stipulating the separate tasks and responsibilities of each actor, was designed 
to streamline and better coordinate the youth care in Flanders. This can improve the 
trustworthiness because it shows the trustor what can be expected of the trustee, and gives the 
trustee a clear overview of what tasks should be focused on. Not only the decree can help, but 
also deontological codes of the organisation or of the whole network can inform members of 
how they are expected to behave in the cooperation. 
 I’m not sure whether it is due to the decree, but the document the OCJ uses to 
refer a societal need or urgent case to the OM has a certain template, which 
maybe forces them more than before to style the report in a certain way. I have 
noticed that now from the beginning of a case there is a concrete problem 
statement, which wasn’t always the case before. […] I find this information has 
improved. (BB&BC) 
However, many issues remain, which cause difficulties in the interactions between the members 
of the organisations. A problem that can occur in complex networks like the justice system is 
that the division of tasks is not that clearly defined. For some tasks, there is a certain overlap, 
and for others it is unclear which organisation should take the responsibility. In addition, for 
certain grey areas in the decree, it is not clear whether one organisation can call upon the other 
organisation for a task or whether this is prohibited. The importance of a clear task division is 
that the expectations one organisation has towards the other are clear, so there are less chances 
for friction. Another area where the responsibilities are not yet clearly carved out is everything 
to do with professional confidentiality. The interpretation of when the conditions for breaking 
the secrecy are met differs between the organisations, causing friction between the 
organisations. 
When the task division is clear between the different actors, only then will we 
know what can and what cannot be said during meetings. Now it is often not 
clear between care givers and magistrates, which creates uncertainty. Once the 
role division is clear there will be more openness and can the cooperation run 
more smoothly. (BD) 
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Yes, it’s a very grey area. And this is not easy, when there are frustrations it 
usually comes down to this. Information that couldn’t be shared but in fact 
should have been shared. Nobody will take that risk, which I can somewhat 
understand. But I am also frustrated sometimes, knowing that if we had known 
certain things we could have done this or that, if only we were aware of it. (AU) 
Proposition: Clear stipulation and separation of the tasks between the organisations makes clear 
what is expected from the trustee (gap 3) and increases the interdependency (gap 2). 
7.3.3 Continuity 
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. 
The judicial youth care chain in Flanders knows a long history of cooperation between several 
partners for achieving the common goal of child protection. For example, the juvenile judges 
are responsible for assigning judicial youth care since 1965, and they can count on the support 
from the counsellors of the SDJ since 1985 (and even before the SDJ existed, there were 
counsellors in the court). At the same time, there is the prospect of a long-term continuation of 
the cooperation, since they are legally bound to work together. This durable character of the 
cooperation has several benefits to the level of trustworthiness present and perceived in the 
network. On the one hand, trustors can rely on the past to inform for future interactions, 
offering information on which to base an evaluation of the trustworthiness of a trustee. As such, 
the gap between the perception of the trustworthiness and the actual behaviour of the trustee 
can decrease by removing bias in the perception. 
Of course, counsellors with whom you work together more often you know 
better, and this has in turn an influence on your trust. Usually for better, 
sometimes maybe for worse. (BI) 
On the other hand, the prospect of recurring interactions motivates a partner to refrain from 
any behaviour that makes them look bad, or causes contempt from the trustor. This shadow of 
the future also stimulates members to invest time in the sustainability of the cooperation, and 
offers the opportunity to search for long-term solutions and an accumulation of these solutions.  
Of course, we have a long-standing tradition of cooperation within judicial 
youth care, of having to work together. I can imagine that those who are not 
used to that will have it a lot harder, especially in the beginning. While we have 
a cooperation since several years, where we also had to find the best ways of 
cooperating. (AM) 
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It has advantages to be in the sector for a long time. You know the people […], 
you can more easily enter a place without needing to make a formal agreement 
first. And you can gain from that. (AV) 
Proposition: The continuity of the alliance creates many past experiences, offering the trustee 
more information to base their perceptions on, removing part of the perception bias (gap 1) and 
gives the trustor more information on the expectations of the trustor (gap 3). 
Proposition: The continuity offers a prospect of recurring interaction, refraining the trustee from 
acting in an untrustworthy manner (gap 2). 
7.3.4 Interorganisational proximity 
Out of sight, out of mind. 
The interorganisational proximity is a constitutional element between the organisations, where 
the physical proximity between the organisations is meant. This aspect is partly manageable, 
since, for example, formerly the SDJ was housed inside the courthouse, while now it resides in 
a separate building, which can be at a distance from each other. Now, at least in the sampled 
embedded cases, the SDJ is housed inside the same building as the OCJ, often on the same or 
on adjacent floors, sharing a coffee machine and a canteen. The OM and the juvenile court still 
reside in the same building: the general courthouse. The architecture of the buildings, the 
placement of the separate departments within one building, or the scale of the organisation can 
determine whether members of both organisations easily seek personal contact with each other 
or not, which can in turn affect perceived trustworthiness. For example, one of the two 
mandated facilities, the OCJ, is housed in the same building as the SDJ, while the other 
mandated facility, the VK, is housed in another building. Looking back at the trustworthiness 
scores in Chapter 6, within the sample the SDJ perceives the OCJ more trustworthy than the 
VK, and likewise the SDJ is perceived more trustworthy by the OCJ than by the VK, despite the 
fact that they are both mandated facilities with a similar task. This could be due to the shared 
origins and shared administrative governance (VK is a non-profit, while OCJ and SDJ are 
governmental organisations). However, one of the SDJ counsellors and a secretary at the OM 
reported that the physical proximity could also affect how well they work together: 
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The fact that I just pop into their office when I receive a casefile from the OCJ, 
I can easily ask: “do you have the referral to the OM, can I get it?” It makes the 
cooperation much more practical than with the VK, they work in another 
service, with another historical background. I also hear from colleagues from 
the OCJ that the way they work with the VK is still different. Even though they 
are both mandated facilities with the same functioning, there remains a large 
difference. (R) 
Here, people run into each other once in a while, so I think the distance, the real 
physical distance, can bring about a form of distrust. The closer people work 
together they will get to know each other, respect each other more, more trust. 
If all walls would be broken down, so to speak, and everyone worked closer 
together, I think there would be a different way of looking at each other. (B) 
Another factor that can determine the proximity between members of the organisation is the 
scale on which the organisations are organised. In the sample, districts of different sizes were 
included, but this factor did not come up as influential by the respondents. This is possibly 
because the larger district had taken counter measures to deal with the larger scale, such as 
making sure only certain counsellors deal with certain juvenile judges, instead of with all 
juvenile judges. The scale could affect, however, the informality between the actors, as one 
counsellor of the SDJ who had the experience of working in both a larger and a smaller district 
noticed. 
The communication here is much more direct [than in a larger district]. It is 
customary that the judges call us and contact us fast. In [the larger district] 
this was not the case. Here, we are also not more than 100 meters apart. It’s 
small things like that, but they do play a role. The custom in the larger district 
was to first call the registrar while here you call the judge, because they want 
you to contact them, there they wanted you to contact the registrar, and this 
created a distance. (Q) 
Proposition: Physical proximity between organisations in a network can improve the perception 
of the trustworthiness by creating more opportunities for personal contact and communication, 
which in turn has an important influence on closing the trustworthiness gap. 
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Proposition: Proximity between the organisations increases the potential for personal and 
informal contact between the members of the organisation, reinforcing the effect of those input 
factors. 
7.4 Chapter summary and discussion 
In this chapter, the interviews were used to better understand which context-specific 
organisational and interorganisational inputs influenced the perception of trustworthiness in 
the case of the judicial youth care chain. The different organisational factors that were identified 
are (1) the communication strategy, (2) personnel composition, (3) internal process control, and 
(4) the workload. The interorganisational factors that were identified are (1) the stipulations of 
a shared goal, (2) the separation of duties, (3) continuity, and (4) proximity. While these 
characteristics were not installed to improve trust between the organisations in the chain, they 
do directly affect the perception of the trustworthiness of the members of the organisations. 
This focus on institutional origins of trust is an addition to the focus on the interpersonal, micro 
level focus, something Bachmann & Inkpen (2011) plead for.  
The first organisational factor, the communication strategy, entails that allowing and 
encouraging frequent personal contact with and open communication policy will offer 
opportunities for the perception of the trustworthiness to be adjusted, removing existing bias. 
This will be positive if indeed the intentions and behaviours of the trustee are better than how 
they were initially perceived. It also allows for better understanding the working procedures 
and limitations of the trustee, and for adjusting certain unrealistic expectations of the trustor 
towards the trustee. Nohria & Eccles (1992) found that indeed the means of contact play a role, 
where face-to-face communication is the most effective way for facilitating trust. Many others 
found a connection between personal contact and trust, where the familiarity and relational 
dimension that emerge between two individuals gives an advantage to the strength of the tie 
and the probability of cooperating in the future (Gausdal, 2012) and leads to trust or distrust in 
collaboration (Bachmann, 2003; Hudson et al., 1999). Emotion enters into the relationship 
between the parties, because frequent, long-term interaction leads to the formation of 
attachment based on reciprocated interpersonal care and concern (McAllister, 1995). Personal 
experiences between people can make the interaction smoother, because a stronger bond and 
greater trust develops. It makes a person seem more real and human, and thus more trustworthy 
(Abrams et al., 2003). Six (2005) likewise found, in a context of consultancy firms, that many 
opportunities for informal contact contributes to trust building. Moreover, personal experiences 
with others increase the amount of information available to assess another’s abilities, intentions, 
and behaviours within the relationship (Abrams et al., 2003). Although the information about 
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the other can also be negative based on bad previous experiences, the literature alludes to the 
fact that mere exposure to something typically leads to increased feelings of liking and therefore 
the link between communication frequency and trust is generally positive (Becerra & Gupta, 
2003). This could also be explained by the fact that the more frequent personal contact there is, 
the greater the chance that the expectations gap decreases, since there are more opportunities 
for communication. Through communication one can get to know the other organisation as 
well, which has earlier been found to be an important antecedent of trustworthiness by Gil-
Garcia et al. (2010). It provides a better sense of the complexity of the other organisation, and 
creates mutual respect and good relationships among participants. Communication increases 
the opportunity to assess the other participant’s trustworthiness (Ostrom, 1998). These 
interactions outside of the digital arena offer more opportunities for building trust, through the 
increase of relational input next to the reliance on depersonalised institutional factors (Pavlou, 
2002). Nilsson & Mattes (2015) found that while fragile forms of trust can be created across 
physical distance, this is rarely the case for resilient trust. As the interaction amongst the 
collaborators increases actors are able to assess the other’s intentions and draw inferences about 
the trustworthiness for forecasting future behaviour (R. M. Kramer, 2010). It was also found that 
full transparency of governments or private organisations does not automatically lead to more 
trust in these institutions (Jonkers, 2013; Opraus & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Transparency, can 
lead to a negative perception compared to non-disclosure because faults and shortcomings 
become more apparent. 
The second organisational factor, the personnel management, entails that an organisation 
should attract, maintain, and retain trustworthy individuals within their organisation. The goal 
of the judicial youth care, together with the demanding job requirements, caused for a self-
selection of trustworthy individuals, but the challenge of the organisations is to correctly 
inaugurate and train their members, and to make sure the trustworthy individuals do not exit 
the organisation due to inflexible HR-procedures and the lack of (financial and emotional) 
extrinsic motivators. As such, correct personnel management has the power to incite 
trustworthy behaviour from their personnel, which should decrease the gap between what the 
trustor expects and how the trustee acts (gap 2), given that both trustor and trustee have the 
same beliefs about how a trustworthy individual should act. Other found that ongoing 
organisational changes (Kiefer, 2005) and the extent to and the length in which an organisation 
uses temporary workers (George, 2003) are negatively related to trust in organisations. 
The third organisational factor, the internal process control, entails installing control 
mechanisms inside the organisation so that the output created by the organisation is of 
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sufficient quality, and should prevent members of the organisation to act in an untrustworthy 
manner. This will decrease gap 2 by improving how trustees behave, but can also close gap one 
when the trustor becomes aware of the internal measures of the organisation, improving their 
perception of the trustworthiness. This can be reinforced by frequent personal contact where 
such measures can be mentioned. Williamson (1985) has argued the case for formalised 
governance structures and safeguards to control for opportunism and deceit. On the other hand, 
Mayer et al. (1995) argued that a strong organisational control system could inhibit the 
development of trust, because a trustee's actions may be interpreted as responses to that control 
rather than signs of trustworthiness. 
The fourth and last organisational factor, the workload within the organisation, can 
compromise the behaviour of the members of the organisation, increasing gap 2 due to the 
resulting untrustworthy behaviour, and can induce the perception that the members will 
behave untrustworthy by the trustor, increasing the trustworthiness gap. The relation between 
workload/work pressure and trustworthiness or trust seems not to have been researched yet. 
Besides the workload of the trustee, it can be assumed that workload of the trustor organisation 
could also have an important impact on the trust this trustor has, since this could force trust 
from their side. When people are forced to take risks not based on positive expectations but 
based on time pressures put on them, it might seem like there is trust present, while there is 
actually not. In an environment where one does not have the time to double check the other’s 
work with other sources due to a lack of time, there can exist a rather dangerous situation. The 
trustor is then forced to take risks while this is not based on positive expectations of the other. 
This way mistakes or purposeful abuse could find its way into the processes. It might be better 
for the performance of a network when organisations actually have the time to distrust one 
another, making sure the checks and balances system can be fully benefited from. This part was 
not covered in the interviews but could be interesting to look into more.  
The first interorganisational factor, the stipulation of a shared goal, ensures everyone is 
working towards the same goal and everyone benefits from helping others out to reach this goal. 
This can induce benevolent behaviour, closing gap 2. Working towards the same goal installs 
value identification, which increases the chances that everyone has the same expectations about 
how a person in the chain should act, decreasing gap 3. Possibly, there is an interaction with the 
factor of ‘personnel management’ since people with similar values are attracted to the 
organisations with the same shared goal. Other have found that a shared goal acts as a 
normative, enduring and fundamental behavioural guide for the members of the partnership 
(Kashyap & Sivadas, 2012). Shared goals are an important relational resource and also a 
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necessary condition to facilitate meaningful communication between parties in exchange 
relationships (Chow & Chan, 2008). Morgan & Hunt (1994) argue that shared goals are a major 
driving force that facilitates the development of interorganisational trust and relationship 
commitment, by creating shared values and a shared language between the organisations. They 
define shared values as the “extent to which partners have beliefs in common about what 
behaviours, goals, and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and 
right or wrong” (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, p. 25). Abrams et al. (2003) argue that it is important for 
knowledge sharing networks to establish and ensure a shared vision and language (see also Tsai 
and Ghoshal, 1998). However, in the extreme case, being exposed to the same institutional 
environment could lead to institutional isomorphism, where all actors behave in a similar 
manner (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
The second interorganisational factor, the separation of duties, where each organisation has 
a clear task that is distinctive to the tasks of the other organisations, causes in the judicial youth 
care chain a high level of autonomy for the organisations, high interdependency between the 
organisations, and clarity of the roles and responsibilities for everyone. The high level of 
autonomy gives the trustee organisation the change to perform well independent of control 
mechanisms imposed by the trustee. This forced initial trust increases the chances for a positive 
experience with the trustee can occur without control being exercised over the conditions of 
the trustee. It seems that power balance is beneficial to trust creation, since otherwise, for the 
less dependent partner, having relative power over its weaker partner makes it likely this power 
will be used to achieve the partner's cooperation and to obtain valuable outcomes. In a business 
context it has been found that the stronger firm has little structural motivation to identify with 
or become attached to the weaker partner (Geyskens et al., 1996). For the more dependent party, 
its fear of exploitation reduces its satisfaction with the relationship (Anderson & Narus, 1984) 
and consequently also its motivation to continue the relationship for affective reasons 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989). 
The third interorganisational factor, the continuity of the collaboration, creates a collection of 
past experiences which offer additional information to the trustor on the trustworthiness of the 
trustee. This can decrease existing bias between the actual behaviour and the perception (gap 
1). Continuity also creates a prospect of long-term future cooperation, making a party refrain 
from opportunistic behaviour, since this can jeopardise the cooperation. Together with the 
balanced interdependence, this means each party will try to stay on the good side of the others, 
closing gap 2. Moreover, gap 3 can also shrinks because with more experience each party gets 
more informed about each other’s possibilities and expectations. Continuity can thus be a big 
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advantage to cooperation, and a current concern for many practitioners is how to build trust in 
networks that only exist for a brief period of time requiring the realisation of swift trust 
(Meyerson et al., 1996). This concern is based on the knowledge that trust develops gradually 
and needs repeated interactions (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). While trust can be seen 
as a determinant of continuation (Anderson & Weitz, 1989) in the judicial youth care chain the 
continuity between the collaborating partners is legally ensured. Other than is the case for most 
private sector alliances, there is no possibility for either partners to circumvent the other partner 
for its tasks since there are no competitors present to take the other’s place. Therefore, in this 
case the question can be turned around to see whether involuntary continuation of a 
cooperation has any impact on the perception of the trustworthiness of the cooperating 
partners. Forced continuation can cause conflict escalation between the partners, without a way 
out of the conflict, which can have detrimental effects on the cooperation at hand. Earlier 
scholars have also referred to the effects of past experiences as the shadow of the past informing 
current interactions (Poppo et al., 2008). Parties choose to cooperate in value-sharing activities 
that are difficult to specify contractually, such as sharing private information or tacit knowledge, 
because “they have credible assurances that they will be rewarded for them” (Dyer & Singh, 
1998, p. 671). Gulati (1995, p. 92) explains, “the idea of trust is based on the premise that through 
ongoing interaction, firms learn about each other and develop trust around norms of equity”. 
Moreover, ongoing interaction sanctions negative behaviour, and in doing so forms a credible 
basis for developing mutual expectations (Larson, 1992). The shadow of the past offers 
information on the trustworthiness of the members of the partner organisation, enabling the 
trustor to move from a neutral or distrusting position to a trusting one, granted that the 
experiences are indeed positive. Zajonc (1968) showed that people were more likely to have a 
more positive attitude towards objects when they were exposed to it frequently than if they were 
not. This was termed the mere-exposure effect. In addition, the future prospect has been 
appropriately called shadow of the future by earlier scholars (Axelrod, 2006; Poppo et al., 2008). 
Cooperative assurances are built through reciprocal acts and depend critically upon a 
significantly extended time horizon of future exchange. Without a window of continuity, short-
term gains would derail trust (Poppo et al., 2008). As such, partners can promote cooperative 
behaviour with their counterpart by creating more durable forms of interactions (Axelrod, 
2006). Any restructuring should be accompanied by sufficient information sharing, but also by 
the knowledge that things need time to settle, and there should be a buffer for the time it takes 
for these things to settle. Legislators should consider this and not make rash decisions on 
revising the legislation when things have not settled down yet. While permanency of the alliance 
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between partners aids the probability of personal interaction and relational trust to emerge, 
there must be sufficient room for personal contact between the boundary spanners to benefit 
from the durability. 
The fourth, and last, interorganisational factor, the proximity between the organisations, 
affects the trustworthiness of the others by creating more opportunities for personal contact 
and communication, reinforcing the effects of those inputs. Both the physical proximity of the 
buildings of departments in which the members reside, as the proximity caused by the scale of 
the departments, play a role. Other research found that trust is more likely to occur and to be 
prevalent when actors have the spatial capability for personal, direct interaction, and that 
embeddedness and proximity in a network lead to an increase of trust between network partners 
(Gössling, 2004; Kraut et al., 1990). Nilsson & Mattes (2015) confirm the importance of direct 
social exchange in the creation of more resilient trust, particularly the speed at which such trust 
can be created and primarily is done when actors are (at least temporarily) collocated. When 
this is not the case, more fragile forms of trust will only be able to emerge. 
To summarize, this resulted in the formulation of the following propositions: 
- Meetings between the organisations offer an opportunity to share the expectations that 
the counter organisation holds (gap 3). 
- Supporting personal encounters with members of an organisation can remove bias 
between the manifestation and the perception of the behaviour (gap 1), and adding an 
informal dimension to the personal encounters will enforce this effect. 
- Providing feedback is a manifestation of benevolent behaviour and removes some bias 
in the perception (gap 1 & 2). 
- During personal contact agreements can emerge which create guidelines for the trustee 
about what is expected from them by the trustor (gap 3). 
- Open communication can remove bias from the perception by clearing out 
misinterpretations of behaviour (gap 1). 
- A shared goal with high social stakes increases the integrity of the participants, both 
through internal motivation and self-selection of trustworthy members (gap 2). 
- Inauguration, training, and specialisation ensure that the actual intentions and 
behaviour of the members remain trustworthy (gap 2). 
- Human resource practices that focus on retaining the members in the organisation for 
longer periods should improve the trustworthiness of these members (gap 2). 
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- Internal control processes assure the trustee to refrain from untrustworthy behaviour 
(gap 2). 
- A high workload of the trustee can decrease trustworthy behaviour, because time 
pressure obstructs the performing (gap 2). This is partly countered by the high integrity 
of the members, which prevents them from allowing negligence in the dealing with the 
cases. 
- Defining a shared goal between the organisations increases the trustworthy behaviour 
of the participants, through value congruence and cooperation, closing gap 2. 
- Autonomy makes the counterpart take responsibility for their actions (gap 2), and 
promotes the need for making mutual agreements which all parties agree upon (gap 3).  
- A balanced interdependency ensures that each party will behave their best, to ensure 
cooperation will be reciprocated in future interactions (gap 2). 
- Clear stipulation and separation of the tasks between the organisations makes clear what 
is expected from the trustee (gap 3) and increases the interdependency (gap 2). 
- The continuity of the alliance creates many past experiences, offering the trustee more 
information to base their perceptions on, removing part of the perception bias (gap 1) 
and gives the trustor more information on the expectations of the trustor (gap 3). 
- The continuity offers a prospect of recurring interaction, refraining the trustee from 
acting in an untrustworthy manner (gap 2). 
- Physical proximity between organisations in a network can improve the perception of 
the trustworthiness by creating more opportunities for personal contact and 
communication, which in turn has an important influence on closing the 
trustworthiness gap. 
- Proximity between the organisations increases the potential for personal and informal 
contact between the members of the organisation, reinforcing the effect of those input 
factors. 
It can be concluded that most of the factors identified in the judicial context are thus also found 
in other contexts by other researchers as having an effect on the perception of the 
trustworthiness of the counterpart. However, showing the mechanisms through which these 
factors could have an effect by closing the gaps adds a new perspective to this. It is also 
important to note that the combined presence of several factors have a reinforcing effect on 
each other, causing the high levels of perceived trustworthiness in the judicial youth care chain.  
The organisations or the overarching administration of the alliance can control certain factors 
themselves. For example, the high turnover or the consequences of the high turnover can be 
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anticipated on. The selection of the right persons on the right job could be controlled. The 
workload can be spread so that there is more time left for checking each other’s work, and for 
communication and personal contact. In addition, when there seems to be too much trust 
between certain individuals from different organisations that it becomes dysfunctional, there 
can be an adjustment of certain factors, such as the proximity of two organisations that should 
in fact keep reservations towards each other when it comes to confidential information. 
Ultimately, the framework of Dietz could offer a good starting point, however, not all factors 
hypothesised by Dietz emerged from the data. For example, culture was not put forward by the 
respondents as a decisive factor for trustworthiness to be perceived. This is remarkably, because 
a large difference in the cultures from the judicial parties and the care parties can be expected. 
While the judicial members are more trained to follow legal rules, the care organisations will be 
taught to be more flexible.
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Chapter 8 Trust: Willingness to exchange 
information 
In Chapter 6, it was established there are high levels of perceived trustworthiness in the judicial 
youth care chain, it was identified what trustworthiness entails in this case, and it was 
discovered how the perception of trustworthiness was influenced by an interplay of different 
existing gaps. These gaps contribute to a departure of the perception of the trustworthiness 
from the existing expectations of the trustor. A framework was developed to support the 
implementation of a gap-analysis in an interorganisational setting, to check where the gaps are 
present and to help understand how these gaps could be reduced. Chapter 7 looked at which 
context-specific characteristics of the judicial youth care chain have an effect on the perception 
of the trustworthiness, categorised in organisational and interorganisational inputs. The 
mechanisms through which these inputs affect the perception were also studied, by examining 
which of the gaps are affected by the different inputs. 
In the universal trust process proposed by Dietz (2011) – which functions as a guidance for this 
exploration – the inputs precede the trustworthiness, which in turn precedes trust. In this case, 
trust is operationalised as the willingness to share information, which is the main 
interdependency between the involved organisations. This chapter therefore proceeds in the 
trust process by examining the actual willingness to share information and how this is 
influenced by the earlier examined perception of the trustworthiness (see Figure 28). This will 
offer an answer to the fourth research question: What is the impact of perceived trustworthiness 
on the willingness to exchange mandatory, optional, or prohibited information? For answering 
this research question, data from both data collection methods are applied, namely the survey 
and the interview data, to get a broad grasp on this step in the trust process. In this chapter, 
first, the levels of trust are evaluated, looking also at the variation between trustor and trustee 
organisations, then, the correlation between trustworthiness and trust is analysed based on the 
survey data, and lastly, this link and the mechanisms behind it are further explored by analysing 
the interview data, where interesting patterns emerge. The chapter is concluded with a section 
providing a summary of the findings and a discussion of the results in light of existing research. 
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Figure 28 The universal trust process (Dietz, 2011), indicating what is explored in this chapter 
8.1 The willingness to exchange information 
Exchanging information has two aspects to it: the provision of information by the holder of the 
information and the acceptance of the information by the receiver of the information. As such, 
during the exchange of information, one party provides and one party accepts information, and 
both parties involved are both trustor and a trustee at the same time (see Figure 29). The holder 
of the information needs to trust the receiver of the information before being willing to disclose 
the information, and needs to be trusted by the receiver of the information for them to accept 
the information and take it at face value. The receiver of the information needs to be trusted by 
the sender before the information will be passed on to them, and they need to trust the person 
or organisation sending the information to actually give credence to the piece of information 
they just received. In a personal information exchange, the situation can become even more 
complex because often both parties provide and receive information at the same time. Both 
aspects of providing and accepting information will be discussed separately below, describing 
the levels of trust regarding information sharing deducted from the survey sample. 
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Figure 29 During information exchange, the provider and receiver of the information are both trustor and 
trustee at the same time 
Providing information is accompanied by certain risks. When an trustor Ai from organisation 
A in the judicial youth care chain sends information to organisation B within the same chain, a 
vulnerability emerges in the sense that Ai cannot further control what organisation B does with 
the information, resulting in uncertain situations. Within organisation B, the information might 
not reach the targeted member of that organisation (Bi) due to internal organisational 
complications of organisation B. When the information does reach Bi, they might misinterpret 
the information or not value it correctly, and as a result ignore or misuse it further down the 
decision making process. Moreover, the information, and therefore Ai, becomes vulnerable to 
being criticised by Bi for incorrectness or incompleteness, or other perceived shortcomings of 
the information. There is also a time cost associated with the act of providing information. To 
minimise their own vulnerability Ai will estimate the potential costs of disclosing any 
information to organisation B, and might adjust its behaviour to the estimated risks of this 
interaction, resulting in an increased or decreased willingness to provide information. 
The survey data allows an assessment of the trust levels at the time of the exploration of the 
trust process. Even though the primary interest of this study is not to reveal how much trust 
there is between the organisations, but rather how the different steps in the trust process are 
experienced and how they are influencing one another, looking at the trust levels helps 
understand the background of the mechanisms, and suggests where and why meaningful 
differences in trust occur. Trust in providing information was measured by one item in the 
survey: ‘I easily share case-information with the following organisation’75, which was again asked 
five times to each of the respondents, once for each counter organisation. Therefore, there is no 
need to construct a new variable – as was the case with trustworthiness – instead it remains a 
                                                     
75 The limitation to one item was due to the need to reduce the amount of questions, (since each question had to be 
repeated five times for each of the counter organisations in the chain) and the lack of an existing validated scale on 
trust in information sharing (See Chapter 5). 
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categorical variable with a range from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree). Twenty 
missing values occurred because the item was not applicable to a respondent when no 
information is provided to one of the other organisations, and another six items remained 
unanswered for undefined reasons. 
The univariate frequency distribution of the variable ‘information providing’ is displayed on the 
left in Figure 30. It shows that the willingness to disclose information is generally leaning 
towards the positive end of the Likert-scale. Of a total of 144 valid responses, 72,3 percent agree 
to strongly agree with the statement, 13,2 percent score the middle neutral position (neither 
agree not disagree), and 14,6 percent disagree or strongly disagreed with the statement. The fact 
that nearly three quarters of the interorganisational relationships are characterised by a positive 
feeling of trust is not surprising, given the earlier observed positive perceptions of the three 
dimensions of trustworthiness: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Indeed, according to the 
universal trust process, trust is directly influenced by the perception of the trustworthiness of 
the trustee, albeit with potential distortions due to consequences beyond the relationship. Such 
distortion occurs when, for example, information goes from Ai to B, but has to pass organisation 
C in order to get to B. In this case, Ai will also need to take into account their trust in C next to 
their trust in B. 
  
Figure 30 Frequency distributions in absolute numbers of the willingness to share and to accept 
information to and from the counterpart 
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Accepting information from the counterpart also poses risks since the receiver must assume 
the provided information is collected in a correct manner and the information does not include 
any mistakes (entered either accidentally or on purpose). The receiver will apply the 
information to make a decision about the minor, for which the receiver can be held accountable. 
Therefore, it is in the receiver’s best interest that this information is correct and their sources 
can be trusted. 
Trust in accepting the received information from the counterpart was similarly asked with a 
five-point Likert-scale item in the questionnaire: ‘I easily accept received information of the 
following organisation’. There were 148 valid responses to this question, received from the 34 
respondents. 22 values were missing (17 not applicable and 5 missing). The frequency 
distribution in Figure 30 shows that the willingness to accept information is scored even more 
positively than the willingness to provide information, with 88,5 percent agreeing to strongly 
agreeing with the statement, 10,1 percent of the responses remaining neutral, only 1,4 percent 
not agreeing with the statement, and none strongly disagreeing. These frequencies follow again 
logically from what was expected from the earlier observation that the organisations are 
perceived as trustworthy, which theoretically contributes to the willingness to be vulnerable. 
8.2 Trust levels depending on trustor and trustee organisation 
To get an impression of how willing members from one particular organisation in the chain are 
to provide information to another organisation in the chain, bivariate descriptive analysis are 
applied, with ‘trust’ and ‘organisation’ as included variables. For this, the trust variables are 
recoded into binary variables to make sure each category has sufficient valid data points. This 
was necessary since certain categories, for example the ‘completely disagree’ category, was used 
only little by the respondents. A trusting attitude (‘1’) is assigned when a respondent agrees or 
strongly agrees with the statement, and a no trust attitude76 (‘0’) is assigned when the 
respondent does not agree with conviction with the statement (neutral, disagree, and strongly 
disagree)77. 
                                                     
76 This category is not labelled as ‘distrust’, agreeing with various authors (see e.g. Van De Walle & Six, 2013) that 
distrust is not just the opposite of trust. Indeed, also during the interviews the respondents did not want to use the 
term distrust when there was a lack of trust. Contrary to trust, distrust can be seen as “an actor’s assured expectation 
of intended harm from the other” (Lewicki et al., 1998, p. 446), and the experiences in this case do not coincide with 
this definition. 
77 It is not self-evident to put the neutral middle category in the ‘no trust’ category instead of in the ‘trust’ category, 
since it means exactly that the respondent was unsure to which side his/her opinion leans. The reader should keep 
in mind that in the remainder of the chapter when referring to the ‘no trust’ category this includes respondents that 
were not trusting or not sure whether they are trusting, while the ‘trust’ category contains only respondents that trust 
the others without being unsure about this trust, so trusting the counterpart with conviction. 
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Table 22 displays the sample proportion of trustors from organisation A (Ai, Aj, …, An) with high 
trust, meaning they are easily willing to provide information to trustee organisation B. The 
number of item-responses for each category is also displayed. The sample-wide proportion 
should be interpreted as follows: in 72 percent of the 144 (Ai → B) relations, there is a willingness 
to provide information to the counterpart. The final row of the table indicates how much a 
trustee organisation is trusted by all other members in the chain. The police perform the least 
in this respect with less than half of their counterparts (46 percent) easily willing to provide 
information to the police. The VK also scores below average, with a proportion of only 0,46. 
These two organisations also scored below average on the trustworthiness scale (see Table 9 in 
Chapter 6). The OCJ scores close to the average, which was the same for the trustworthiness. 
The court, OM, and SDJ score above average, in ascending order. Again, this was also the case 
for their trustworthiness scores. 
The final column contains the opinion from all members of a specific trustor organisation about 
all other organisations in the chain. The voluntary care organisations OCJ and VK have the least 
trust in others and are thus most wary of providing information, followed by the court and SDJ 
also scoring below average. The OM is easily willing to provide information in 95 percent of 
their relationships with the other organisations, and police to all. Looking back at the situation 
for the perceived trustworthiness in Chapter 6, the fact that the police trust the others does not 
seem to follow from the perceived trustworthiness, since they valued the others’ trustworthiness 
below average. The same holds true for the court, but then in the opposite direction, where their 
earlier seen high perception of trustworthiness of the others, does not seem to result in a high 
level of trust in the others. It is likely that forces beyond the relationship are at work here. 
Concerning the reciprocity of trust, for the police there is a large discrepancy between the high 
trust they have in the others and the low trust they receive from the others, meaning their trust 
is not reciprocated. For the OCJ, court, and SDJ the opposite is true, where they are the ones 
not reciprocating the high levels of trust they receive from the others. 
Looking at the inner cells of the table, showing the specific directed trust levels (from all 
members of a trustor organisation in a trustee organisation), it becomes clear that the court has 
little willingness to share information with the mandated facilities (OCJ and VK), and this is 
reciprocal, where also the OCJ and VK are not willing to share information with the court. Only 
the OM is above average willing to provide information to the police. The SDJ, which is a care-
inclined facility but for the judicially imposed youth care, enjoys more trust from the judicially 
inclined actors in the chain (police, OM, and court), than from the fellow care inclined 
organisations (OCJ and VK). 
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Table 22 Proportions of willingness to provide information from A to B; N= Number of valid responses used 
to calculate proportion 
 Trustee organisation 
Trustor 
organisation 
Police OCJ VK OM Court SDJ All 
p N p N p N p N p N p N p N 
Police . . 1,00 3 1,00 1 1,00 3 1,00 2 1,00 3 1,00 12 
OCJ 0,20 5 . . 0,60 5 0,80 5 0,50 2 0,60 5 0,55 22 
VK 0,17 6 0,75 4 . . 1,00 6 0,00 3 0,67 6 0,56 25 
OM 1,00 8 0,88 8 0,88 8 . . 1,00 8 1,00 8 0,95 40 
Court 0,40 5 0,00 3 0,00 3 0,86 7 . . 1,00 7 0,60 25 
SDJ 0,25 4 0,75 4 0,75 4 0,50 4 1,00 4 . . 0,65 20 
All 0,46 28 0,73 22 0,67 21 0,84 25 0,79 19 0,86 29 0,72 144 
 
Concerning the willingness to accept information of the members of one organisation from 
another organisation, presented in Table 23, the overall level increases from 72 percent to 89 
percent, as was also clear from the earlier presented frequency distributions. From the column 
proportions displayed in the last row of the table, it can be concluded that the willingness to 
accept information is the highest when the information comes from the OM, with all 25 
individuals from the other organisations trusting the information from the OM. The police and 
SDJ share a close second place, and the court follows, all scoring above average. The 
organisations linked to voluntary care (VK and OCJ) are trusted by a below average proportion 
of their counterparts, however, still around three-quarters of their counterparts trust them. For 
the police there is a great shift in trust in accepting information from the police compared to 
the trust levels of providing information to the police, going from place six to place two in the 
ranking. Possibly, the different risks that accompany the different types of exchange lead to a 
different result in the trust process. This confirms that trust is indeed task dependent.  
The row totals displayed in the last column of Table 23 show that the police and the SDJ have 
full trust to accept information from others, followed by the court and the OM respectively. The 
VK and OCJ trust the others below average, which is reciprocal to the levels of trust they receive. 
From the inner cells, it can be concluded that especially the OCJ is not at ease sharing 
170 
  
information with the court, and the mandated facilities do not easily share information between 
themselves. 
Table 23 Proportions of willingness to accept information from A to B; N= Number of valid responses used 
to calculate percentage 
 Trustee organisation 
Trustor 
organisation 
Police CJ VK OM Court SDJ All 
p N p N p N p N p N p N p N 
Police . . 1,00 3 1,00 1 1,00 3 1,00 2 1,00 3 1,00 12 
OCJ 0,80 5 . . 0,60 5 1,00 5 0,50 2 0,80 5 0,77 22 
VK 0,83 6 0,60 5 . . 1,00 6 0,75 4 0,83 6 0,81 27 
OM 1,00 8 0,75 8 0,63 8 . . 1,00 8 1,00 8 0,88 40 
Court 1,00 5 0,75 4 0,75 4 1,00 7 . . 1,00 7 0,93 27 
SDJ 1,00 4 1,00 4 1,00 4 1,00 4 1,00 4 . . 1,00 20 
All 0,93 28 0,79 24 0,73 22 1 25 0,90 20 0,93 29 0,89 148 
 
8.3 The link between trustworthiness and trust 
8.3.1 First impression based on the survey data 
To check whether the earlier found positive perceptions of trustworthiness lie at the basis of a 
higher willingness to exchange information, and to measure the strength of this relation, 
bivariate correlation analysis can be performed. Perceived trustworthiness is a continuous 
variable, as it was used in Chapter 6, and trust is used in the recoded binary format, to make 
sure each category has sufficient information to do meaningful analysis. A visual inspection of 
the correlation can be done by looking at the boxplots, where the distribution of the perceived 
trustworthiness of the trusting relationships is compared to the perceived trustworthiness of 
the non-trusting relationships. Figure 31 shows that the median perceived trustworthiness score 
for the trusting relationships in information providing is around half a point higher than for the 
non-trusting relationships, and that overall the trustworthiness perceptions are higher when 
there is also trust present. The median perceived trustworthiness is one point higher on the 5-
point trustworthiness scale in those relationships where information is easily accepted by the 
receiver. 
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Figure 31 Boxplots of the distribution of the perceived trustworthiness for trusting an non-trusting directed 
relationships in information providing and information accepting 
To start with a parsimonious testing of this correlation, a bivariate correlation test can be 
performed without taking the clustering into account. A point-biserial correlation can be 
performed, which is a special case of the Pearson correlation when a binary variable is involved. 
The assumptions for this test are that one of the two variables is a continuous variable (the 
perceived trustworthiness scale) and the second variable is dichotomous (trust in providing 
information). A third assumption is that there are no outliers for the continuous variable in both 
categories of the dichotomous variable. The boxplots show that this is not the case for ‘trust in 
providing’ but for ‘trust in accepting’, there are five outliers. These will, however, not be 
discarded for the testing procedure, because this would lower the amount of data-points for the 
‘no trust’ group too much. Therefore, the results will need to be interpreted with caution. A 
fourth assumption is that the continuous variable is approximately normally distributed for 
each category of the dichotomous variable. This is not the case for both trust variables, as was 
tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (see Appendix F). This is not a reason not to 
perform the tests, but needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. A fifth and last 
assumption is that the continuous variable has equal variances for each category of the 
dichotomous variable. This was the case for ‘trust in providing’, but not for ‘trust in receiving’, 
as tested by the Levene's test of equality of variances (see Appendix F). Again, this needs to be 
considered in the evaluation of the results.  
The point-biserial correlation test is performed one-tailed, because the hypothesis is that the 
correlation will be in the positive direction: the higher an organisation is scored on the 
trustworthiness scale, the more likely the trustor will trust that organisation in the exchange of 
information. The outcome of the tests (see Table 24) shows that there is a significant correlation 
between perceived trustworthiness and trust in both interactions. Since certain assumptions 
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were violated, the correlation coefficient should not be used to make claims about the strength 
of the correlation. 
Table 24 Point-biseral correlation test between ’trust in providing’ and ‘trustworthiness’ and between ‘trust 
in receiving’ and ‘trustworthiness’ 
  Trustworthiness 
Trust in providing Pearson Correlation ,385* 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
N 144 
Trust in receiving Pearson Correlation ,398* 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
N 148 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
To estimate the size of the effect, taking the clustering into account, a generalised linear mixed 
model with logit transformation should be performed given the binary dependent trust variable; 
unfortunately, this is not yet sufficiently developed in the standard statistical programs 
available. In any case, it is safe to assume that, based on both the visual inspection of the 
boxplots, and the highly significant point-biseral correlation coefficients, at least among the 
sampled respondents, that there is a tendency to trust an origination during information 
exchange (both providing and receiving), when the trustworthiness of that organisation is 
perceived positively. The chances of finding a significant link when taking the clustering into 
account are fairly high. This link will be further inspected based on the interview data, looking 
also at the different dimensions of trustworthiness (ABI) and the different types of information 
that were identified before (mandatory, optional, and prohibited). 
8.3.2 In-depth analysis based on the interview data 
The survey results have shown that in general the willingness to disclose and accept information 
to and from the counterpart is present, and that this is in part determined by the perceived 
trustworthiness of the respondent. To understand better why the trust levels are so high and 
how the connection with the trustworthiness works, a deeper analysis of the interview data is 
performed. The preliminary study revealed that there is a spectrum of different types of 
information shared, depending on the formality and legal requirements of the information (see 
Chapter 4). First, there is the mandatory information exchange, which concerns standard 
information that legally should be disclosed towards each other. It includes identification data 
on the clients, and objective observations of the situation of the client. Second, there is the 
optional information exchange, which is information that can be shared between the 
organisations, but there is no legal obligation to do so. The last category is prohibited 
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information exchange, which is information that falls under the professional confidentiality. 
This is, for example, information on the criminal background of a client or detailed information 
on the course of the voluntary youth care shared without the client’s consent. In exceptional 
cases this information can be shared, namely when a clear and acute dangerous situation can 
only be averted by disclosing confidential information. From the interviews, it became clear that 
the respondents do not always know what information can be shared freely, and with whom, 
due to the grey areas in the legislation. 
In the survey sample, a more trusting attitude was detected towards receiving information than 
towards sending out information. This suggests that there are different levels of trust depending 
on whether you provide or receive information, and that trust is task dependent. Table 25 
presents a differentiation between six forms of information, depending on the position in the 
exchange, and what category of information is being exchanged. These interactions, denoted by 
the content of the information and whose side is viewed, might depend on different factors 
before they will take place. While most interactions will not be easily placed within one of these 
six archetypical categories, but will rather be made up of a mix of these types, it remains 
interesting to try to find patterns to understand these interactions better. 
Table 25 Types of information that can be provided or received for which a different willingness could exist  
 Information provider Information receiver 
Mandatory information Need to share Need to know 
Optional information Nice to share Nice to know 
Prohibited information Shouldn’t share Shouldn’t know 
 
The next sections will describe what the respondents said about each type of information and 
how their willingness to exchange information was influenced by the perceived trustworthiness 
of the counterpart. However, in what follows only the aspect of the willingness to provide 
information will be further discussed, so the situation where the trustor is the one providing the 
information. Although the aspect of accepting information was also touched upon during the 
interviews, little substantive evidence emerged from the interviews about this particular aspect. 
It was easier for the respondents to elaborate on their experiences in providing information than 
was the case for receiving information. Even though no conclusive explanation for this could be 
deducted from the interviews, one possible explanation is, as observed from the quantitative 
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analysis, that there is generally a willingness to accept received information, and little doubt 
exists about the truthfulness of this information. It is likely that trust in these experiences is 
self-evident, and the respondents are not mindful of the opposite situation. Therefore, in the 
remainder of this chapter the focus will lie on the willingness to provide information, from the 
perspective of the trustor. 
8.3.2.1 Mandatory information exchange: Need to share 
The first category of information exchange is mandatory information exchange, or ‘need to 
share’ information for the provider. It is information that is formal and legally prescribed, for 
which standardised procedures and documents exist. Within the judicial youth care chain, there 
is generally a high willingness to share this type of information. The counterpart will need to 
consider the provided information as part of their job description, and the risk for neglect of the 
information will be small. The following quote illustrates how a public prosecutor expects 
everyone to act on provided mandatory information, without the risk of the receiver neglecting 
the information: 
Yes, there is trust, when we receive a referral we will always take it seriously and 
we will always investigate this. Nobody will ever say they will not do anything 
with it, they always will. It’s reasonable to think every other organisation will 
do that too. (AI) 
This willingness appears to be present irrespective of the perception of the trustworthiness of 
the counterpart. Even when a positive perception of the counterpart’s trustworthiness is absent, 
it is expected that this type of information will continue to circulate nonetheless. Each member 
will share the information they are required to share because it is part of their mandatory tasks, 
whether they expect the counterpart to act on it correctly or not. Illustrative of this are the 
following quotes from two SDJ counsellors, one describing an actual situation of low trust, 
which did not hinder mandatory information sharing, and the other anticipating that people 
would still do what is expected of them even if they did not get along personally: 
I can’t say there is more than 50 percent trust between all these actors, and it 
still works. So I don’t think trust is the basis for everything to work well. It could 
help if everyone could trust each other and did what they said they would do. 
We could maybe come to a solution [for the child] faster, but there would not 
be a magical improvement in the functioning. (P) 
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Everyone should expect that you act professionally. Is the cooperation running 
well, that’s a bonus. If it’s not, too bad. They should still expect you to do your 
job, whether you hit it off or not. (Q) 
As such, the willingness to share what needs to be shared will typically be present, regardless of 
a positive trustworthiness perception. This is due to a sense of duty, with everyone taking their 
responsibilities. Not sharing ‘need to share’ information could pose a greater risk for the 
provider than sharing the information, because a family cannot be helped when the information 
does not pass down the chain, and the information holder could be accused of neglect of duties. 
This could lead, however, to a form of forced trust when information is provided while the 
trustor has negative expectations of the outcome, and creates unease for the trustor. When this 
was mentioned by the respondents, it was usually connected to a doubt about the ability of the 
other organisation to do something with the information, generally because they knew the 
counterpart was overloaded with work. When the estimated ability is low, it does not refrain 
one to send mandatory information, but it might be sent in another way, with more reminders 
and additional information to make sure the others take it up, as this juvenile judge describes 
where the mandatory information is the request for a social investigation to the SDJ: 
If I request further investigation I hope this is executed conscientiously and that 
I can count on the information I receive being correct. Sometimes we don’t have 
a recent report at the hearing and that is annoying. Then I need to sound the 
alarm. Or when I requested investigations last year and then at the hearing I 
discover nothing was done in the case. It feels a bit like a damaging of my trust. 
(N) 
Even when the trustworthiness of the direct receiving party is perceived well, the disclosed 
information is still handled with some reservation by the provider. This is because written 
information will get included in the case file, meaning that in the future other parties will get 
access to this information, of which you do not know the trustworthiness. This is an example of 
the consequences that lie beyond the trustor-trustee relationship that are also included in the 
universal trust model by Dietz (2011). This counsellor of the SDJ describes this nicely: 
Your information has to be correct and complete, but you have to be careful 
with the way in which you formulate it. If it would be only for the magistrate, I 
would have no issues with that. But lawyers will read this as well. I don’t know 
those people and you should be careful nothing is drawn out of context or 
interpreted differently than was initially intended. (O) 
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Proposition: Mandatory information will always be shared, regardless of the perceived 
trustworthiness of the counterpart. However, when the ability of the counterpart to act on the 
information is perceived well, the information will be shared in a more comfortable manner. 
8.3.2.2 Optional information exchange: Nice to share 
The second type of information is the optional information, or ‘nice to share’ information. 
Within every interaction between two or more members of different organisations, there is 
generally room for sharing additional information on top of what the legal requirements 
prescribe, especially when there is non-written communication involved. Even though basic 
tasks can be performed based on just the mandatory information, optional information can be 
extremely valuable for the decision-makers to take into account, increasing the success of these 
decisions. Nonetheless, sharing this information carries certain risks for the provider. Firstly, 
there is a larger margin of choice on the account of the information provider to share the 
information. Doing more than is legally required in a professional setting takes away time from 
performing other required tasks. As such, investing time and effort in side tasks poses a risk, 
especially in a setting where time is a scarce resource. The following team leader at the VK 
describes such situation where there is no time for optional information sharing: 
They want continuous feedback throughout the whole process, but I’m sorry we 
don’t have the time for that. We often hear that the cooperation with us is not 
good because we give too little feedback, even though I have the impression we 
try do that quite a lot. (I) 
A second risk comes from the ‘nice to share’ information being less objective and shared in an 
unstandardized format, increasing the possibility that the receiver will misinterpret the 
information. Indeed, as one OCJ counsellor puts it: “It is difficult to write down a suspicion, 
even though these suspicions are usually the most worrying. […] But the other can interpret this 
as a fact, and not a suspicion” (AL).  
As a consequence, ‘nice to share’ information will not spontaneously flow irrespective of the 
perception of the trustworthiness, as was the case with the mandatory information. For these 
informal interactions, trust becomes more important. The following quotes give a description 
of a VK counsellor who can imagine limiting the information provision to only the ‘need to 
share’ information when things would turn bad, and a OCJ counsellor where this is already the 
case: 
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If I would not trust the other I would certainly try to do most things on my own. 
Then automatically you will avoid contact. […] Although in this sector 
avoidance isn’t always possible, the contact would be more careful, more 
formal. (J) 
I have had less positive experiences with the VK and now I am less inclined to 
discuss things with them. I’ll rather discuss it within my team without being 
dependent upon the VK’s actions again. (AD) 
When it comes to sharing optional information, one particular dimension of the counterpart’s 
trustworthiness plays a prominent role, namely the perceived benevolence. As such, an 
increased willingness to share it depends on the receiver’s perceived openness to discussion, 
willingness to listen to the others’ thoughts and take them into account, and readiness to share 
additional information when the situation calls for it. Exemplary of this benevolent nature are 
judges who give the impression that the counsellors “better call once too often than once too 
little” (AF), and the following SDJ counsellor returning the favour of sharing additional 
interesting information to a police assistant: 
It’s also a game of give and take, of information. With certain policemen of a 
district where you go many times and that you see often, you will easily share 
unofficial information. It works in two directions, when you remain tight-lipped 
on your side, you won’t get anything from the other side. It’s not always useful 
information, but the information can confirm a hunch or it’s something you 
can try to turn into hard information. (AV) 
The other two dimensions, ability and integrity, seem less important for deciding whether or 
not to share optional information, although, a few mentions were made that one will sooner 
decide to call someone who works hard and knows how to handle things, and someone who is 
known to handle information in a professional matter. 
Proposition: The willingness to share optional information will be especially dependent on 
whether the counterpart is perceived as benevolent. 
8.3.2.3 Prohibited information exchange: Shouldn’t share 
The third type of information is the prohibited information, or ‘should not share’ information. 
This is especially relevant in this case, where certain restrictions about what can be shared 
between the organisations exist because of the separation between voluntary and judicial youth 
care, and the professional confidentiality. Nonetheless, this prohibited information can still be 
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valuable for different reasons to the different entities in the chain. Sharing this information can 
mean finding a better solution for a child, and finding it faster. It can decrease the workload and 
increase the work successes, which will in turn benefit the child and its environment. These 
benefits results in certain members in the chain sharing information, even when it is unclear 
whether the legal conditions are strictly met. The following counsellor and team leader of the 
SDJ named a few advantages of these exchanges: 
We are working around children, and everything should be done in the interest 
of the child. And you should stay correct, but it’s all about the children, so let’s 
go for it and not be stuck. When all of us stick only to the mandate and to what 
can and cannot be done, we sometimes won’t get there. Much more accidents 
would happen I believe. Luckily, there are these informal ways to consult each 
other for things such as “Am I seeing this right or am I completely wrong about 
this?” (AV) 
The better the cooperation and the better you know each other the easier you 
can walk on that fine line of confidentiality, purely functional, in order not to 
take insane decisions. (R) 
For this type of information, the willingness to share it seems to be based on the positive 
expectations of the other’s integrity. The information provider has to be certain that the 
receiver will not abuse the information and will not put the information in writing so that it can 
be traced down to the original sender, since the transferal of this information without the 
necessary formal requirements can lead to sanctions. This SDJ counsellor describes how indeed 
a trustee’s integrity can affect the willingness of a trustor to send you information: 
It has much to do with who you are as a person. That is a very important factor 
to determine which information you will receive: how careful do you handle the 
information. You have the hard facts which you can use, but then you also have 
soft information. And when you get soft information you should be cautious. 
You should not immediately set many things in motion, but keep it in the back 
of your mind. And I think older colleagues therefore receive more soft 
information. (AV) 
You also need to trust the counterpart not to expose the provider of the information, or to 
impeach them for breaking the rules. One prosecutor stated that even when all conditions are 
met to prosecute, they do not find it a priority to prosecute and will invoke their discretionary 
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power to dismiss the case, so they “should not be afraid of this” (AI). Most counsellors are 
confident that the public prosecutor will not prosecute them when they share information they 
should not actually be sharing:  
Some cases are not really discussed with anonymization of the case, sometimes 
it is borderline acceptable. But the last thing I heard is that there have not been 
any convictions yet. And to be honest, I also balance on that edge a lot, and 
cross the edge a lot. But I have never worried about that, ever. (AH) 
The sender should also be aware whether the receiving end of the information understands the 
value of sharing information balancing on the edge of confidentiality. When a counterpart puts 
more value in keeping strictly to the law, there is no desire from their part to receive this 
information. The trustor must be confident that the counterpart equally values the interest of 
the child higher than the value of keeping with the regulation. Below, two conflicting views of 
how one sees the possibility of sharing confidential information are presented. It is probable 
that with the second respondent a confidential information exchange will be more risky than 
with the first: 
When I look at their views and their confidentiality I respect this. But you also 
have to respect the reality with which we are confronted. And when there is 
mutual respect much more can be done. When there is mutual trust and a 
mutual understanding of the views and context then much more is possible and 
this can only benefit the minor. (M) 
Trust is very important, but it can never circumvent the regulation. It is simply 
the law that we cannot transfer information from the voluntary care to the 
imposed [judicial] care unless the client explicitly agrees on this. And there can 
be trust all you want, but if you don’t have an agreement you shouldn’t pass 
things on. (AK) 
For this reason, a criminologist at the OM is valued a lot by both the counsellors and the 
magistrates, because they have been educated with an added emphasis on the social side of 
justice besides the strict legal application, making them highly competent for the job, with the 
right values steering their behaviour. As such, the criminologist embodies a bridging function 
between the voluntary care and the involuntary care. 
During the interviews, most negative experiences mentioned concerned prohibited information 
exchange, proving that this is indeed the exchange that carries the most risks, and can 
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frequently go wrong. The most heard problem regarded a trustor sharing information in a 
confidential manner, while the counterpart disclosed the information and the source in the case 
documents. This has a large effect on the relationship, as a counsellor of the SDJ describes: 
I had given information to the police, and it was important this was not 
disclosed to the client. They did write it down in their report, from which you 
could know the information came from me. This was of course not ok for these 
clients. And then I learned not to do this again. […] It’s stupid that one incident 
can distort your whole approach but it’s better to conserve your limits. […] I 
might call them again about information that is already on paper, but never 
about confidential information, because you can’t know where it will end up. 
You can say there is a breach of trust, yes. (P) 
Other respondents were of the opinion that confidential information should never be shared. 
Certain members found it a too great risk for the provider, while others found it a slippery slope, 
where sharing information once, could lead to a habit of sharing it:  
You should in any case have a basic distrust because if you trust blindly you will 
come to grief, and you’ll have a situation where you as a counsellor express to 
a person from the police that you don’t know, the situation in good faith and 
the police-official transfers literally to the public prosecutor what you just said. 
(R) 
I find it a trap, that we can share anything in confidence, and we can break the 
professional secrecy since we all know each other, so it’s no big deal. I see a big 
trap there, that it will be used to disclose anything. (K) 
Proposition: The willingness to share prohibited information will especially increase when the 
integrity of the counterpart is perceived well. 
8.4 Feedback on the perceived trustworthiness  
The interviews did not extensively cover the aspect of trust in accepting the received 
information. At least in this context, not much proof is found that the willingness to accept 
information is affected by the perceived trustworthiness of the information provider. What did 
stick out during the analysis at the side of the receiver was that the act of providing information 
forms a new basis for assessing the trustworthiness of the providing party. As such, the result of 
this information sharing process (or risk taking act) brings us back to the start of the universal 
trust model, namely to the inputs on which trustworthiness is based. It was established, for 
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example, that the communication strategy of a trustee organisation is an important 
characteristic determining the trustworthiness of their members. This feedback mechanism is 
also included in the universal trust model (see Figure 28). 
Interestingly enough, the various types of information being provided also signal different 
aspects of the trustworthiness. It was found that, a willingness to provide mandatory, optional, 
and prohibited information is respectively influenced by a positive assessment of the ability, the 
benevolence, and the integrity of the trustee. Now, a similar pattern emerges where being 
willing to share the different kinds of information also offers the counterpart a view on different 
aspects of your trustworthiness. Looking back at the findings from Chapter 6 about what specific 
traits of a trustee are necessary to be perceived as trustworthy, these traits are displayed during 
one of the three kinds of information sharing. The ability of the trustee was judged based on 
whether provided information is correct, complete, and shared in a timely and efficient manner, 
and the trustee possesses good communication skills. This will be mainly evaluated based on 
the ‘need to know’ information provision. When this information does not come through as it 
should, it can leave a bad impression on the ability of the trustee who was responsible. When 
even the basic necessary tasks cannot be executed correctly, it is not exemplary of the abilities 
of (a member of) that organisation. The following criminologist at the OM describes: 
I won’t say they don’t care about it, I assume these people want to perform well, 
but due to time limitations it is not always good. It happens a lot that cases 
appear before court after six months and nothing has been done in the case, 
except one consultation to hear how things are going. Then you don’t know 
anything, you can’t have a clear picture of that family, that’s my opinion. I think 
there should be more follow-up, certainly with the juvenile court. (H) 
Proposition: The way in which mandatory information is provided by the trustee can deliver a 
good source of input to the trustor about the abilities of the trustee. 
It was observed in Chapter 6 that benevolence in this context is determined by showing a 
willingness to cooperate, being flexible, and facilitating, or at least not complicating the other’s 
work. This kind of behaviour will be displayed especially during ‘nice to know’ information 
exchange, where the willingness to share extra information on top of what is strictly required 
can be determined. A counsellor at the VK describes the perception of the police as follows: 
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Most of our contacts with the police are by phone, so we need to estimate the 
different personalities. When you feel someone is willing to take the time and 
to listen, that will make all the difference. When someone is asking for 
information, but is also willing to give some, then there is reciprocity. Those are 
important elements. (J) 
Proposition: The way in which optional information is provided can deliver a good source of 
input to the receiver about the benevolence of the provider. 
The identified qualities required to be perceived well on integrity were found to be discretion, 
not leaking information, and not taking on a habit of gossiping about clients. This kind of 
behaviour can especially be signalled when sharing ‘shouldn’t know’ information. This judge 
describes how counsellors should deal with confidential information: 
With information you need to watch out. Sometimes they receive information 
from within their network, from other care givers. Yes, it is very important that 
they don’t get into a gossiping-mode, like “and they did this and that…”. (BN) 
Proposition: The way in which prohibited information is provided by the trustee can deliver a 
good source of input to the trustor about the integrity of the trustee. 
8.5 Chapter summary and discussion 
In this chapter, an answer was found to the question about the link between perceived 
trustworthiness and trust. Trust was operationalised as the willingness to exchange information 
with the counterpart, which is a specific interaction where an information provider and an 
information receiver are involved, and where the assumption is made that the optimal exchange 
will take place when both the provider and the receiver trust one another. The receiver should 
trust that the sender is trustworthy in collecting and providing the information, while the 
sender should trust that the receiver will correctly interpret and apply the received information. 
First, it was established that there were high levels of trust present within the different 
interorganisational relations in the judicial youth care chain. The willingness to accept 
information was higher than the willingness to provide information, meaning that trust is 
indeed task or domain dependent. Possible explanations for this variation are that the risk is 
perceived larger with disclosing information, than with accepting information, since especially 
the sender invest time and energy in collecting and sharing the information, and is vulnerable 
when sharing. Accepting information is more of a passive act, and the risks only come later, 
when the information is also applied for decision making. Possibly, the survey and interviews 
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were not successful in grasping the full risks that come from accepting information, which 
should be explored in further research. Among the sampled respondents, the willingness to 
disclose information was the highest towards the SDJ, and the lowest towards the police. The 
willingness to accept information from the OM was the highest and from the VK the lowest. 
Some of the lowest trust scores were again seen between organisations that work with a different 
set of values, namely between the judicial and the care organisations. There was a significant 
correlation between the earlier examined levels of perceived trustworthiness and these levels of 
trust. 
Based on the interviews with the respondents, this link was further deepened, and it was 
determined that for the willingness to share the different kinds of information – mandatory, 
optional, and prohibited – different aspects of trustworthiness are important. Providing 
mandatory information carries relatively little risk and therefore the willingness to share it is 
independent of the perceived trustworthiness, but will happen with more peace of mind when 
the receiver’s ability is perceived well. One possible explanation for this is that the sender of the 
information is obliged to share the information, which means there is little to no discretionary 
power on the side of the holder of the information whether to share the information. There is 
clarity on which information should be shared, on what is the purpose of the information and 
on how it should be transferred, so little deliberation is needed when sharing the information. 
Moreover, this is the type of information that will be shared most regularly, so it is the exchange 
that the members are most habituated to. Furthermore, the sender takes no risk of losing time 
from the mandatory tasks they should perform, and they can expect the receiver to act on the 
information as a part of their legally described tasks. The risk actually lies more in not disclosing 
the information, since then the provider would not fulfil their legal obligations. 
Disclosing optional information carries some greater risks, and therefore depends on the 
perceived trustworthiness of the counterpart, and especially on the benevolence of the 
counterpart. The counterpart should be attentive to the efforts of the provider, and should listen 
and be willing to reciprocate with information in the future. As such, if a network wants to 
benefit from optional information flow, it will be important that the expectations of the 
benevolence are realistic, to make the perception meet the expectation, and thus to decrease 
the trustworthiness gap. 
The greatest risks come with sharing sensitive and (borderline) prohibited information. Despite 
the prohibition, when confidential information is shared, this can bring many benefits to the 
efficiency of the task execution in the chain, as Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 144) stated that 
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“negotiations may be easier because of boundary spanners’ willingness to share sensitive 
information and their confidence that information provided by the counterpart is not 
misrepresented. Consequently, we expect mutually beneficial agreements to be reached more 
quickly when boundary spanners trust each other”. It was established that sharing prohibited 
information requires a positive perception of the integrity of the counterpart, to make sure they 
value the information the same as the provider, and that they in turn will be discreet about the 
information. 
The fact that separate information has different requirements further confirms that trust is task-
specific (also referred to as domain specific in the literature) where with every new interaction, 
not only the function of the trustee can influence the willingness to be vulnerable (as provider 
or receiver), but also the type of information involved can determine the outcome of the trust 
process. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995, p. 727) said in this respect that “the trustor’s 
perception and interpretation of the context of the relationship will affect both the need for 
trust and the evaluation of trustworthiness. Changes in such factors as the political climate and 
the perceived volition of the trustee in the situation can cause a re-evaluation of 
trustworthiness”.  
Caution should be granted to the fact that here might be such a thing as too much trust and too 
much information sharing when also confidential information begins spreading. Other, possibly 
higher, goods should be respected such as the privacy of the clients, the right to a fair trial, and 
the safeguarding of the client’s trust in the system. Even though rationality will be less bounded 
with more information available, the question should be asked whether a decision-maker needs 
to know as much information as possible. Will the decision making improve when the decision-
maker needs to take into account information that is difficult to value because it is shared in an 
illegal manner, or it is based on hunches that cannot be demonstrated by concrete proof. Inertia 
in the decision-making process can stem from a lack of information, but also from an 
information overload. Trust and distrust can both have interesting functions within a certain 
organisational setting. It will be key to any organisation not to make the mistake to strive only 
for a maximum amount of trust, since too much trust can have adverse consequences. Too much 
trust can lead to blind trust, which opens the doors for abuse by the other party (Oomsels et al., 
2016). What should be focused on is finding the optimal amount of trust, together with an 
optimal amount of distrust, and a balance between the two, since these will both be influencing 
each other. Kramer (2009) calls this right amount of trust ‘tempered trust’. I would add there is 
also a need for tempered distrust, especially in a public service delivery chain such as the judicial 
chain, since the different entities in the chain should be aware of and control for possible 
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mishaps of the other entities in the chain. The system should have enough checks and balances 
incorporated which could be skipped when there is blind trust. 
A last finding is that apart from trustworthiness being a predictor of trust, the risk-taking acts 
resulting from trust function as input factors for the perception of the trustworthiness. This 
feedback mechanism is also foreseen in the theoretical framework by Dietz. What these findings 
add is that the effect was diversified between the three kinds of information sharing giving input 
and knowledge about respectively the ability, the benevolence, and the integrity of the 
information provider. As was described in Chapter 2, trust has been researched both as a cause 
of communication and information sharing (Cheng, 2011; Mohr & Sohi, 1995; O’Reilly, 1978; 
Sezen & Yilmaz, 2007; Williams, 2005) and a consequence of information sharing (Fisman & 
Khanna, 1999; Sydow, 2000), and indeed should be approached as a reciprocal process. 
The result of this chapter are summarised in a matrix (see Table 26) describing how the different 
kinds of information exchange carry with them different levels of vulnerability, require different 
dimensions of perceived trustworthiness, and signal different dimensions of trustworthiness to 
the receiver of the information. 
Table 26 The three types of information, each requiring and signalling different dimensions of 
trustworthiness 
 Risk/Vulnerability 
(for the provider) 
Requires 
(from the receiver) 
Signals 
(to the receiver) 
Mandatory information Low (Ability) Ability 
Optional information Medium Benevolence Benevolence 
Prohibited information High Integrity Integrity 
 
With this last results chapter, the study comes to a conclusion, and in the next chapter, a 
summarising overview of the study is provided, together with a discussion of the results, and a 
look at what the results can mean for future research and its implications on practice.
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
In this last chapter, the thesis is concluded with a summary of the results, indicating also how 
these results build on to the existing knowledge. A reflection is made about how the study was 
executed and what could be improved. Potential future research on the matter is identified, and 
recommendations for practitioners and policy makers will be given. 
9.1 Main findings and contributions 
The focus of the research revolved around discovering how the trust process was experienced 
by the different actors in the judicial youth care chain in Flanders, when interacting with the 
other organisations in that chain. This is relevant since trust has been identified as an important 
social force for successful cooperation, and the judicial system is a network of organisations 
where cooperation could be difficult due to its compositional features. The organisations 
included in the case are the youth police, the mandated facilities OCJ and VK, the juvenile public 
prosecutor’s office, and the juvenile court. There is a complex and strenuous context in which 
they work together. The involved organisations are highly interdepend of one another to 
perform their tasks, and the risks of a faulty cooperation are high, since children in dangerous 
situations could be undetected or overlooked. If one organisation in the chain neglects its 
duties, or functions below acceptable norms, the mutual goal of child protection is more 
difficult to reach. In the same time, the organisations function autonomous from one another, 
in the sense that there is no hierarchical link between the organisations. They have little grasp 
on how the other functions, and are thus even more dependent on the good will of each actor. 
The six organisations are managed by four different policy domains, and are governed on the 
local, communal, and federal level. Nonetheless, five out of the six organisations are, 
coordinated by the decree on integrated youth care since 2014. Only the youth police are not 
mentioned in this decree. While there is a lot of academic interest in the functioning of 
networks, these studies usually look at temporary networks, or networks that form voluntarily, 
and can dissolve again when cooperation is not successful. Here, however, it concerns a non-
voluntary, high risk, high autonomy, high interdependence network, which is expected to have 
its own particular trust dynamics. While close cooperation and trust between the organisations 
could be beneficial for the effectiveness and efficiency of the chain, it should not hinder other 
important features indispensable in a constitutional state. Such features are the right to an 
independent ruling, the instalment of checks and balances, the protection of the privacy of the 
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clients, and trust of the clients in the justice system and its members, necessary to establish 
cooperation. 
The research questions were set out to discover (1) what are the levels of trustworthiness, (2) 
what specific characteristics make someone perceived as able, benevolent, and having integrity 
in this context, (3) what are the context specific inputs that influence these perceptions, and 
what are the mechanisms for their effect, and (4) how does trust, in the form of being willing to 
exchange information, originate from the different aspects of trustworthiness.  
Despite the challenging context in which the actors operate, it was established, trough 
interpretation of both survey and interview data, that the trustworthiness of the organisations, 
and the members of these organisations, is reasonably high. While there was some individual 
variation between the organisations, with the organisations at the beginning of the chain 
(police, OCJ, and VK) being consistently perceived the least positive on the different dimensions 
of trustworthiness, the overall mean trustworthiness reaches 4,07 on a scale of 1 to 5. Regarding 
different kinds of organisational relations, a pattern has been detected where organisations with 
the same perspectives value each other somewhat higher than the others (security vs. care), 
however, this pattern is far from perfect. It is possible that shared values indeed play a role, but 
it is not necessarily a decisive factor determining how someone will be perceived. Since 
trustworthiness is not going to have the same components in every context, where a surgeon 
for example is expected to have other abilities than a lawyer, it was deemed useful to see what 
constitutes trustworthiness in this context. An able person in this context is someone who 
provides complete and correct information, passes this on in a timely and efficient manner, and 
possesses good communication skills. Also within the chain, ability depends on the main tasks 
one has to perform, where for the information gatherers (police and counsellors) it is more 
important to provide correct and complete information, in a timely and efficiently manner, 
while for the judicial actors who make decisions the communication skills are most valued. A 
member of a partner organisation is seen as benevolent when they show a willingness to 
cooperate, are flexible, and make an effort not to complicate the work of the trustor, or even 
facilitate it. Having integrity is based on a combination of being discreet, honest, professional, 
and responsible, having the right priorities, and making conscientious decisions. In general, 
when a lack of trustworthiness was mentioned, this was not attributed to personal malevolent 
intentions or incompetency, but to the structural, organisational limitations hampering the 
behaviour of the individuals. 
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Based on what emerged from the interviews, a trustworthiness gap-model could be designed, 
which offers a view on how a trustworthiness perception can be shaped by various related 
concepts. First, it is proposed that a positive perception can only occur when the expectations 
of a trustor about how a trustee will behave coincide with the expectations the trustor has about 
how the trustee should behave. The narrower this gap becomes, the higher the chances for a 
positive perception. Both the trustor’s prior expectations and the perception can in turn be 
influenced by three other gaps that might exist (see Figure 32). First, a gap can exist between 
the actual intentions and behaviour of the trustee and the perception of the intentions and 
behaviour of the trustee. A perception will most likely always be somewhat distorted because 
the trustor can never acquire a full overview of the trustee’s intentions and behaviour. All actors 
are bounded in their rationality, where a decision on the trustworthiness is limited by the 
information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time 
they have to make a decision. This will be even more the case when the trustor and the trustee 
reside in separate autonomous organisations, with less chances of observing each other in their 
work environment. A bias can be either positive or negative, where a trustee is either seen as 
more trustworthy than is actually the case, or less trustworthy. Second, a gap can exist between 
the prior expectations of the trustor, and the actual intentions and behaviour of the trustee. 
This is the case when the trustee manifests intentions and behaviours that are not in line with 
how the trustor expects the trustee to perform. This can be due to either the trustee’s behaviour 
being out of line, or due to the expectations of the trustor being unrealistic, or both. The third 
and final gap exists between the expectations of the trustor, and the perception of the 
expectations by the trustee. There again will be some distortion present in this perception, and 
the goal is to reduce this bias and bring both factors closer together. At the end of Chapter 6 a 
checklist was developed to aid a gap analysis for trustor-trustee relationships. 
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Figure 32 The trustworthiness gap model 
Even though this model emerged from an analysis of interviews within the context of the judicial 
youth care chain, I believe it is also applicable in other interorganisational contexts, and even 
within any trustor-trustee relationship, be it between colleagues, friends, family, or intimate 
relationships. Interestingly enough, in other fields studying other human behaviour than trust, 
similar gap models have been developed, such as in marketing and accounting studies. This 
strengthens the external validity of the model. 
Regarding the question of which context specific inputs affect the perception of the 
trustworthiness, the focus went to the broader aspects of the cooperation, and the situational 
and domain specific influences. The findings are based solely on the interview data, and 
emerged through thematic analysis of the open-ended questions on what the respondents 
viewed as important characteristics. Two sets of factors were extracted, the organisational 
inputs and the interorganisational inputs, with each set containing four separate inputs.  
The first organisational input concerned the communication policies of the organisations in the 
chain, where allowing frequent, personal, informal, and open communication can improve the 
perception of the trustworthiness. Communication offers opportunities to learn about the 
other’s expectations, intentions, behaviours, and limitations, which can contribute to closing all 
three gaps at once, by removing biases and adjusting expectations. The second organisational 
input is the personnel management of an organisation, where trustworthy individuals should be 
attracted, supported, and retained by the organisation. This increases the chances that members 
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of the organisation will display trustworthy behaviour, closing gap 2. The third input is the 
internal process control of an organisation. Internal control mechanisms can make sure the 
members refrain from posing untrustworthy behaviour, also closing gap number 2. When these 
internal control processes are also known to the trustors, gap 1 can also close, since the trustor 
can obtain better expectations that a trustee will behave trustworthy because they are 
controlled. The last organisational factor entails the workload the members of the organisation 
are burdened with. A high workload can take away time from the trustee to perform to the best 
of their abilities, and prevent them from being benevolent. This behaviour will depart from the 
desired behaviour by the trustor, widening gap 2. 
The first interorganisational input is the stipulation of a shared goal. The organisations in the 
judicial youth care chain are connected by the shared goal of protecting children in alarming 
situations, which all consider as the biggest priority. This causes members to display 
trustworthy behaviour, because they are motivated to perform well and to cooperate in order 
to reach this goal, closing gap 2. The second interorganisational feature that works as an input 
for trustworthiness is the strict separation of duties between the organisations. This causes the 
organisations to be autonomous, promoting their accountability and responsibility, to be truly 
independent of one another making them invest in good cooperation, and to have clarity on 
what can be expected from one another. This affects all three gaps at once. The third 
interorganisational factor is the continuity of the cooperation. The past they share causes 
behaviour, expectations, and limitations to become apparent to all involved parties, diminishing 
all gaps. The future they expect to share makes them refrain from posing untrustworthy 
behaviour, not to jeopardize the cooperation, and to invest in the continuous improvement of 
the cooperation. This is reinforced by the fact that they know they will all need each other in 
the future, because of the mutual interdependencies. The last interorganisational input is the 
proximity of the organisations, and the members of the organisations. This proximity is 
determined by the physical placement of the buildings or departments within buildings, but 
also by the amount of individuals within an organisation. Proximity, just like the 
communication strategy, allows for more frequent personal contact between the organisations, 
affecting in turn all gaps. While most of these factors have been found as important to trust in 
other research contexts, the addition here is the unveiling of the mechanisms through which 
they affect the perception of trustworthiness, through widening or tightening the gaps in the 
gap-model. 
The last aspect of the trust process that was examined was trust between the organisations, in 
the sense of their willingness to exchange information with the other organisations. Based 
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on the survey data it could be concluded that trust between the organisations was high, not 
surprisingly, given that the trustworthiness was also perceived so positively. Indeed, the 
trustworthiness and trust were found to correlate significantly with one another. The 
willingness to accept information from the counterparty was slightly higher than the willingness 
to disclose information to the counterpart, proving that trust is indeed task dependent. If you 
trust a trustee when they provide you with information, it does not automatically mean you will 
trust them when you need to offer them information. From the interviews, the link between 
trustworthiness and trust was disentangled in more detail. Three types of information were 
distinguished: mandatory, optional, and prohibited. Sharing these kinds of information is 
accompanied by different levels of risks. Mandatory information is shared with little risk, since 
it is shared in standard documents, on a day-to-day basis, and is part of the main tasks. Not 
sharing the information would be a greater risk for the trustor, who then would be guilty of 
neglecting their tasks. According to the respondents, this information will be shared irrespective 
of a positive or negative perception of the trustworthiness of the counterpart. However, when 
the ability is not perceived adequately, the sharing of this information might be associated with 
feelings of unease. Moreover, while the provider of the information is sharing mandatory 
information, the ability of the provider can be judged, depending on the correctness, 
completeness, and timeliness of the information.  
Sharing optional information holds a greater risk, since it takes time that could be contributed 
to mandatory tasks, but it also happens in a less standardised and thus less predictable way. The 
receiver might misinterpret the information or not be open to listen to this additional 
information. The respondents declared that a willingness to share optional information depends 
mainly on the perceived benevolence of that counterpart. A trustee’s open attitude, a willingness 
to listen, and a willingness to reciprocate the optional information sharing will increase the 
chances that optional information will be shared to them. Correspondingly, during the act of 
providing optional information, the benevolence of the provider can be evaluated, by assessing 
the openness, and reciprocity of the way this information is shared. 
Prohibited information is the riskiest to share, because it is shared only infrequently, the reaction 
of the counterpart will be difficult to predict, and the provider becomes vulnerable to possible 
sanctions. The willingness to share prohibited information is related especially to the positive 
assessment of the counterpart’s integrity. The trustee should understand the value that sharing 
this kind of information can have for reaching the shared goal. When the trustee values strictly 
keeping to the law and not crossing any lines, chances are this will is not the right person to 
disclose this information too. Furthermore, the trustor should be certain that the counterpart 
193 
  
would handle the information discreetly, and not expose the trustor to possible sanction by 
telling others about it. The act of sharing prohibited information will make it possible for the 
counterpart to assess the integrity of the provider, since this is a display of the values of the 
provider, and of their care in handling confidential information. This is summarised in Table 
27. 
Table 27 The three types of information, each requiring and signalling different dimensions of 
trustworthiness 
 Risk/Vulnerability 
(for the provider) 
Requires 
(from the receiver) 
Signals 
(to the receiver) 
Mandatory information 
(need to share) 
Low (Ability) Ability 
Optional information 
(nice to share) 
Medium Benevolence Benevolence 
Prohibited information 
(shouldn’t share) 
High Integrity Integrity 
 
This last finding regarding the sharing of prohibited information when the integrity of the 
counterpart is assured exposes a sensitivity within the judicial system concerning trust. While 
trust has many advantages, it has also many known disadvantages (see Oomsels et al. (2016) for 
a broader discussion on this in the administrational and judicial context). It becomes clear that 
trust is not something that should be achieved to the extreme level, and that a slight amount of 
distrust might be beneficial to ensure other important values needed for a well-functioning 
justice system, namely the right to privacy and legal protection, and having sufficient checks 
and balances between the different powerful actors. In addition, trust of the client in the 
members of the care organisations is also important, since clients can only be helped when they 
feel they can share their worries without the fear these will be used against them in a court of 
law one day. 
9.2 Reflections on the study design 
Finding an appropriate research methodology for answering the research questions proved to 
be a challenge of its own. The trust field is still at an early stage of developing fitting data 
collection methods that can be applied in different contexts, let alone in a judicial context. The 
preliminary study was of great help to make some firm decisions about what approach would 
be most successful in this context. Ultimately, a mixed-method approach was applied 
combining qualitative and quantitative research method. The largest part of the data originated 
from in-depth interviews with those sharing information across the borders of their 
organisation, and a smaller part of the data originated from an interorganisational survey, 
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asking the respondents about their opinions on statements regarding their five counterpart 
organisations. Both data sources provided different insights in the steps of the universal trust 
process. 
The interviewing method was especially useful to explore the field, given the rudimentary state 
of knowledge on interorganisational trust in a judicial setting. It was not yet possible to develop 
relevant testable hypothesis about how the trust process would work in a judicial context. The 
main advantages of interviewing were (1) the collection of in-depth information about the topic 
little prior knowledge existed about, (2) the willingness for a respondent to cooperate, because 
of the personal aspect connected to trust, and (3) the possibility for the respondent to nuance 
their answers. However, there were some limitations to the approach as well. First, it was not 
always clear whether the respondent talked about trust in the same way this was defined in the 
theory. In retrospect, certain situations the respondents described could be labelled as 
distrustful situations, in the sense that risk was avoided based on negative expectations. 
However, since most negative expectations were due to organisational constraints rather than 
individual incompetence, the respondents were reluctant to label these experiences as distrust, 
because this felt as labelling a counterpart individual as untrustworthy by nature. Therefore, it 
is possible more experiences of distrust were present, but these were not detected. One solution 
could be to avoid the use of the terms trust and distrust, and talk only about positive 
expectations, and willingness to be vulnerable. The researcher should then be the one labelling 
the experiences according to the predefined definitions. Additionally, the same advice counts 
for the development of survey items. However, this should be approached with care, since not 
disclosing to the respondents that the focus of the study is trust, could impair the informed 
consent.  
Second, while choosing respondent from five out of the 13 judicial divisions was beneficial to 
getting access to the cases, and to compare experiences from different organisational 
perspectives, it does decrease the external validity of the study to the whole of the Flemish 
judicial youth care system. It is not certain that choosing five other embedded cases would have 
resulted in similar conclusions, however, choosing most-different cases as a sampling technique 
does decrease the chance that the five embedded case will be representative of the other cases.  
Third, the data had a richness of information that has not been fully explored, mostly due to the 
large amount of interview data that was collected. While larger amounts of data make it possible 
to detect patterns that are present within all interviews, there is less time left for more in-depth 
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analysis of the different trust experiences between the different types of respondents, such as 
by gender, organisation, district, age, or years of experience.  
The survey methodology, which came about only after trial and error of several other survey 
formats, was definitely a useful addition to the study. Survey data leaves less room for the 
interpretation by the individual researcher, and as such, can triangulate the more subjective 
interpretations of the researcher by measurements achieved from the standardised scale. 
Moreover, the comparison over organisations in the network was only possible by survey data. 
On the other hand, only a limited amount of respondents was included in the sample, and for 
stronger results, the survey should have been administered to a larger sample. Since the survey 
required piloting, which was performed together with the earlier interviews, it could not be 
administered after all 67 interviews. Another limitation is that the survey data is gathered form 
the same source as the interview data, decreasing its triangulation potential. However, sending 
out the survey as mail or online survey might have suffered from low response levels because of 
the sensitive nature of the questions, and the need for trust in the researcher first, making it 
suffer from its own limitations.  
9.3 Recommendations for future research 
The exploratory research yielded new insights into, on the one hand, the specificities concerning 
interorganisational trust in a judicial context, and on the other, on the explanatory mechanisms 
underlying interorganisational trust processes. Much effort was put into explaining the 
complexities of the trust process in an easily comprehendible manner, so that it can be 
successfully applied and understood by a broad public. The new perspectives can aid the 
understanding of why certain trust dynamics exist, and how these work, in a judicial context, 
but possibly in a much broader context as well. However, these newly developed frameworks, 
namely the trustworthiness gap model and the information diversification matrix, should be 
tested in other contexts, to be either validated, or adapted and further developed. 
Within the judicial context specifically, what this study has not been able to do, partly due to 
the little variation that was present in the case, since there was a lack of negative trustworthiness 
perceptions and distrustful attitudes, is to compare the performance of judicial chains where a 
general trusting or distrusting attitude prevails. As such, the current study did not investigate 
whether higher levels of trust do indeed lead to a better functioning network. Since efficiency 
and effectiveness are not the only goods to strive for in a judicial context, other values such as 
independence and privacy of the clients, might be better preserved when less trust is present, 
also contributing to the performance of the system.  
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What also became clear is that it is difficult to separate trust in an organisation from trust in 
the members of that organisations, while most likely trust in an organisation is not merely the 
sum of the attitude towards its members. An interesting path for trust research is to look into 
the differences between interpersonal trust across organisations, and interorganisational trust. 
A last recommendation is that research on information exchange and communication should 
definitely also consider trust as an important influential factor. While advances have been made 
in this field, especially when comparing the knowledge sharing processes of tacit and explicit 
knowledge (Smith, 2001), a differentiation into the forms of explicit knowledge, as was found in 
this dissertation between mandatory, optional, and prohibited shared information, could be 
further applied. 
9.4 Recommendations for policy and practice 
Since the research was focused on one particular case, the judicial youth care chain, the findings 
are especially relevant for them, however, they could also be expanded to the whole of the 
judicial system, and several aspects can be retained for interorganisational management in 
general.  
It was observed there is a lot of trust present within the interorganisational relations, which 
should, according to the theory, lead to a better functioning cooperation between the involved 
organisations. However, it remains difficult to evaluate whether there is possibly too much or 
too little trust present in the case, since trust brings about both positive and negative 
consequences. The willingness to share information between the organisations could very well 
be responsible for making sure in Flanders all children in alarming situations receiver the 
needed care for their situation. At the same time, the high willingness to share information 
could conflict with other important legal principles, such as the privacy of the client or the right 
to an independent ruling by a judge. The balance between desired trust and distrust levels in 
the system will depend partly on the social and political climate, which can change over time. 
However, it should not be seen as impossible to get the best of both worlds, where the 
advantages of high trust are safeguarded, and the possible disadvantages are anticipated on and 
counteracted. This study should aid exactly in finding a way to achieve this. Further, the findings 
can contribute to a discussion on the difficult balance between trust and information sharing 
on the one hand, and other important judicial values such as privacy, independence, and checks 
and balances. When trust is a desired quality of these interorganisational relations, attention 
should be paid to counter possible adverse effects of this trust. Specific measures can also be 
taken to improve the communication strategies of the organisations, to make sure the personnel 
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management can retain trustworthy individuals in the organisations, to lower the workload of 
the members, and to adjust the physical proximity between the organisations to the needs of 
the cooperation. 
Policy-makers and practitioners can apply the developed checklist to detect possible gaps 
present in interorganisational relationships. The study has also contributed to filling in the first 
row of this checklist, where the qualities that a trustworthy person in this context should possess 
have been identified in Chapter 6. In addition, the effects of reforms on trust can be better 
assessed, especially when they influence one of the eight important (inter)organisational factors 
detected throughout the study. 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
Dit proefschrift gaat over interorganisationeel vertrouwen in de Vlaamse gerechtelijke 
jeugdhulpketen. Het proefschrift is het resultaat van een vierjarig onderzoek (2014-2017) 
gevoerd in het kader van het IAP project Justice and Populations (IAP VII/22) gefinancierd door 
Belspo. De doelstelling van het onderzoek was een beter inzicht krijgen in het 
vertrouwensproces dat zich afspeelt bij het delen van informatie tussen de betrokken 
organisaties (jeugdpolitie, OCJ, VK, jeugdparket, jeugdrechtbank, en SDJ). Deze inzichten zijn 
nodig om de gevoeligheden inzake vertrouwen bij gerechtelijke informatie-uitwisseling te 
detecteren, en om te begrijpen hoe vertrouwen tot stand kan komen in deze uitdagende context, 
waar verschillende organisaties behorende tot verschillende beleidsniveaus en beleidsdomeinen 
worden verplicht om samen te werken om een gemeenschappelijk doel te bereiken, namelijk 
het beschermen van kinderen in verontrustende situaties. Er is een grote wederzijdse 
afhankelijkheid, waar de gevolgen voor een gebrekkige samenwerking desastreus kunnen zijn 
voor een bepaalde jongere, en waar elke schakel in de keten optimaal moet functioneren, willen 
de anderen hun taken correct kunnen uitvoeren. Maar tegelijkertijd is er weinig grip op elkaars 
functioneren door de afwezigheid van een hiërarchische relatie. 
Om het vertrouwensproces in kaart te brengen werden vier onderzoeksvragen gespecifieerd: 
1. Wat is de algemene perceptie van de betrouwbaarheid tussen de leden van de 
gerechtelijke jeugdhulpketen? 
2. Welke eigenschappen dragen bij tot een positieve perceptie van de betrouwbaarheid? 
3. Welke context specifieke factoren hebben een invloed op de perceptie van de 
betrouwbaarheid, en op welke wijze beïnvloedden ze deze perceptie? 
4. Wat is de impact van gepercipieerde betrouwbaarheid op de bereidheid om (verplichte, 
optionele, en verboden) informatie te delen tussen de leden van de gerechtelijke 
jeugdhulpketen? 
Deze vier vragen werden beantwoord aan de hand van een mixed-method 
dataverzamelingsproces, waarbij kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden werden 
gecombineerd om een zo volledig mogelijk inzicht te krijgen in het vertrouwensproces. Eerst 
werd een duidelijke afbakening van het onderzoek nagestreefd aan de hand van een verkennend 
vooronderzoek via interviews, waarbij informatiedeling tussen de organisaties naar voor kwam 
als de belangrijkste interactie. Verdere interviews met de nieuwe afbakening als leidraad, en 
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aanvullende informatie uit een vragenlijst, maakten het mogelijk een geïntegreerd antwoord te 
formuleren op bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen. 
Wat betreft de perceptie van betrouwbaarheid die leefde onder de respondenten op het moment 
van onderzoek kan gesteld worden dat deze overwegend positief was. Dit is een belangrijk 
gegeven, omdat het enerzijds aantoont dat het mogelijk is een positieve indruk te verkrijgen in 
een uitdagende context, en anderzijds de achtergrond schetst waarin de overige resultaten tot 
stand zijn gekomen. De eigenschappen die voornamelijk van belang zijn bij een evaluatie van 
de betrouwbaarheid konden worden gecategoriseerd naargelang de drie theoretische aspecten 
van betrouwbaarheid: competentie, welwillendheid, en integriteit. Iemand die competent is in 
deze context is iemand die complete en correcte informatie deelt op een stipte en efficiënte 
manier, en goede communicatieve vaardigheden bezit. Welwillendheid wordt beoordeeld aan 
de hand van de bereidheid tot samenwerking, flexibiliteit, en het niet compliceren tot zelfs het 
verlichten van andermans taken. Iemand wordt als integer beoordeeld als deze discreet, eerlijk, 
professioneel, en verantwoordelijk handelt, de juiste prioriteiten heeft, en doordachte 
beslissingen neemt. Verder kon op basis van de interviews een model worden ontwikkeld 
waaruit blijkt dat het verkrijgen van een positieve perceptie afhangt van vier concepten en de 
afstand tussen deze concepten: de trustor’s verwachting van hoe de trustee zich moet gedragen, 
de trustor’s verwachting van hoe de trustee zich zal gedragen, de eigenlijke gedragingen van de 
trustee, en de trustee’s perceptie van hoe hij zich moet gedragen. Hoe meer deze factoren 
samenvallen, hoe groter de kans op een positieve evaluatie van de betrouwbaarheid. Alle vier 
de factoren kunnen worden bijgesteld om de afstanden te verkleinen. 
De contextuele factoren die deze percepties beïnvloeden kunnen worden opgedeeld in 
organisationele en interorganisationele factoren. De vier organisationele factoren die een rol 
spelen zijn het communicatiebeleid, het personeelsmanagement, interne controleprocessen, en 
de werklast. De vier interorganisationele factoren zijn de bepaling van een gedeeld 
maatschappelijk doel, een duidelijke afbakening van de taakverdeling, de continuïteit van de 
samenwerking, en de nabijheid van de organisaties. In het proefschrift wordt ook telkens 
aangegeven op welke afstand tussen bovenstaande aspecten deze factoren een invloed hebben, 
door ze te vergroten of verkleinen. 
Ten slotte, betreffende de invloed van de betrouwbaarheid op het vertrouwen tussen de 
organisaties, specifiek met betrekking tot het delen van informatie, valt ten eerste op dat dit 
vertrouwen hoog is, in lijn met de eerder beschreven positieve inschatting van elkaars 
betrouwbaarheid. Verder komt naar voor dat de bereidheid tot delen van de drie verschillende 
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types van informatie, de verplichte, optionele, en verboden informatie, gepaard gaat met een 
verschillende gradatie in risico en kwetsbaarheid, en kan gelinkt worden aan de verschillende 
aspecten van betrouwbaarheid. Zo zal een bereidheid tot delen van verplichte informatie in 
principe altijd aanwezig zijn, maar zal met een geruster gemoed gebeuren wanneer de 
competentie van de tegenpartij hoog wordt ingeschat. Verder signaleert het delen van verplichte 
informatie aan de ontvanger hoe competent de zender is, afhankelijk van de correctheid, 
volledigheid, en stiptheid van de informatie. De bereidheid tot het delen van optionele 
informatie wordt als risicovoller beschouwd en zal voornamelijk aanwezig zijn als de 
welwillendheid van de tegenpartij positief wordt ingeschat. Gelijkaardig zal ook het delen van 
dergelijke informatie de tegenpartij informeren over de welwillendheid van de zender. Ten 
slotte zal het delen van verboden informatie, informatie die wettelijk gezien niet zou mogen 
worden gedeeld maar een zaak wel erg vooruit kan helpen, veel risico inhouden en vooral 
aanwezig zijn als de integriteit van de tegenpartij hoog wordt ingeschat. Ook zal het delen van 
deze informatie veel zeggen over de integriteit van de zender van deze informatie. De vraag rijst 
hierbij dan ook wat wenselijk is inzake de hoeveelheid vertrouwen tussen (de leden van) de 
organisaties en de informatiedeling die er tussen plaatsvindt. 
Deze studie heeft verschillende implicaties, zowel voor verder onderzoek als voor het beleid. 
Ten eerste geven de ontwikkelde conceptuele modellen een nieuwe kijk op het 
vertrouwensproces, en kunnen deze binnen andere contexten worden gevalideerd of 
gefalsifieerd. Ook methodologisch is dankzij de ontwikkeling van een interorganisationele 
vragenlijst aangetoond hoe vertrouwen in een interorganisationele context kan worden 
gemeten, rekening houdend met de verschillende relaties binnen het netwerk. 
Ook beleidsmakers en mensen uit de praktijk kunnen gebruik maken van deze resultaten. Via 
de ontwikkelde checklist kan worden nagegaan of er belangrijke afstanden bestaan tussen de 
verschillende aspecten die een positieve perceptie van de betrouwbaarheid verhinderen. Er kan 
beter worden ingeschat hoe hervormingen een invloed kunnen hebben op het vertrouwen 
tussen de organisaties. Verder kan er worden nagedacht in hoeverre vertrouwen een wenselijk 
aspect is binnen de interorganisationele relaties, en indien wenselijk, hoe de nadelige effecten 
van hoog vertrouwen kunnen worden gecounterd op (inter)organisationeel niveau. Concreet 
kan bijvoorbeeld worden nagedacht over het verbeteren van de communicatie strategieën, het 
organiseren van het personeelsbeleid zodanig dat betrouwbare individuen behouden worden in 
de organisatie, het verlagen van de werkdruk, en de fysieke afstand tussen organisaties 
aanpassen aan de noden van de coöperatie.
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Summary in English 
This dissertation focuses on interorganisational trust in the Flemish judicial youth care chain. 
It is the result of a four year research project (2014-2017), part of the IAP project Justice and 
Populations (IAP VII/22), funded by Belspo. The goal of the study was to obtain a better 
understanding of the trust process at play when sharing information between the organisations 
involved in judicial youth care (juvenile police, OCJ, VK, juvenile OM, juvenile court, and SDJ). 
This is a challenging context since different organisations from different policy levels and policy 
domains are forced to cooperate to reach a common goal, namely the protection of children in 
alarming situations. There is mutual interdependency between the organisations, with possible 
disastrous consequences for minors when one organisation malfunctions and cooperation fails. 
At the same time, due to the lack of a hierarchical relation between the organisations, there is 
little control over the functioning of the others. Therefore, insights in trust experiences are 
needed to detect the possible issues surrounding trust in information sharing in a judicial 
context, and to understand how trust can emerge in this challenging context.  
To map out the trust process four research questions were specified: 
1. What is the general perception of the trustworthiness of the members of the judicial 
youth care chain? 
2. What qualities, in the context of the judicial youth care chain, make a member to be 
perceived as trustworthy? 
3. What context specific inputs influence the perception of trustworthiness, and how do 
they increase or decrease trustworthiness? 
4. What is the impact of perceived trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, and integrity) of 
an organisation on the willingness to exchange mandatory, optional, or prohibited 
information with the members of that organisation? 
An answer to these four research questions was sought by applying a mixed-method approach, 
combining qualitative and quantitative research methods, to obtain a deep insight into the trust 
process. First, the focus of the research was established by performing a preliminary exploratory 
investigation by means of semi-structured interviewing. During this exploration information 
sharing was detected as the main interaction taking place between the organisations. Further 
more focussed interviewing, and data gathered with an interorganisational network survey, 
enabled finding a comprehensive answer to the above research questions. 
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It was established that the perceptions of trustworthiness between the members of the different 
organisations at the time of investigation were predominantly positive. This is an important 
finding since on the one hand, it shows that despite the challenging context there is a possibility 
to obtain positive perceptions of one another, and on the other hand, it shows what the context 
was in which the remaining findings originated. The characteristics that are especially looked 
at when assessing the trustworthiness are categorised according to the three main aspects of 
trustworthiness: ability, benevolence, and integrity. The ability is perceived well when trustees 
share correct and complete information, in a timely and efficient manner, and possess good 
communicative skills. A trustee is perceived as benevolent when they show a willingness to 
cooperate, are flexible, and try to facilitate, or at least not complicate, the other’s work. The 
integrity is assessed base on the discretion, honesty, professionalism, and responsibility, on 
having the right priorities in mind, and taking conscientious decisions. Next to this, a gap model 
has been developed based on a deeper analysis of the interviews, which shows that a positive 
perception of trustworthiness depends on the distance between four interrelated concepts. They 
are the trustor’s expectations of how a trustee should behave, the trustor’s expectations about 
how a trustee will behave, the actual behaviour of the trustee, and the expectations of the trustee 
of how he/she should behave. The more these aspects coincide, the higher the chance for a 
positive evaluation of the trustworthiness. The trustworthiness can be better perceived by 
decreasing the gaps between each of these aspects. 
The contextual inputs that influence the trustworthiness perception can be divided into 
organisational and interorganisational input factors. The four organisational factors are the 
communication strategy, the personnel management, the internal control processes, and the 
workload. The interorganisational factors are the stipulation of a shared goal, the separation of 
duties, the continuity of cooperation, and the proximity between the organisations. Throughout 
the dissertation, it is also made clear how these factors influence the perception, by their effects 
on the above-mentioned gaps. 
Finally, regarding the influence of perceived trustworthiness on trust between the 
organisations, specifically concerning information sharing, it is noticed that the levels of trust 
are predominantly high, in line with the largely positive perception of the trustworthiness. 
Through in-depth analysis of the interviews, it is detected that sharing the three types of 
information; mandatory, optional, and prohibited information; is associated with different 
levels of vulnerabilities and risks, and can be linked to the three different aspects of 
trustworthiness. Sharing mandatory information is seen as a low risk interaction, and will 
essentially always take place, irrespective of the perception of trustworthiness. However, when 
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the ability of the counterpart is perceived well, this will be shared more comfortably. Moreover, 
during the act of sharing mandatory information, the ability of the sender of the information 
can be assessed by the receiver, which will serve as new input to the receiver for the next 
interaction between these two parties. The willingness to share optional information is seen as 
medium risk and will mainly depend on the assessment of the counterpart’s benevolence. 
Similarly, the sharing of optional information will be a source for the receiver on which to base 
the assessment of the benevolence of the sender. The sharing of prohibited information, is seen 
as a high risk interaction, and will depend mainly on the perception of the integrity of the 
counterpart. When sharing this type of information, also the integrity of the sender can be 
assessed. 
This study has several implications, for further research as well as for policy. First, the developed 
conceptual models, the gap-model and the information typology model, will need to be tested 
in other contexts, where they can be validated, or falsified and further developed. Second, the 
methodological development of an interorganisational survey contributes to the further 
development of trust research, where there are still many opportunities for improvement. For 
policy-makers and practitioners, the checklist proposed to evaluate the trustworthiness gaps 
can be applied to detect possible gaps present in interorganisational relationships. In addition, 
the effect of reforms on trust can be better assessed, especially when they influence one of the 
eight important (inter)organisational factors detected throughout the study. Further, the 
findings can contribute to a discussion on the difficult balance between trust and information 
sharing on the one hand, and other important judicial values such as privacy, independence, 
and checks and balances. When trust is a desired quality of these interorganisational relations, 
attention should be paid to counter possible adverse effects of trust. Specific measures can also 
be taken to improve the communication strategies of the organisations, to make sure the 
personnel management retains trustworthy individuals in the organisations, to lower the 
workload of the members, and to adjust the physical proximity between the organisations to 
the needs of the cooperation.
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Appendix 
A. Interview characteristics 
N° ID code Organisation Division Size Function Date Length 
1 A Juvenile court 1 Medium Registrar 4/04/2014 0:58:47 
2 B OM 1 Medium Secretary 17/04/2014 1:40:48 
3 C OM 1 Medium Magistrate 17/04/2014 0:48:28 
4 D OM 1 Medium Magistrate 17/04/2014 1:15:49 
5 E OM 1 Medium Crown prosecutor 24/04/2014 1:34:15 
6 F Juvenile court 1 Medium Juvenile Judge 24/04/2014 0:57:02 
7 G Juvenile court 1 Medium Juvenile Judge 13/05/2014 0:59:35 
8 H OM 1 Medium Criminologist 24/05/2014 1:18:18 
9 I VK 2 Medium Coordinator 3/04/2015 0:50:41 
10 J VK 2 Medium Counsellor 3/04/2015 1:31:33 
11 K OCJ 2 Medium Counsellor 11/03/2015 1:31:01 
12 L Juvenile police 2 Medium Inspector 1/04/2015 1:27:26 
13 M OM 2 Medium Magistrate 26/03/2015 1:44:16 
14 N Juvenile court 2 Medium Juvenile Judge 7/04/2015 1:13:42 
15 O SDJ 2 Medium Counsellor 17/03/2015 0:49:16 
16 P SDJ 2 Medium Counsellor 17/03/2015 0:45:53 
17 Q SDJ 2 Medium Counsellor 17/03/2015 0:50:19 
18 R SDJ 2 Medium Team leader 17/03/2015 1:45:30 
19 S OM 1 Medium Criminologist 16/01/2015 1:19:02 
20 T OM 1 Medium Secretary 16/01/2015 0:58:24 
21 U OM 1 Medium Secretary 16/01/2015 0:44:27 
22 V Juvenile police 1 Medium Assistant 28/04/2015 1:26:41 
23 W Juvenile police 1 Medium Inspector 28/04/2015 1:35:08 
24 X VK 1 Medium Counsellor 11/05/2015 1:46:21 
25 Y VK 1 Medium Counsellor 11/05/2015 1:02:12 
26 Z Juvenile court 1 Medium Juvenile Judge 12/05/2015 1:06:02 
27 AA Juvenile court 1 Medium Juvenile Judge 12/05/2015 1:06:02 
28 AB OM 1 Medium Magistrate 12/05/2015 1:28:01 
29 AC OCJ 1 Medium Counsellor 10/08/2015 1:28:01 
30 AD OCJ 1 Medium Counsellor 4/09/2015 1:10:36 
31 AE SDJ 1 Medium Counsellor 8/09/2015 1:34:00 
32 AF SDJ 1 Medium Team leader 8/09/2015 1:23:44 
33 AG Juvenile police 3 Small Inspector 5/02/2016 1:23:03 
34 AH Juvenile police 4 Medium Inspector 8/02/2016 2:40:56 
35 AI OM 5 Large Magistrate 11/02/2016 0:57:44 
36 AJ OM 3 Small Criminologist 15/02/2016 1:22:14 
37 AK OCJ 4 Medium Team leader 17/02/2016 0:58:21 
38 AL OCJ 4 Medium Counsellor 17/02/2016 1:00:45 
39 AM OM 5 Large Criminologist 18/02/2016 0:58:05 
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40 AN SDJ 5 Large Counsellor 18/02/2016 0:43:35 
41 AO VK 5 Large Counsellor 19/02/2016 1:37:19 
42 AP OCJ 3 Small Counsellor 22/02/2016 1:03:56 
43 AQ SDJ 3 Small Counsellor 22/02/2016 1:03:45 
44 AR VK 5 Large Counsellor 26/02/2016 1:10:58 
45 AS OCJ 5 Large Counsellor 29/02/2016 0:48:07 
46 AT OCJ 5 Large Counsellor 29/02/2016 0:39:13 
47 AU SDJ 4 Medium Team leader 2/03/2016 1:17:22 
48 AV SDJ 4 Medium Counsellor 2/03/2016 1:00:03 
49 AW Juvenile police 4 Medium Inspector 2/03/2016 0:34:42 
50 AX OM 5 Large Magistrate 3/03/2016 0:57:47 
51 AY VK 4 Medium Counsellor 7/03/2016 0:52:44 
52 AZ VK 4 Medium Coordinator 7/03/2016 0:42:00 
53 BA Juvenile court 5 Large Juvenile Judge 8/03/2016 1:12:28 
54 BB Juvenile court 6 Small Juvenile Judge 9/03/2016 0:49:33 
55 BC Juvenile court 6 Small Juvenile Judge 9/03/2016 0:49:33 
56 BD OM 5 Large Magistrate 10/03/2016 No record 
57 BE OM 3 Small Magistrate 11/03/2016 No record 
58 BF OM 3 Small Magistrate 11/03/2016 1:47:30 
59 BG OM 4 Medium Magistrate 14/03/2016 0:45:00 
60 BH OM 4 Medium Criminologist 14/03/2016 0:57:57 
61 BI Juvenile court 5 Large Juvenile Judge 15/03/2016 1:33:37 
62 BJ SDJ 3 Small Counsellor 17/03/2016 1:09:12 
63 BK VK 3 Small Counsellor 17/03/2016 1:15:38 
64 BL VK 3 Small Counsellor 17/03/2016 1:27:24 
65 BM Juvenile court 4 Medium Juvenile Judge 18/03/2016 0:42:01 
66 BN Juvenile court 4 Medium Juvenile Judge 18/03/2016 1:12:07 
67 BO Juvenile court 3 Small Juvenile Judge 26/04/2016 Phone 
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B. The final coding scheme 
Coding scheme 
 Trust 
 Task delegation 
 Urgent situation 
 Interpersonal 
 Information sharing 
 Shouldn't share 
 Nice to share 
 Need to share 
 Perceived trustworthiness 
 Integrity 
 Responsible 
 Professionalism 
 Honesty 
 Discretion 
 Correct priority 
 Benevolence 
 No unnecessary burden 
 Flexibility 
 Cooperative attitude 
 Accessibility 
 Ability 
 Timely information 
 Correct information 
 Complete information 
 Communication skills 
 Input 
 Organisational principles 
 Workload 
 Personnel management 
 Type of personalities in this line of 
work 
 Turnover 
 Selection 
 Inauguration 
 Expertise 
 Experience 
 Education 
 Internal process control 
 Team decisions 
 Accountability 
 Take responsibility 
 Communication strategy 
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 Personal contact 
 Knowledge of other organisation 
 Communication 
 Informality 
 Formalisation 
 Familiarity 
 Content 
 Rectifications 
 Feedback 
 Consultation 
 Agreements 
 Interorganisational principles 
 Shared goal 
 Shared values 
 Shared practices 
 High stakes 
 Separation of duties 
 Interdependency 
 Coping strategy 
 Clarity of responsibilities 
 Autonomy 
 Proximity 
 Scale 
 Continuity 
 Reforms 
 Past experiences 
 Positive experiences 
 Negative experiences 
 Frequency and duration contact 
 Information sharing process 
 Shouldn't share 
 Nice to share 
 Need to share 
 Deleted nodes 
 Risk society 
 Rejuvenation 
 Flexibility 
 External control process 
 Digitalisation 
 Deontology 
 Common enemy 
 Boundary spanner 
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C. Mind maps generated during thematic analysis 
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235 
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D. The (translated) format of the survey 
1. With which of the following organisations do you exchange information on cases of 
alarming situations? (as sender or receiver of information) [check off] 
2. The following organisation does the best they can to execute their tasks in alarming 
situations. 
3. The following organisation possesses sufficient capacity and knowledge to execute these 
tasks. 
4. The following organisation is generally willing to help me when needed. 
5. The following organisation does not hinder me in my task execution. 
6. The following organisation has a strong will to bring each case to a successful conclusion. 
7. Sound principles guide the other organisations behaviour. 
8. I easily share case information with the following organisation.  
9. I easily accept case information of the following organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree, nor 
disagree 
Agree Completely 
agree 
Not 
applicable 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
OCJ          
VK          
OM          
Court          
SDJ          
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E. Assumption testing for ANOVA 
The normality assumption can be tested with the Shapiro-Wilk’s test. The distribution should 
not differ significantly from the normal distribution, meaning the Shapiro-Wilk’s statistic 
should not give significant results (probability should be higher than 0,05). 
For trustor organisation 
Tests of Normality 
 
Target 
Organisation 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Trustworthiness Police ,239 12 ,056 ,840 12 ,028 
OCJ ,144 22 ,200 ,948 22 ,285 
VK ,138 28 ,187 ,908 28 ,018 
OM ,129 45 ,058 ,931 45 ,010 
Court ,109 27 ,200 ,928 27 ,063 
SDJ ,165 20 ,155 ,951 20 ,375 
Ability scale Police ,215 12 ,132 ,842 12 ,029 
OCJ ,212 22 ,011 ,895 22 ,023 
VK ,212 28 ,002 ,910 28 ,019 
OM ,189 45 ,000 ,870 45 ,000 
Court ,199 27 ,007 ,876 27 ,004 
SDJ ,193 20 ,049 ,880 20 ,018 
Benevolence 
scale 
Police ,446 12 ,000 ,592 12 ,000 
OCJ ,216 22 ,009 ,926 22 ,103 
VK ,264 27 ,000 ,875 27 ,004 
OM ,186 45 ,000 ,856 45 ,000 
Court ,185 27 ,018 ,826 27 ,000 
SDJ ,236 20 ,005 ,896 20 ,035 
Integrity scale Police ,499 12 ,000 ,465 12 ,000 
OCJ ,201 22 ,022 ,888 22 ,017 
VK ,293 28 ,000 ,849 28 ,001 
OM ,278 45 ,000 ,838 45 ,000 
Court ,213 27 ,003 ,868 27 ,003 
SDJ ,160 20 ,191 ,938 20 ,224 
 
238 
  
For trustee organisation 
Tests of Normality 
 
Trustee 
Organisation 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Trustworthiness Police ,167 29 ,038 ,969 29 ,525 
OCJ ,094 26 ,200 ,957 26 ,331 
VK ,220 23 ,005 ,903 23 ,029 
OM ,160 25 ,099 ,933 25 ,102 
Court ,136 21 ,200 ,929 21 ,129 
SDJ ,117 30 ,200 ,943 30 ,113 
Ability scale Police ,144 29 ,127 ,943 29 ,122 
OCJ ,232 26 ,001 ,861 26 ,002 
VK ,152 23 ,178 ,946 23 ,245 
OM ,252 25 ,000 ,842 25 ,001 
COURT ,192 21 ,041 ,862 21 ,007 
SDJ ,184 30 ,011 ,864 30 ,001 
Benevolence 
scale 
Police ,197 29 ,005 ,896 29 ,008 
OCJ ,182 26 ,026 ,910 26 ,026 
VK ,156 23 ,153 ,958 23 ,433 
OM ,235 25 ,001 ,880 25 ,007 
COURT ,228 20 ,008 ,877 20 ,016 
SDJ ,212 30 ,001 ,878 30 ,003 
Integrity scale Police ,244 29 ,000 ,925 29 ,040 
OCJ ,192 26 ,014 ,935 26 ,103 
VK ,211 23 ,009 ,872 23 ,007 
OM ,191 25 ,019 ,882 25 ,008 
COURT ,200 21 ,028 ,840 21 ,003 
SDJ ,216 30 ,001 ,867 30 ,001 
 
When performing an ANOVA analysis, there needs to be homogeneity of variances. This 
assumption is tested using Levene's test for homogeneity of variances. When the Levene statistic 
is not significant, this means there is no significant heterogeneity of variances, which means the 
assumption is met. 
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For trustor organisation 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Ability scale ,508 5 148 ,770 
Benevolence scale 2,794 5 147 ,019 
Integrity scale 4,460 5 148 ,001 
Trustworthiness scale ,948 5 148 ,452 
 
 
For trustee organisation 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Ability scale ,919 5 148 ,470 
Benevolence scale 6,58 5 147 ,656 
Integrity scale ,605 5 148 ,696 
Trustworthiness scale ,511 5 148 ,768 
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F. Assumption testing for boint-biseral correlation 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test for normality 
For trust in providing information 
Tests of Normality 
 Trust 
Providing 
Binary 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Trustworthiness Less than 
agree 
,144 40 ,037 ,935 40 ,023 
(completely) 
agree 
,104 104 ,007 ,954 104 ,001 
 
For trust in receiving information 
Tests of Normality 
 Trust 
Receiving 
Binary 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Trustworthiness Less than 
agree 
,317 13 ,001 ,795 13 ,006 
(completely) 
agree 
,109 130 ,001 ,955 130 ,000 
 
Levene’s test of equality of variances 
For trust in providing information 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Trustworthiness 1,620 1 142 ,205 
 
For trust in receiving information 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Trustworthiness 18,766 1 141 ,000 
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